POLLUTING SACRED FAITH

A Study on Communalism and Violence

Pramod Kumar

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IT

During the last two decades or so the increasing use of religious symbols and idioms in politics and its reliance on violence as a dominant mode of political and social discourse are sending unmistakable signals. These signals are generating fear—the fear of disintegration of Indian civilization and also the emergence of a prototype of fascism in socicty and politics.

This book is an attempt to understand the shifts in inter-religious and caste dialogue and their relationship with politics, economy and society. A detailed analysis trying to capture the variations in the form of social conflicts taking shape in different parts of the country and their impact on the future of Indian democracy and secularism has been attempted.

Pramod Kumar, a well known scholar has made a serious and systematic attempt to lay bare the reasons, content and forms of Communalism and Communal riots in India.

This study is not only an effort to understand the phenomenon of Communalism and Communal riots, but throws sufficient light to find the way out. This book will have immense value for those who have faith in a secular and democratic society.

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SACRED FAITH

A Study of Communalism and Violence in India

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Dedicated to

S.G. SUNDARAM

PREFACE

This work stems from a decade-long study of the problem of communalism and violence in India. The pertinent question, whether communalism and communal violence are inevitable in a multi-religious society pursuing a specific path of economic development and politics, was posed in the year 1975. Since then I began to question several of my theoretical premises. The enquiry is still incomplete. Even this attempt does not answer the main question, but it has certainly helped to raise a sub-set of related questions. In that sense this venture has proved to be meaningful.

The academic enquiry as well as the fast-changing empirical situation in the country raised another issue: given the pervasiveness of communalism and increasing use of violence as a mode of social and political discourse, is it possible to shape the dialogue on non-communal lines? And in fact the scope of articulating alternate views without escaping the physical assault, has forcefully surfaced.

It is not to suggest that this venture could fully answer these questions theoretically in its own pursuit. The empirical situation did influence the pace of the project as well as colour the contents. However, an attempt has been made to articulate the findings and the concerns in a dispassionate manner. The diverse set of developments in the late eighties even tried to control the intellectual means of production by framing a code of conduct for the journalists, authors and researchers which made this task further difficult. Thereafter, the legitimate question is to be asked: Can civilisations survive and flourish by relying on violence as a mode of discourse ? Is it possible to build the so-called nations, be it khalistan or Hindu Rashtra, by subverting democratic ethos and institutions in the name of freedom ? Punjab has seen the sunset of democratic process and the people have been living in the hazy world of masked authoritarianism and terrorism.

It is not, however, intended to suggest that meaningful academic pursuits and dialogue have become irrelevant. Just the contrary. The answers to meaningful dialogue, however, ineffective and limited space it is occupying, should not be seen in silence or submission. Rather, an answer must be seen in a more genuine academic activity and vibrant debate.

People who think that they are right should become a debate so that the morally right acquire legitimacy. Some people may go wrong and be swayed by wrong and unhealthy appeal, but people's support what legitimacy is all about in a democracy. Therefore, the answer to democracy, however, degenerate, corrupt and ineffective it may be should not be seen in masked authoritarianism or terrorism. Whether an alternative must be seen in a genuine secular democracy.

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Pramod Kumar

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Chapter I

Communalism : Meaning and Concept

Students of social phenomena have offered different explanations for the existence and persistence of communalism in India. The variations in their explanations have roots in their conflicting answers to the questions relating to the meaning, origin and causation of communalism. Further, even the reasons for the need to understand and analyse communalism varied, with the historical conditions and of course, with the theoretical framework of social analysis. For example, before independence the concurrence of the frequent manifestation of communalism and communal rioting and the attempt to understand it, was more striking. This was due to the fact that communalism was seen as a hindrance to anti-colonial national freedom movement.

In fact, communalism was seen as a phenomenon which has been interwoven with the growth of Indian Nationalism. The process of formation of separate collective consciousness ofvarious religious groups got initiated only after 1857. This was a result of the inculcation of the concept of modern nationhood under the influence of western liberal education and frequent interactions of emerging elite with the western world. Given the multi-religious reality and British politics of divide and rule, a major component of this articulation acquired communal overtones. To quote from the Bhagwan Dass Committee report submitted to A I C C:

> Communalism in India develops as a concomitant to Indian Nationalism and is nothing but Nat ionalism driven into religious channels. In Hindus, it has allied itself to a territorial sentiment because of the more ancient connection of Hinduism with India and also because of confinement of Hinduism to this country. In Musalmans, it has got deflected towards Pan-Islamism because of the action of the divisive British policy, the foreign origin of Islam, and the existence of Muslims in other countries where Islam is politically regnant. But in both the communities these developments begin to take place naturally after the upset-

> ting of the old social balances and ideals by British conquests and introduction of the nationalistic ideal in Indian life through the spread of Western ideas and education. [1]

The emergence of communal nationalism was seen as a counterpoise to secular nationalism. [2] So it was concluded that it was the British design to weaken the secular national movement because of which they relied on creating a communal wedge between two religious groups. The empirical evidence for this was found in the impact it had on secular mobilizations of various political and social groups. This in a way weakened secular anti-colonial struggle and strengthened the spectre of Hindu-Muslim confrontation, threatened the Congress claim of a unified, secular nationalism and made cooperation across religious lines exceedingly difficult [3]. The British imperialism supported communal forces using them principally as a threat to Congress nationalism. It is no doubt that the communal forces needed British support for their growth, but it was British imperialism which needed their support for governance.

Similarly Nehru writes regarding the role of the British :

> It is a political question of the upper middle classes which has arisen partly because of the attempts of the British Government to weaken the national movement or to create rifts in it and partly because of the prospect of political power coming into India and the upper classes desiring to share in the spoils of offices [4].

---

1. Report of the Kanpur Riots Enquiry Committee, published as *Roots of Communal Politics* edited by N.G. Barrier, New Delhi, 1976.
2. The substantive critique of this understanding has been by Randhir Singh in his article,'Theorising Communalism' *Economic & Political Weekly* (1988) July, p.1541-48.
3. Ashok Mehta and Achyut Patwardhan (1942) *'The Communal Triangle*, Kitabistan, p.53.
4. Jawaharlal Nehru (1975), *Selected Works*, Vol.7, Orient Longman, pp.175-190.

The compelling immediacy of over-throwing colonialism influenced the theoretical formulations on the subject and in the process restricted its scope. Political activists and theoreticians tried to grasp the essence of communalism in relation to nationalism with the asumption that the better they understood this relationship, the more it would help fight British Colonialism. This kind of approach can be discerened from the writings of Bhagwan Dass, Achyut Patwardhan, Jawaharlal Nehru and others.

This understanding implies a certain contrariety. The British colonialism may have used and perpetuated the existing reality of suspicion, fear and insecurity prevalent amongst various religious, caste or ethnic groups. But to say that it is the colonial mode of production which has caused the emergence of the phenomenon of communalism may not be a valid generalization. Communalism was able to develop in an alarming way even after independence, after the end of British colonialism. In other words, the practice of exploitation of the existing reservoir and mistrust among members of different religious groups continued even after the independence of these colonies.

This only highlights the fact that the theorization on the subject was inadequate or incomplete. The real nature of communalism was not correctly understood. An adequate theory of communalism may have helped the masses to launch a political ideological struggle against it with a correct strategy and tactics. No doubt, theory alone cannot help to resolve conflicts and contradictions, but a scientific theory can help to launch the struggle on correct lines. However, there were authors like W.C. Smith and K.B. Krishna in the pre-Independence phase who tried to understand communalism in a much broader sense. For them communalism was to be seen in relation to its use by British imperialism, landed interests, bourgeoise forces and a mass of people striving for freedom from all dominations. To quote W.C. Smith :

> At present time, there are three aspects of the communal problem in India. One is its creation and use by the reactionaries, British imperialism and the landed interests and so on in India; reactionaries endeavouring to divert energy from the fundamental Indo-British struggle; and endeavouring so to disrupt and to vitiate Indian corporate life as to render it demoralised and helpless. Secondly, there

are the bourgeois forces, divided among themselves and each struggling for power; for freedom from domination from above, for freedom to dominate below. Thirdly, there are the masses of the people amongst whom the mighty thrust towards freedom - freedom from all domination - is being couched in communal or local nationalist terms. [5]

These scholars identified the social forces creating and using communalism. But the character of these forces has changed in the post-Independent phase. However, for the Indian leadership, particularly Nehru, communalism was a kind of an aberration. Nehru thought that communalism will recede with the departure of British imperialism.

I am afraid I cannot get excited over this communal issue, important as it is temporarily. It is after all a side issue, and it can have no real importance in the large scheme of things. Those who think of it as the major issue think in terms of British imperialism continuing permanently in this country. Without that basis of thought, they would not attach so much importance to one of its inevitable off shoots. I have no such fear and so my vision of a future India contains neither imperialism nor communalism.[6]

Even if it is conceded that communalism has its basic in British colonialism it is very difficult to accept that with the departure of British, the structural reality of colonialism will transform on its own.

The theorization on the subject of communalism in the pre-1947 period could not throw adequate light on the persistence and growth of the phenomenon of communalism in the post-1947 phase. The objective of theorization was mainly to study communalism in relation to nationalism and colonialism. A dynamic analysis of the phenomenon with its specific context may have helped to understand it in a more comprehensive and indepth way. But it was

---

5. W.C. Smith(1946) *Modern Islam in India*, Usha pub. p.231, K.B. Krishna (1939)*The Problem of the Minorities*,George Allen and Unwin Edd, London.
6. Jawaharlal Nehru (1975) "Presidential Address at Lucknow Congress, 12 April 1936 - *Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru* Vol.7, Orient Longman Publications, p.190

thought that since communalism was a pre-capitalist notion and was caused by colonialism it would get eroded after independence and with the development of capitalism. The perspective was that with the initiation of the process of development of science, technology, industry and with the steady spread of literacy, communalism and other such retrogressive tendencies would automatically get sub-sumed and would lead ultimately to the emergence of new kinds of social and economic groupings and identities under-cutting the base upon which communal (i.e. caste,religion,tribal, racial) social relations and politics rest. It was believed that "communal par-ticularism" would be submerged by universalistic character of market forces.

Consequently, in the initial years after independence i.e. upto the sixties, social sciences' researches paid scant attention to study communalism. This is evident from the number of books and articles published on communalism during this phase. It is of interest to note that there was a decrease of 20.27 per cent of the publication of articles on communalism in Phase II, i.e. 1948-1966, as compared to Phase I, ie. 1925-1947. It is further revealing to find that in Phase III, i.e. 1967-1988, the percentage increase in the publication of articles on communalism was 400 as compared to Phase II, 1948-1966. Whereas in the publication of books on communalism, the percentage in increase in Phase II as compared to Phase I was 637.50 and 2088.14 in Phase III as com-pared to Phase II. [7]

It is again interesting to find that since the mid-sixties, with the increase in incidents of communal rioting, attempts to understand and analyse, communalism and communal violence became more pronounced and widespread. Most of the studies undertaken, how-ever, neglected the notion of totality and attempted to understand communalism only through its manifestation, i.e. communal rioting.

Communal rioting was seen as a result of increasing intoler-ance of other religious group beliefs and discrimination on the basis of religious group identities.This was seen as a counterpoise to secu-larism. In other words, communalism was seen as a negation of secularism i.e.acceptance and tolerance of separate religious identi-

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7. Meena Khurana & others (1989), *Bibliography on Communalism*, unpublished, CRRID, Chandigarh.

ties.[8] Hence the need to study this. This approach underplayed the complexity of both, the phenomenon of communalism and the wide spectrum of its operative reality. 'By identifying communalism at a single point locus it loses sight of a whole spectrum in which communalism manifests itself; and, in locating it at a point of tension, its silent manifestation goes unnoticed[9]. This identification of communalism at a single point locus i.e. communal riots and to understand causation and content through its own manifestations and consequences provides partial understanding.

Similarly, the threat posed to class politics by the institutionalisation of communalism was one of the main factors which attracted the attention of social scientist and activists.

> Upto 1960s the so-called "Congress Socialism" was the common ideology which sought to bind the majority of the masses to the ruling class. But once the initial eeconomic boom was over, and the conditions of the masses started worsening and the faith in the government started declining, this ideology lost all its meaning. Since 1960s there is no such common ideology though an attempt was made through slogans like Garibi Hato etc. This lack of ideology has led to a hiatus between the ruling class and the masses threatening the ruling classes with a complete loss of legitimacy. Communalism is one such ideology which can be a nationwide ideology binding majority of the people, diverting their attention from the real issues and securing the interests of the ruling classes. This is the

---

8. Rasheeduddin Khan (1989) 'Communalism and Secularism in Indian Polity: Dimensions and Challenges' in *Challenges To the Polity*, edited by R.C. Dutt, Lancer page 4,"That is why the Sovereign Democratic Republic of India with all its other shortcomings, not withstanding the lapses of its successive governments and major national parties still remains the most stable polity in the wide range of newly independent developing countries of the world and is respected for its commitment to secularism and secular democratic politics, which stands out as unique in the backdrop of Third World politics that is vitiated by religious fundamentalism, inter-ethnic violence, oppressive coup d'etat regimes, traditional autocracies and a wide range of undemocratic forms of government.
9. Harbans Mukhia (1990) 'Communalism and Indian Polity' in *Secularism And Indian Polity* edited by Bidyut Chakrabarty, Segment Book Distributors, New Delhi, p.83

reason why even the ruling party is coming out more and more openly with its communal bias. [10]

Therefore, it was mentioned that a systematic and scientific study of communalism is imperative, not only because of its potential to disintegrate the country on communal lines, but mainly because it is a distorted, mystified and unscientific view of social reality. In other words, it tries to mystify the real placement of individuals. Not only this, the continuous propagation and subsequent inculcation of elements of communalism among workers tend to divide them and hamper their struggle for better life. Above all, communalism restricts the formation of a rational and progressive perception of social, economic and political process and hinders the struggle for equality and building up of a just socieity. Hence the need to study.

The other trend was to study communalism in relation to community and nationalism. This trend was the product of a particular historical context. It was influenced by the theorization of the pre-1947 phase. The central argument of this trend was that communalism was a weak force when the struggle for national freedom movement attained its peak. Therefore, communalism in Independent India is outcome of the failure to inculcate national consciousness. This overemphasisis on nationalism as an ideological antidote to communalism and making India a monolithic entity by evolving a canopy culture and, thereby, denying its various constituents their democratic rights, will be at the expense of democracy.

Communalism needs to be studied as a phenomenon which has been shaped by socio-cultural, political and economic processes rather than merely because of its dangerous consequences. `(Communalism) was (and still is), is process, taking different forms in different geographical, cultural and chronological spaces; and at all times, a political-cum-linguistic project, an endeavour'. (Dilip Simeon).Most of the studies have been undertaken in response to the recurrent riots, blurring of real social placement of individuals, danger to the integration of the country etc. These efforts no doubt

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10. A.R. Desai (1985) *Caste and Communal Violence in Independent India* CGSMT p.42

have proved to be useful but they provided only partial understanding of the phenomenon.

The present venture is an attempt to understand communalism as a process and phenomenon. It has tried to discuss the following questions in detail :

a) What is the meaning of communalism ?
b) Where does it stem from and why ?
c) Why does it persist ?
d) What are its various manifestations & consequences ?

Defining Communalism

The attempt here is to provide a restricted definition of communalism. Errors of perception and conception have inevitably led to wrong understanding of communalism. Social science literature in the global context attributes a positive meaning to communalism. But in India this has been used to denote a negative phenomenon which has disastrous consequences. In order to avoid confusion and semantic diversion and to comprehend the phenomenon with greater clarity, either a new term may be coined or the existing term viz. communalism, be scientifically defined in a specific historical, political context. Ideas which are not an expression and product of social reality, but of a process of "pure thought" and imitation cannot help in understanding and comprehending social phenomenon and reality.

The following meanings of communalism have been discussed and refuted :

(a) Communalism as community assertion;
(b) communalism is a discrimination on the basis of religion; and
(c) communalism is the use of religion.

Comunalism As Community Assertions

Communalism has been understood in various ways. Some authors understand communalism as the political assertive-

ness of a community in order to maintain its identity in a plural society which is undergoing modernization. [11]

The following three features of political assertiveness of these 'communities' are identified by these authors :

(1) Homogenizing and universalising forces haveled 'communities' to define, maintain and continuously revise their distinct identities;
(2) Concentration of one "community" in one area and its intermingling with members of another "community" living in the same area may aggravate political assertiveness to an extreme form, like secession; and
(3) Differences in wealth, status and power of members of different "communities" leads to political assertiveness of "communities".

This definition of communalism, alongwith its aforementioned features, was unimaginatively applied to Indian conditions.

According to Ratna Naidu, "Communal situation is characterized by tensions between culturally distinct but geographically intermingled communities"[12]. Social scientists subscribing to this view went on to define religious, caste or other ascriptive groups as communities.[13]

It is relevant to point out here that defining communalism in relation to community is the result of an understanding which has developed in social science literature in the global context. In this

---

11. Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe (1970) "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism : A Theoretical Perspective" *The American Political Science Review* Vol.64.
Milton Gordon (1964) *Assimilation in American Life, OUP* New York, James S. Coleman (1960) *Nigeria : Background to Nationalism* University of California Press, Berkely & Los Angeles. Joseph Rothschild (1981), *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* Columbia, University Press, New York.
12. Ratna Naidu (1980),*Communal Edge to Plural Societies* New Delhi, p.87.
13. Prof. Balraj Puri opines that Communalism implies an identity based on religious community whereas secularism denies it. Balraj Puri (1976) "Communalism: Its Meaning and Practices" paper presented at CRRID at the workshop organized on *Approaches and Methods to Study Communalism.*

the term communal has been defined in relation to the community, which means a common identity accompanied by common culture, history and interest and further these characteristic features of the community have been seen to have their basis in religion.[14] For instance, according to Durkheim,

> A religion is a unified system of belief and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, the things set apart and forbidden - beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. The individuals which compose it feel themselves united to each other by the simple fact that they have a common faith. A society - whose members are united by the fact that they think in the same way in regard to the sacred world and its relations with the profane world and by the fact that they translate these common ideas into common practices, is what is called a church [15].

In this understanding "communal" has been defined viz-a-viz one's own group. Whereas, the meaning which the term communalism has acquired in the Indian context is in relation to other groups.

The term communalism has both negative as well as positive characteristics. For example,communalism reinforces the commonality of interest of religious, caste or other ascriptive group and at the same time, highlights divergent and even antagonistic aspects viz-a-viz other religious, caste or ascriptive groups. In other words, it reinforces the intra-group unity or commonality but also highlights the inter-group differentiations and antagonisms.

The new meaning which the term communalism has acquired particularly in the Indian context and its well accepted meaning in social science literature have been contradictory. This

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14. Kenneth W. Jones defined communalism "a consciously shared religious heritage which becomes the dominant form of identity for a given segment of Society".
    Kenneth W. Jones (1968) "Communalism in the Punjab"'*Journal of Asian Studies*, 28, p.39.
15. Emile Durkheim (1915) *Elementary Forms of ReligiousLife*, The Freeman Press, paperback, pp. 59-63.

has resulted in an erroneous understanding of the social phenomenon. Some of the scholars used the well-accepted definition of communalism to understand a social phenomenon of a divergent sort. Consequently,the phenomenon of communalism was mixed up with the growth of national identity. Political mobilizations by religious fundamentalists, casteists and other similar parochialists were taken to be assertions of national or sub-national identities.

If this logic is extended to contemporary Punjab, it would mean that the Sikhs are a 'community' and hence, have an inalienable right to self-determination. But the perception of Khalistan among some members of the Sikh religious group or *Hindu Rashtra* among some members of the Hindu religious group does not make them different 'communities'. By definition religion may be only one element of 'community'.

Hence the Panjabis may be considered a community, because they share a common historical heritage, culture and language. So a Panjabi Hindu is no different from a Panjabi Sikh except in some aspects relating to religion. Similarly, the treatment of Hindu and Muslim religious groups as distinct communities is equally incorrect. Because a Bengali Muslim has not much in common with a Muslim living in the North except his religion and a Bengali Muslim shares a common historical heritage, culture and language with a Bengali Hindu.[16]

Imtiaz Ahmed observed that Muslims do not constitute an all India community because they are more intra-community diversities than the common features. Peter Meyer's data suggest that ordinary Muslims are active participants in a regional culture whose perspective they share. The Indian Muslims have been found to be more diverse, more complex and better integrated with those of Indians of other religious beliefs than the statement found within the corpus of received opinion on the subject suggest.[17] However, there is a tendency among minority communities to acquire greater potential to create a pan-Indian consciousness and all India community. This is happening mainly due to communal violence,

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16. Imtiaz Ahmed (1971) - "Muslim Politics", *Islam and Modern Age* November. Suneet Chopra (1976) "Problem of Muslim Minority in India", *Social Scientist.*
17. Peter B Meyer (1981) -"Ideology Intellectuals Proletarians in the Study of Contemporary Islam" *Journal of Asian Studies*, May, p.497.

cultural discrimination, physiological make-up, common religion and ruthless political initiatives.[18]

But the question remains, how far these factors which are contributing to the self-consciousness of belonging to a (religious) community can withstand the historical process of formation of community, which transcends boundary of religion.

Communalism discrimination on a religious basis

Communalism is also defined as the discrimination or protection of interest on a religious basis and is the outcome of conflicting religious practices. This understanding has the following implications :-

> It implies that religious groups are homogeneous in nature and their members have common social, economic and political interests which bind them together.[19] This assumes that there exist separate socio-cultural, economic and political interests of Hindus, Sikhs, Muslims and these are dissimilar and divergent.

To accept this implication is to analyse the question of communalism within the communal framework. In fact, it is this assumption which is the basis of communal propaganda. It is very difficult to accept such an assumption when members of a religious group pursue different occupations and have dissimilar socio-economic background and cultural heritage. These elements of com-

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18. Irfan Habib, Iqtidar Alam Khan and Gopal Singh (1976) "Problmes of Muslim Minority in India", *Social Scientist*, June;
Javed Alam (1983) "Dialectics of Capitalist Transformation and National Crystalization", *Economic and Political Weekly*, January
19. There are many authors who assumed that interest and structural communities based on religion do exist. Prabha Dixit argues that communalism is the phenomenon which make use of religio-cultural differences to achieve political ends. Prabha Dixit (1974),
Communalism : A Struggle for Power, New Delhi, Rajni Kothari cannot be clubbed with the above mentioned authors. However, on this question though not explicity, the logic of his arguments can be interpreted to mean that he is using the term 'minorities' for 'communities'. See Rajni Kothari (1984) "Communalism in India : The New Face of Democracy", *Lokayan*, June.

munal propaganda distort real isues and misrepresent real interests. To quote Bipan Chandra :

> The very tools of analyses have been contaminated by it (communalism) as a result of the idological conditioning of the last 100 years, when the middle classes and the intelligentsia were perceptually surrounded by a communcal outlook in politics, in the press, in literature and particularly otten been viewed in the social sciences, as a inreal life, through conscious or unconscious communal assumptions. For example, if one's analysis starts by accepting the communal leaders as leaders and representatives of their `communities' - and if one refers to the Hindu, Muslim or Sikh communalists as Hindu leaders, Muslim leaders, or Sikh leaders - or if one accepts communal political activity of their `communities' one is already accepting the basic communal framework of thought and analysis. On the other hand, if no communal, economic, political and social interests exist, the communalists cannot be representing such interests and are not, therefore, representative of their `communities' [20]

The use of communal categories to understand and unfold social reality leads to mistaking the symptoms for causes. Remedies are then prescribed to eradicate the symptoms. To understand and counter communalism it is no doubt necessary to recognize the religious factor as an important component, but it will be hazardous to accept the notion of Hindu interest, Muslim interest or Sikh interest and so on. Once this notion is rejected, there shall be no question about secular needs, aspirations and expectations of different religious groups being divergent and dissimilar.

The second implication is that communalism seeks the protection of the interests of one religious group at the cost of another. To accept this is to again reinforce the communal propaganda. Communalism does not an cannot protect the interests of one religious group at the cost of another. Communalism does not benefit the 'community' in whose name it seeks concessions or safe-guard their religion. It is only a few individuals who benefit from this and such examples become a tool in the hands of commu-

20. Bipan Chandra (1984) Communalism in Modern India Vikas pp.101

nalism to mobilize support.

It arouses expectations for the fulfilment of the secular needs and reinforces the belief that a particular religious group is being discriminated against. The present system is not geared to benefit one or the other 'religious community'. Hence demands raised along communal lines cannot benefit 'communities' as a whole, but may only benefit individuals within them.

The third implication is the historical inevitability of the phenomenon of communalism in a society having plurality of religions and castes. The assumption that the very existence of religions would make communalism inevitable is false.

Present day communalism, which is a modern phenomenon and has its basis in conflicts which are coloured by contradictions, uses religion to fulfil other secular interests and will persist even if religious group identities are abolished. Only its form may change and some other retrogressive categories may replace religion.

To subscribe to the above mentioned definition alongwith its implications is to accept the premises of communalism. Any analysis of or solution to the problem made on these premises is bound to be communal.

Communalism is the use of Religion

Some of the authors also believe that communalism is the use of symbols and institutions associated with religious, caste or other ascriptive groups in politics[21]. Use of symbols and institutions associated with religion, caste or other ascriptive categories of social organization in politics, is only a manifestation of communalism. This manifestation of communalism gets transformed into sufficient conditions for its perpetuation. On the other hand, it should be recognized that every use of symbols and institutions associated with religion, caste or other ascriptive groups is not

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21. According to Rasheedudin Khan, adherence to religion and religious system is not communalism. Exploitation of religion is communalism. R.C. Dutt (1989) op cit,p.6
Asghar Ali Engineer is of the view that religion is only an instrumental cause. Asghar Ali Engineer (1990) *Communal Nationalism, A Farce*, a paper presented in a Workshop on *Approaches and Methods to study communalim* organized by CRRID, Chandigarh.

communal. For example, the use of the notion of 'Rama Rajya' by Gandhiji was essentially a tactic to mobilize masses against colonial domination. Similarly, the movement launched by the Wahabis against landlords and the British colonialists in North India and Bengal proclaimed a Holy War against the infidel and appealed not only to the oppressed to unite against their exploiters but to the Muslims to unite for the defence of their religion.

The "Wahabi" movement, therefore, did not set lower class Muslims against lower class Hindus in an open conflict, nor did it divert lower-class Muslims from economic issues to a false solidarity with their communal "friends" but class enemies. Nonethless it did encourage communal attitudes, especially in religious thinking, and left a considerable section of the Muslim masses more susceptible to later communalist propaganda than they might otherwise have been [22].

None of these political activities, however, were anti-Hindu or anti-Muslim or against any other ascriptive group. The movement made use of religious ideology, as class struggle,as the pre-industrialist societies have often done and though religious, these were not communal.

In view of the above definitional inadequacies the need is to develop a systematic definitional paradigm to explain the underlying causal interactions among phenomena of widely divergent types.

A starting point may be to define communalism as antagonistic assertiveness in political, social and economic spheres by one aggregation of individuals against another after being organised along religious, caste or other ascriptive lines[23]. In other words, communalism is to believe or to propagate that the socio-economic and political interests of all members of one religious, caste or an ascriptive group are similar and are dissimilar, divergent and antagonistic to those of another.[24]

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22. W.C. Smith (1946) op cit. p.193
23. It is possible that linguistic, ethnic, caste and religious group identities co-exist. The assertion of the primary category of group identity varies with the changing times. For example, in Punjab in the 1950s the primary category of group identity was language but after its division in the mid-sixties, it acquired religious overtones in addition to the language determinent.

The following are some of the distinctive features of the definition of communalism.

(a) Integration and Differentiation

The inherent notion in communalism is the inter-group differences and intra-group commonality of secular interests having their basis in religious, caste or other ascriptive group aggregations. In other wrods, communalism underplays the nomogenous and common aspects shared by members of different religious, caste, or ascriptive groups and highlights their differences. For instance, communalism use religion as an instrument to cement communal monoliths. Communal propaganda projects the commonality of social, political and economic interests of all members of a particular religious, caste or other ascriptive group. It creates an illusion of the universal content of the secular interest of unequal individual members of a religious, caste or ascriptive group.

(b) Hindu, Sikh and Muslim Communalism : A Misnomer

Communalism can not be branded on the basis of its projected claims. What it projects no doubt is real, but distorted. For instance, if it is using Hindu religion, it would be wrong to label it as Hindu communalism. Because communalism cannot protect the secular interests of the religious groups it is trying to use. Since communalism uses religions, and is not caused by them it would be wrong to categorize it on the basis of religion. Such an attempt weakens the struggle against communalism. This is so because it may further sharpen communal polarization. The inference that communalism having its basis in Hindu religion should be branded as 'Hindu communalism'

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24. There is a broad agreement with the definition given by W C Smith, but with one important difference. Smith emphasizes the distinction and even antagonism as central to the definition and rightly so, but concealing of intra group differences and inter group similarities to reinforce communal monoliths does not find adequate reference. According to Smith, communalism in India may be defined as that ideology which has emphasized as the social, political and economic unit of the group of adherents of each religion and emphasised the distinction, even the antagonism between such groups; the words "adherents" and religion taken in the most nominal sense W C Smith (1946) op.cit.,p.187

and all others, including communalism of other varieties should oppose it, is wrong. There are others who conclude that the Hindus should oppose 'Hindu Communalism' and the Muslims should counter 'Muslim Communalism'. Such formulations are based on communal premises and therefore not only weaken the struggle against communalism but also reinforces communal polarizations.

Further to categorize communalism as minority or majority is also misleading. This categorization accepts the existence of separate secular majority and minority interests which is a mirage. It also viewed that one category of communalism is more dangerous than the other.For instance, it has been pointed out that 'majority communalism' is more dangerous as compared to 'minority communalism'. In this context it should not be forgotten that communalism having its basis in one religion, feeds and fattens the communalism having its basis in other religions. Therefore, it will be counter productive to brand communalism having its basis in majority religion as 'majority communalism' and evolve strategies to oppose the so called 'majority communalilsm'.

(c) Communalism is a Distortion

Communalism reflects objective reality in a distorted way. For example, there is widespread unemployment. Communalism does not question the social system which fails to generate adequate opportunities for employment. Instead, communalism, particularly of the incremental-conformist type, seeks a reallocation of the available scarce job opportunities along religious, caste or other ascriptive group lines. As is evident from this example, communalism reflects objective reality in a distorted way in so far as it does not explain the cause nor suggest a structural solution to unemployment.

Communalism is a distorted reflection of reality insofar as it seeks employment opportunities along religious, caste or other ascriptive group lines, but not for all unemployed persons. It may be appropriate to mention here that communalism, like fascism and racialism, also blurs the real issues and conflicts of a society. For instance, fascism articulated the supposedly democratic demands of the people but, it did so to protect the interests of the monopoly fraction of the bourgeoisie. This concealment of the real interests of the monopoly fractions under the cover of supposedly democratic demands was accomplished by projecting Jews as the exploiters of

the people. Hence, it was propagated that everyone who opposed Jews was a natural ally of national socialism[25].

Communal propaganda also smudges objective reality. It does not represent the hidden structure of concrete reality. The real conflicts are likely to get mystified and thus result in the identification of displaced targets. For example, in Ahmedabad, the main trade union in textile mills is the Majoor Mahajan. This trade union has on its rolls more than 80 per cent of the total labour force employed in textile mills. It was interesting to observe that workers from among the Muslims were conspicuous by their absence from the Majoor Mahajan. They had formed their own union called the Sarni Kamgar Sabha. The Bombay Trade Union Act,also applicable to Gujarat State then, stipulates that only the 'majority' trade union can negotiate with the the management. This renders the Sarni Kamgar Sabha ineffective.

Further a large section of workers from among the Muslims could not find employment or were underemployed after they were retrenched in the late sixties due to a crisis in the textile industry. Yet, the workers who happen to be Muslims continue to side with Sarni Kamgar Sabha and those who happen to be Hindus were with Majoor Mahajan. The pervasiveness of communal ideology thereby not only drives an unnatural wedge between workers but fosters communal animosity and hatred among them. Communalism has been used as an instrument for achieving the ends set forth by sectional groups to serve their narrow interests. The prevalence of communal ideology and the non-absorption and displacement of existing skills make competition for jobs more severely communal.

In this context, it is necessary to point out that there is no mechanical relationship between an individual's objective being and social existence. Not all human thought, consciousness and ideology might be the valid reflection and cognition of concrete reality. There are ideas which mystify the real conflicts and blur the vision regarding the real social placement of individuals affected by them. This means that individuals are not aware of their own objective reality. For instance, to take the existence of Hindu, Muslim or Sikh interests to be an objective fact is to become a victim of empirical reality.

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25. See for details, Daniel Gurien (1974) Fascism and Big Business, N.Y. Pathfinder Press

Religious differences are real. But portraying these differences to be the basis of political, economic or social organization and taking them to be the main inner contradiction in secular spheres, is an aspect of distorted ideology. The objective reality is filtered through values and beliefs adhered to by the social actors, which would constitute social reality for them. This might not be in consonance with objective reality. There are mediations which blur the real social existence of an individual from himself or herself. [26] Therefore it is necessary to comprehend the process of blurring issues and interests.

This is imperative because every phenomenon involves a historical process having various pre-stages in its formation. This point can be illustrated from findings of a field study conducted in Maunath Bhanjan - a centre of handloom production and trade in Azamgarh district of Uttar Pradesh. The emergence of retailers of yarn during the early seventies is perceived by wholesalers, most of whom happen to be Hindus, as the emergence of "Muslims in yarn trade". Even the reasons for the emergence and growing prosperity of the new retailers are explained as follows : "Muslims traders sell their product to Muslim weavers on credit. We cannot do so and, hence, are put at a disadvantage. We can do with less profit. But we cannot write-off our dues from these Muslims, who instigate riots to absolve themselves of credit liabilities".

Such beliefs arise from actual or pretended ignorance of market conditions prevalent in the household industry which, in turn, is operating within a capitalist economy. The emergence of retailers in the trade of yarn could possible be attributed to :

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26. See for details on the issueof ideology, Jorge Larrain (1982), *Marxism and ideology* (p.103):" Even Althusser understands this by admitting that althought ideology does not correspond to reality it does make illusion toreality". Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p.153. A false or distorted ideology is not a mere epistemological or intellectual problem. Neither is false ideology a delusion or a phantasy without any basis in reality. Then the has effects question that arises is whether the social being of an individual is not the reflection of his objective being ? If communalism is an ideology,how can it be false ? The argument behind this question is that something which has widespread effects, like ideology cannot be false. This argument equates falsity with non-existence or non-reality. There is no reason why one should oppose falsity to existence. The false statement is quite real, it exists and yet it entails a distortion.

(a) surplus acumulation among a section of weavers during the different boom in the local market, viz. 1966-69, 1980-83 etc.

(b) the gradual emergence of small brokers as merchant manufacturers and yarn traders.

Trade in cloth particularly has a greater credit component, some of which is advanced by organized credit institutions but much more by wholesaler middlemen and retailers. The amount of credit varies with the market demand of commodities, i.e. the higher the demand the more the likelihood of faster circulation of money leading to cash payments. Such market conditions are projected as benefitting only one section of traders who happen to be Muslims. Competition per se is related to the direction and nature of capitalist development. But its perception as competition between traders happening to belong to two different religious groups is caused by the operation of communal ideology and, in turn, it reinforces this ideology.

(d) Communalism is a modern phenomenon

Another distinct feature of communalism is that it is a modern phenomenon. No doubt, communalism has incorporated some of the traditional ideological elements, but the content of present-day communalism derives its life force from the new system of production and ideology. For instance, in Punjab the nature of industrialization and agricultural development has given birth to a rural and urban bourgeoisie at the regional level. Relative stagnation in agriculture and lop sided industrial development provide meagre scope for the expansion of investment opportunity in industry and trade. The persistence of communal ideology has provided a tool to sectional interests to exploit and mobilize the emerging regional bourgeoisie along communal lines for maintaining and enhancing their economic and political power. This, however, does not imply that modern communalism is a product of pre-capitalist notions or has been caused by past structures or institutions. Instead, it is a modern phenomenon flowing from modern structures. The history of many countries bears testimony to the fact that the dead past - with all its memories, myth and legends - comes to life only in solution to

problems and compulsions of the living present.[27]

To sum up, communalism has elements of ideology. It is not a total ideology and it is not an ideology of any particular class, not even of the middle class. Communalism is a distorted ideology as it reflects objective reality not inadequately but in a distorted way.

Elements of Communal ideology

The element of communal ideology are rooted in the basic assumptions from which communalism derives its strength and reinforcement. The propagators of communalism enter into a dialogue with each other by referring to the facts gathered on the communal basis. For instance, these elements of communal ideology have their basis in assumptions like :

(a) Communal Based Nationality;
(b) Communal Competition;
(c) Ruler-Centric Religious Based History;
(d) Ascriptive Based Collectivities: Interaction and Discourse.

The political and social discourse between competing communal groups takes place not merely through traditional mediums but also modern ones. This debate uses the medium of family, religious institutions and also media, both print and electronic, educational institutions like schools, political parties etc. The perceived authenticity of ideas having communal overtones also depends upon the disseminating medium. In this case it is necessary to understand that the degree of legitimacy attached to any medium is measured within the prevalent framework of political and social thought. Consequently, the social appeal of ideas depends upon, how clearly and effectively they reflect the communal way of thinking. An attempt shall be made to identify the elements of communal ideology and the assumptions behind them.

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27. P.C. Joshi (1980) 'The Economic Background of Communalism in India - A Model of analysis' in B.R. Nanda ed. *Essays in Modern History*, Oxford University Press.
Bipan Chandra has very lucidly elaborated this. He identifies communalism as a middle class ideology. We differ with this formulation.
See Bipan Chandra (1984) op. cit.

(a) Communal Based Nationality:

The understanding that religion is the sole basis of a nationality and the members of a religious group have an inalienable right to self determination is subscribed to by communalism of all varieties. For instance,in the pre- Independence phase, the All India Muslim League speaking on behalf of the Muslims, claimed that Muslims are a separate nation. Vir Savarkar, President of Hindu Mahasabha agreed with this claim. While addressing the 1937 All India Mahasabha session held at Ahmedabad, he observed, "India cannot be assumed today to be a unitarian and homogeneous nation, but on the contrary there are two nations, in the main, the Hindu and the Muslim". Even after independence similar kind of views were expressed by various leaders. For instance, Urdu Times dated October 14, 1986, reported a provacative speech of Shiv Sena Chief, Bal Thackeray, whose first paragraph is as under :

> This nation is the land of Hindus. The oppression by Muslims and Sikhs will not be tolerated now. We will convert this nation into 'Hindustan' (or the place for Hindus). Every sacrifice will be made to obliterate the name "India" and "Bharat". Every 'Shiv Sainik' (a member of Shiv Sena, political party) will take up arms in defence of Hinduism. Under the guise of being a minority, Muslims have benefitted a lot in this nation and the government has also encouraged them. This is so despite the fact that Muslims are conspiring against Hinduism, which conspiracy cannot be put to an end by either the government or the police. If there is anyone who can control Muslims, it is the Shiv Sainiks who are defenders of Hinduism (translated from Urdu).

Vishwa Hindu Parishad also articulates similar kinds of views. It says, "when will you the citizens of Hindu nation arise ? Not after you have lost this nation (Muslims have 44 nations, Christians have many. And you Hindus had only one ancient nation, which had been reduced after it was partitioned).

Similarly, communalism of other variety accept the communal view propagated by 'rival' communalism so as to create and widen communal cleavages. To quote Abdula Bukhari, "Where the

Muslims are in majority, it becomes nation of Muslims". In Hindustan Muslims are in minority and Hindus are in majority. Therefore, India is a 'Hindu' Nation. Communalism accepts this and immediately start prescribing a code of conduct for "Muslims".

> After partition, Hindus are the owners of India and Muslims second class citizens. Muslims should show gratitude towards their 'Maaliks' for allowing them to live peacefully. Since Hindus are the owners of this land they should be permitted to take their processions through any road or locality with music bands. Members of the minority community should stop prayers until the procession has passed away if they feel that they cannot concentrate.[28]

Similarly, communalism put forward the charge that Muslims are anti-national as they celebrate the victory of Pakistani sports teams over Indian teams. 'There is hardly any Muslim who is faithful to "Hindustan". All of them without exception, rejoice when Pakistan defeats India in cricket or hockey matches. They would no doubt greet Pakistani soldiers with garlands if they conquered India. During the Indo-Pak wars the sympathy of every Muslims was with Pakistan'.[29]

Communalism rebuts this charge by referring to the active role of "Muslims" in the freedom struggle and the two wars against Pakistan. Communalism charges Hindus with sowing seeds of national disintegration by always suspecting the integrity and patriatism of Muslims. These rebutals are within the communal framework.

> ....Muslim loyalty is unimpeachable. There has not been a single instance of Muslim disloyalty to this country. In any case, we, Muslims, do not require a loyalty certificate from the likes of and the Shiv Sena. Thackeray has constantly made provocative venomgous, tenditious and

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28. 'Gems from other recent speeches of Bal Thackeray', *Muslim India* Vol.19, July 1984, p.301.
29. 'Gems from other recent speeches of Bal Thackeray', ibid,p.304.

baseless remarks, which have poisoned the atmosphere against Muslims.[30]

In the same way, *Sobat* in its issue dated May 6, 1984, under the blatantly communal title "Muslims cannot live in Hindustan" published the following :

> The very concept of a nation is opposed to Quran. Therefore, if anything is to be placed for their not having any feeling-affection for this country it is Quran. The character of Quran-Shariat, i.e. the Islamic system of governance, is opposed to our Constitution and Laws. If we have faith in our Constitution, we will have to ban Quran and the Islamic system of governance... The clear position is that to allow anyone other than the followers of islam to live in this world is a crime to Allah and therefore to abduct women of those who indulge in idol worship or to loot their property or to kill them is no crime according to their religion.

These reports incite fears and hatred among members of one religious group against members of the other group which is perceived to be antagonistic and define nationalism in communal terms. So in this way the dialogue between communalists continues.

Rulers-Centric Religious Based History

There have been consistent efforts on the part of communalism to reinforce the perception of communal monoliths and commonality of secular interest of all the members of a religious group irrespective of their economic and political status. This kind of interpretation has been used in communalism even to interpret history. The history has been divided into Hindu history, Muslim history and Sikh history. Its division reinforce separate and competing identities of different religious groups. In this rulers who happened to be Mus-

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30. Interview of G.M. Banatwala, President, Indian Union Muslim League, quoted in *Bhiwandi. Bombay Riots : Analysis & Documentations* by Asghar Ali Engineer, 1984,p.100.

lims were projected as 'expansionists', 'brutal', 'aliens' and rulers who happened to be Hindus were projected as nationalists.

Communalism visualized the medieval centuries as a long period of alien Muslim dominance over the Hindus (the vast masses of the country's native people). Vishwa Hindu Parishad charged that Qutabudin-Aibak demolished all the temples in Meerut, one thirty three temples were converted into mosques in Kalanzar Nagar'.[31] Number of such examples can be gleaned from literature having communal overtones. The medieval period was also visualized as a period where the Muslim rulers converted a large number of Hindus to Islam or else eliminated them. 'In Bihar one lakh brahmins were killed, Allauddin Khilzi beheaded fourteen thousand worshippers of Hindu religion etc.' [32] Such examples are cited to prove the attempts of "Muslim rulers" to forcibly convert believers of Hinduism to Islam. Examples are also cited to build an imagery of heroic deeds of Hindus in defence of their religion and country's honour. For instance, VHP in one of its pamphlets alleged that one lakh and seventy three thousand Hindus were assassinated, by Mir Baki Babar's army commander, because they were trying to defend Ram Janam Bhoomi. Other type of imagery is also fabricated : that the `Hindus' have lost their battles to `Muslims' because of their mutual dissentions. Muslims are fanatics and fundamentalists and that is why they refused to merge with the mainstream of Indian (Hindu) civilisation, unlike their predecessors, the Greeks, the Sakas, the Huns who were also aliens. Hindu civilization was always known for its oppenness and large heartedness and it was Muslims who sought to forcibly change the character of this stream. In fact this outlook is cause of the origin of communalism in India. On the other hand, communalism projects the medieval period as the peak of Islamic glory.

However, the basic assumption of both Hindu and Muslim communal historiography (as also the British) constituted the unity of their thought: they all visualized the Hindus and the Muslims in medieval India to be perpetually in conflict, deriving their evidence from the arena of political, indeed dynastic history.[33]

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31. Vishwa Hindu Parishad (1989) *Is the Future of this country be written in Jama Masjid or in this (Ram Mandir at Ayodya) Mandir ?* pamphlet.
32. ibid.
33. Harban Mukhia(1983) 'Communalism and Historiography' *Social Scientist* p.61

Ascriptive Based Collectives

Communalism uses ascriptive based collectivites as a basis of social and political discourse. In this, it is highlighted and reinforced that the ascriptive groups have exclusive and antagonistic ways of life and this can be protected by organization along religious, caste or other ascriptive lines.

Another moot point in this context arises from the relativity attached to the justification. This relativity is symptomatic of the transitional nature of the Indian society. In the environment of shrinking opportunities ascriptive categories have emerged as a crucial factor promising solace to the people. The economic development, however, has led to the fragmentation as expressed in various religious and caste alliances and conflicts within religious and caste structure itself. But these developments have not been powerful enough either to subsume religious and caste structure or replace it altogether.

Correspondingly, justice is demanded and imparted with reference to collectivities having their basis in kinship, caste, religion, ethnicity and not to individuals as it is done in the 'modern' framework of political and social discourse. It is this framework of reference on the part of the state which is acquiring dangerous proportions. For example, if a militant in Punjab kills a person happening to be Hindu by alleging that all Hindus are traitors because they disowned Punjabi as their mother tongue and therefore Hindus must be punished, is questioned. The individual killed is an individual first and a member of religion or caste later. The judiciary, parliament and executive formulate and execute laws in relation to individuals and not collectivities.

The pertinent question is, can the Indian political system have two contradictory norms of social justice — one for countering dissent of people trying to articulate the so called interests of collectivities like religion as in the case of Punjab and other when it comes to the Indian political leadership trying to hoodwink people in the name of imparting social justice on the basis of collectivities like caste or religion. Reservations on the basis of caste and legislation on Shah Bano case are obvious examples.

The problems of human under-development are projected as communal traps laid to destroy their co-religionists by the other ascriptive group perceived to be antagonistic. This helps communal-

ism to incite the fears, insecurities and hatred of their co-religionist against religious groups perceived to be antagonistic. No communalism can thrive without these. For example, it has been noticed that Muslims under the influence of communal perceptions are imbued with the feelings of fear,persecution and a sense of discrimination. Whereas Hindus who are under the influence of communalism are imbued with a sense of deprivation and insecure future. A respondent who happened to be a Muslim narrated how he always been accused by his neighbours, who happened to be Hindus, to be sympathetic to the Pakistan and not the Indian team when the cricket and hockey matches were being played between the two countries. Another teacher working in a Meerut (U.P) college narrated a story of his childhood where he was prevented from playing the role of *Hanuman* in a religious play because he happened to be a Muslim. Such facts have come to acquire certain distinctive characteristics which brand Hindus as cowards, deceitful and Muslims as fanatics and anti-national and so on.

Communal propaganda, therefore, prepares the ground for increasing the plausibility of solutions like the 'elimination' or 'expatriation' of the religious group perceived to be antagonistic.[34]

Communal Competition in Politics, Economy and Society

Communalism operate within the framework that economic and political gains are distributed on religious, caste or other ascriptive group lines. And if protective reservation is sanctioned it would improve social and economic position of the whole "deprived" religious, caste or other ascriptive group. Communalism is a predisposition (state of mind) of a person or a group belonging to a particular religion (or caste/community/sect within it) arising out of a feeling that a threat - real or imaginary - exists to his/their faith which should be combatted by collective action of members of religion (or caste, community or sect) reinforce a sense of discrimination, information on the representation in jobs, legislatures etc. is collected and projected with reference to religious, caste or ascriptive group. This kind of propaganda reinforces the fears, insecurities and generates competition for jobs and economic and political bene-

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34. P.K.B. Nair (1990) 'A Sociological Analysis of Communalism with reference to Kerala'. Bidyut Chakraborty ed. Secularism And Indian Polity p.211.

fits on communal basis. Many middle class respondents during our field survey, found evidence to prove discriminations on religious group lines in journals and newspapers like *Muslim India, Marmik, Sobat, Organizer, Panch Janya* etc. In these they project the individual gains of persons belonging to another religious or caste group to be those of the whole of that `community'. The gains so projected and exaggerated are posed to be the loss of their own religious or caste groups. Interestingly, rival communalism accept this and a circular battle ensues. For example, if a politician who happened to be a Muslim gets elected to parliament, communalism will project this to be a gain for all Muslims and the loss of other religious groups. And this parliamentarian will be considered merely a leader of the Muslims. Further, if vice-chancellorship of a university is conferred on an individual who happen to be a Hindu communalism will project it to be a gain of all Hindus and loss of other religious groups.

Recent events in contemporary history show how dangerous this approach is. Communalism bullied innocent members of the Hindu religious group for disowning Punjabi language and communalism harassed innocent believers of Sikhism outside Punjab and the same communalism repeatedly propagated that Hindi was the language of the Hindus and Punjabi of the Sikhs.

The pro-Hindi section viewed the demand for linguistic demarcation of Punjab to be an attempt to create a theocratic state. Communalism owned this. And this in turn hardened communal attitudes and transformed demagogy into a grave crisis. The net outcome of this confrontation was a flaring up between the two communal groups at the cost of several innocent lives.

Similarly, the vociferous agitation for minority character for Aligarh Muslim University (AMU) sharpened communal cleavages. The accrual of minority status, it was projected, would benefit all 'Muslims' and deprive all 'Hindus' of an opportunity for higher education. This issue rocked Aligarh several times with intense rioting. Communal propaganda on this issue was fueled by the emerging middle classes of Aligarh, from both Hindu and Muslim religious groups. The implication of such an understanding will be to pose one communalism against another. Such propaganda identifies the causes of deprivation falsely. Whereas, the discrimination or favouritism resorted to by communalism on the basis of religious is a byproduct of the pervasiveness of communal

perception. It shall be a gross conceptual error to suggest solutions by taking byproducts of communalism like discrimination to be the cause of communalism .

Even employment outside the region and country and utilization of remittances, therefrom, have been interpreted communally by a section of people. This communal interpretation of uneven economic development has further contributed to the propagation of communal stereotypes and exaggeration of communal fears. For example, in Sikar district of Rajasthan the common notion amongst communal Hindus is that it is only Muslims who are migrating for work to Gulf countries. Further the communalists argue that a large part of remittance by these people are used for conspicuous consumption and promoting religious fanaticism. It does not confine merely to the perception of the common people, but even the district planning department of the Government of Rajasthan, further reinforces this notion. It argues that "The Muslims working class started going for work in Muslim countries since 1950 after being inspired by migration of Marwaris to these countries". However, our field survey indicates that it was not exclusively Muslims who had ventured out to the gulf countries for work, but a large number of Masons, Carpenters, Helpers, Labourers etc., from amongst lower sections of Hindus have also migrated. This out-migration is the result of the inadequate employment opportunities which act as a push factor. While absorption outside is due to the requirement of certain specific skills in Gulf countries which are related to the level and nature of development in those countries. Further, the non-productive utilization of remittances is related to the relative absence of investment opportunities in local areas. Its utilization does not have linkages with their religious group affiliation.

Our field observation further reveals that most of the remittances, by workers in the Gulf and other countries who happen to be Hindus was also spent in items of conspicuous consumption, building temples, celebration of religious festivals etc. For example, the famous Rani Sati Mandir of Jhunjhunu is mainly funded by remittance of cloth traders of Jalaan sect who control large trading houses, in West Bengal and Bombay. Similar noticeable trends exist amongst the traders or workers who happen to be Muslims.

The limited employment opportunities in the local area, steadily shrinking job opportunities in the Gulf countries, and perception

relating to the out-migration and remittances, provide the sufficient conditions for mobilizations along communal lines.

Further, even profits and losses are often misinterpreted. For example, iron and tin manufacturing in Indore is undergoing transformation under the influence of changing market conditions. An increasing and diversified demand for tin based products led to the improvement in the methods of production during the 60s. Before this the products were manufactured by nearly 42 traditional 'Lohar' families (most of whom happened to be Muslims) by using simple processes of production. The improved technology necessitated capital investments which were made by traders (most of whom happened to be Hindus) who began manufacturing agricultural implements, steel almirahs etc. Further the traditional 'Lohars' entered the sphere of manufacturing drums, utensils, trunks, frames etc. This marginalization of the 'Lchars' was interpreted, by them and certain self-proclaimed 'community' leaders to be a conscious discrimination against Muslims.

Another instance of change in the market conditions of a product which provide the necessary conditions for the social appeal of communal ideology is the case of *zari* and its allied products in Bhopal. Some of the *zari* items manufactured by artisans have lost their market e.g. *chappals* and *purses*; with the introduction of plastics. There are around 200 families in Bhopal city which are involved in the *zari* household industry. The real wages of the household units have declined considerably compared to their previous earnings. For historical reasons the skill of making *zari* products happened to be possessed by craftsmen who were Muslims. The overlapping of a religious group identity with a particular skill often provides an easy tool to communalism to interpret and propagate changes in the market value of particular skills, viz-a-viz the persecution of a particular religious group.

To sum up, communal tensions are generated by the nature of socio-economic and political processes. But they are imparted a communal colour by communal stereo-types, distorted version of history, religiosity, operational and unascertainable beliefs. These are pregnated with notions having a sense of discrimination, deprivation and hatred for other religious, caste or ethnic groups perceived to be antagonistic. These notions have their basis in larger assumptions of social living and way of life. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and analyse these notions in their proper social, cultural and historical context.

The strategy to counter these notions must, therefore, question the basic assumptions from which they drive their life-force. For instance, the content of communalism has its basis in the understanding that societies are organized around religious and caste lines. A crisis of social and economic nature is interpreted by communalism to be specific to religious groups. In otherwords, social problems, political and economic issues are projected as matters concerning caste or religious groups. In a situation where caste and religious group identities overlap with secular identities the task of communalism becomes easier.

Dimensions of Communalism

To comprehend the phenomenon of communalism, it is also necessary to explore its various underlying and obvious dimensions. However these dimensions are specific to situations in time and space. Descriptive categorization of social actors involved in the process of accentuation and strengthening communalism may help to evolve a viable strategy to counter it.

Three main descriptive categories have been identified:

(a) Communalism - Conformist
(b) Communalism - Conformist and Incremental
(c) Communalism - Secessionist

(a) Communalism -Conformist

Communalism - conformist are those who conform to communal framework of thinking in practice. The interaction and discourse of the individuals or groups takes place within the framework of ascriptive based collectivities. They define their social position and role in the society, politics and economy with reference to ascriptive group affiliation.

These victims of communalism subscribe to ruler centric religious based history. In this they eulogize rulers belonging to their own religious group and condemn the history of other religious groups, nurse antagonistic feelings about the social and religious practice of other religious groups and consider other groups to be culturally inferior and destroyers of their glorious traditions.

These victims of communalism participate in communal activities out of justification which they perceive to exist in history, religious norms and well accepted religious practices. Their communalism gets reflected in their vision of the future ideal society, which is Hindu Rashtra in the case of communal Hindus, Darul-Islam in the case of communal Muslims and Khalistan in the case of communal Sikhs. It is this normative rationale that guides their social interactions and also ascribe roles to them.

These individuals or groups try to universalise their faith and vision of an ideal society. This tendency in India is represented by Brahman Sabha, Hindu Parishad, Jamat-e-Islami, Muslim League, Akhand Kirtini Jatha, Damdami Taksal etc. Such groups in their enthusiasm for theocracy curtail the liberty of others and thereby turn fascist. The victims of communal ideology conform to these beliefs due to their irrationale impulses and fears which are created by the contemporary social reality. They are mainly drawn from skilled and semi-skilled workers, slum dwellers and peasantry and a section of urban traders and white collar workers. The possibility of victims of communalism belonging to other categories cannot be ruled out.

Communalism-Sesessionist

This tendency has no fundamental ideological differences with communal conformist except that it has well defined territorial limits, whereas communalism-conformist is universal.

This tendency has a well defined economic and political interest. It uses communalism as a basis for mobilising people and also it defines its political programme and territorial boundaries. For instance, this tendency in Punjab is represented by National Council of Khalistan and the Dal Khalsa.

Communalism-Conformist and Incremental

This variety of communalism is characterised by individuals/groups which on the one the hand conform to communalism and on the other want to gain certain incremental benefits. These sections perceive that incremental gains such as more

jobs, promotions in jobs, [35] subsidies, licences etc., are distributed on communal lines.

Communalism selects those examples which feed the feelings of neglect and discrimination of the under-represented religious or caste group. And in case of beneficiaries communalism reinforces the notion that these gains have accrued on religious or caste group lines. Many organizations have mobilized people from incremental concessions on similar lines. The Indian Union Muslim League, Jamait-ul-Ulema-e-Hind, Muslim Majlis(UP), Majlis-e-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (Andhra Pradesh), among others, have demanded the inclusion of Muslims in the list of backward "Communities" and the grant of adequate reservations at all levels. Some among them have demanded proportionate representation through a constitutional amendment[36]. The Shiromani Akali Dal has also in one of its resolutions declared that "it shall raise its firm voice against any discrimination against Sikh (or even others) employees of the Central or State governments. The Shiromani Akali Dal shall also endeavour to maintain the traditional position of the Sikhs in all the wings of the defence department and the panth would pay particular attention to the needs of the Sikh Armymen"[37]. Incremental concessions have been demanded by Brahmins and non-Brahmins, Bhumihars, Kayasthas, Reddys and Kammas and many other high castes.

The incremental communalists are involved in a *zero-sum-game* where one "community's" gain is considered to be the other's loss. This section accepts the existence of "community interests" and presumes that such interest will merge with the larger national interest in course of time. This section advocates and

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39. Such as N.C.Saxena (1983) 'Public Employment Educational Backwardness Among Muslims in India' read at a Seminar organized by Aligarh Muslim University, Department of Economics.
    A special feature in a monthly journal *Muslim in the Employment Column in which data on absorption Muslims in Public and Private Sector is compiled..*
36. Muneer Ahmed Khan (1982) 'Muslims Attitudes' in a edited book, *Reservation Policy in India* by Sharma and Reddy Hight and Life Publishers, New Delhi, pp. 219-220
    Report for 1981-83, Hamdard Foundation of Business an Employment Bureau, India, April, 1984.
37. Giani Ajmer Singh (1977), *The Draft of the New Policy Programme of the Shiromani Akali Dal*, Amritsar

fights for reservation in jobs and separate electorates and thereby showing its incrementalist nature. Such communalism is not very extreme and is satisfied with claiming to utilize available resources, institutions, etc., to maximise gains for the "community". It is most vociferous in raising issues and shaping communal ideology. It has social roots in the middle class, specially among those who look for jobs, subsidies, reservations and other benefits as their exclusive previlege. Profits and losses, employment or unemployment and promotion or demotion are rationalized by these individuals with reference to "Jagratas", "Satsangs" and the number of pilgrimages one has undertaken.

Another dimension of this brand of communalism is prevalent in some of the industrial houses also. Its operation is more subtle. For instance, in some of the big industrial monopoly houses, such as Birla group, Kirloskars, DCM, etc. most of the top managerial staff is drawn from among the kin of the owners. The diversification of industries extended the distribution of such benefits from kinship to religious or caste "community". This is not the case with entrepreneurs alone. Even in Government or semi-Government concerns, such trends have been noticed. A number of examples can be cited from various concerns. Not only this, incremental conformist communalism is used by industrialists to curb trade union movements. The employment of workers in industries from one's own clan makes it easier to suppress the working class movements and evade the provisions of the Factory Acts, etc. Kinship, caste and religious affiliations have been used to promote a kind of feeling that jobs are being given not on merit but on the basis of these affiliations.

These dimensions of communalism co-exist and reinforce each other. It is in this context that various manifestations of communalism can be understood and analysed. Communalism may manifest in hatred, suspicion and communal violence. Extreme form of communalism is theocratic, and fasicst in orientation.

Chapter 2

Causes and Appeal of Communalism

Communalism is a pertinent reminder of the complexities of religion, caste, ethnicity and the intractable political and economic problems often inherent in them. It has taken diverse forms over time, with contextual variations manifesting in desires for incremental concessions, communal rioting secessionists demands etc. Identification of the causes for the existence or persistence of any social phenomenon provides the necessary insight into ways of seeking solutions.

Communalism : Caused by Religious Differences?

It is widely believed that communalism is caused by differences in religious practices[1]. Communalism is also understood to be the result of discrimination on religious group basis. Communalism uses religion, caste or other ascriptive group affinities. So it is commonly believed that communalism is caused by ascriptive group differences and has existed ever since religion, caste or other ascriptive groups came into being. It is proposed that a distinction should be made between the origin of caste or religion and the factors causing the origin and persistence of communalism. The belief that communalism is caused by differences in religious, caste or other ascriptive categories, alongwith the assumptions and implications of this belief, leads to the following suggestions for overcoming communalism:

(a) preaching and practice of tolerance and communal harmony by members of all religious, caste and other ascriptive groups.

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1 P.C. Joshi has rightly pointed out that explanations of the communal problem have been biased in favour of either religious, economic or political factors. Very rarely does one come across explanations which attempt to investigate the kind of political and economic framework or background in which the fact of past religious antipathy developed into a force of explosive potentiality. In other words, very rarely does one come across an attempt to evolve a comprehensive and integrated approach to the problem.

(b) proportionate reservations for and protection to members of all religious, caste and other ascriptive groups.

In the event of failure of these two solutions, the ultimate way out suggested is that the members of one religious, caste or other ascriptive groups should be physically separated from another either by expatriation or through elimination.

Antagonism constitutes a crucial element of communalism and is given the moral garb of religion to perpetuate inhuman acts such as, looting, rioting, arson and killing. W.C. Smith has rightly pointed out that in this (comunalism) religion is used as an instrument to provide justification for acts, which are otherwise undesirable or even inhuman.

> Further, history has shown many times that religion is ready to excuse atrocities which decent men would hesitate to commit under any other name. Moreover once a conflict has started for economic or other reasons and then when it assumes a communalism guise, it tends to expand to include innocent co-religionists of the real enemies. Also it tends to colour the thinking of the persons involved for all their other issues.[2]

However, it should be mentioned here that religion is not a synonym for communalism. By this is meant that a religious person is not essentially communal. Religion as an ideology, according to the Marxist tradition, performs two social functions. First, it makes the conditions of this "heartless world" bearable for the oppressed who are alienated from the fruits of their labour by the nature of production relations. Thereby, religion removes the motives and saps the will of the oppressed to change the conditions of this "heartless world" by making them bearable. Second religion helps the oppressors to prevent the oppressed from resorting to violent or other remedies to rectify the conditions of this "heartless world".

However, there are instances when religion was used to bring about an order slightly better than the existing one. The example of the 17th Century English Puritans is quoted in this context. The Puritans attacked the forces of monarchy and aristocracy and supported commercial interests. The support extended by

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2. W.C. Smith (1979) op.cit. p.21

the Puritans helped, together with other factors, change the social order from totering feudalism to nascent capitalism. But the emergent commercial interests needed religion and a morality based on it, to accumulate capital by propagating thrift and austerity. But religion and the morality based on it, was also required for purposes of having a subservient working class to whom honesty and diligence were preached.

In the non-Marxist tradition, religion as an ideology is thought to make people more humane, moral and honest. Religion is also believed to take people closer to God who symbolizes divinity, sublimity, virtue and goodness. Religion as an ideology does not cause communalism. However, over-religious people are drawn to communalism. Therefore, religion cannot be used to combat communalism because there is a thin line between being over-religious and religious.

Colonialism, Nationalism and Communalism

Moonis Raza is of the view that the colonial rulers, particularly the British, caused communal tensions among their subjects to rule them in Malaysia, Nigeria and India. It is also pointed out that the French colonial authorities did not resort to communalism in Morocco and neither did the Dutch colonialists do so in Indonesia[3]. Communalism, therefore, in its existing form and magnitude, was a typical phenomenon experienced in ex-colonial countries ruled by the British. These observations are only partially correct.

Communalism was not conspired into existence by the British. However, once communalism appeared due to the social conditions prevailing in India, the British used it to perpetuate their rule[4]. No doubt, there existed a reservoir of mistrust and suspicion among members of different religious groups which was exploited by the colonialists to govern the colonies. And this continues even after independence of these colonies.

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3. Moonis Raza (1992) "Communalism : The Dragons's Teeth" *Towards Understanding Communalism*, Pramod Kumar (ed.)
4. C.P. Bhambri also subscribe to the view that the British rulers institutionalized and not caused communalism. The British rulers in India consciously followed policies of "divide and rule" and in the process divisive tendencies were strengthened and institutionalized. C.P. Bhambri (1989) *Axis with Imperialism in India. Nation State And Communalism*, Patriot Publishers, p. 28

There is also a view that communalism is an outcome of the failure to inculcate national consciousness in independent India[5]. In this context, it is pointed out that during the freedom struggle communalism receded with the growth of nationalism. This view over-emphasizes nationalism as an ideological anti-dote to communalism. Nationalism, no doubt, was a progressive ideology during the freedom struggle. In independent India, national disintegration can be one consequence of communalism; so can communalism cause fascism. Hence, communalism has to be seen in its totality. Communalism is an outcome of the failure to understand and resolve social problems in a secular and democratic way.

Nationalism in independent India cannot be a substitute for the failure to solve the problems of social inequality, brutalization and dehumanization of society, unemployment, corruption, abridgment of civil liberty etc. People should be mobilized among secular and class lines to fight against these problems. Only then can the anti-imperialist stance of the Indian nationalists be meaningful.

Lag in Economic Development : Relative Deprivation Hypothesis

Some other authors try to establish an isomorphic relation between the perception of deprivation or discrimination along religious, caste or other ascriptive group lines and economic development.
Scholars subscribing to this approach see "the lag" in economic development between different religious, caste or other ascriptive groups to be the cause of perception of deprivation[6]. This "lag" is attributed by them to :-

(i) the economic situation during British rule which benefit-

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5. Bipan Chandra (1984) op. cit.
   Aloo Dastur (1984) paper presented in a Seminar on *`Multi-Dimensional Approaches to Communalism'*, Summary published in *MAN & DEVELOPMENT*.
6. Rajni Palme Dutt (1955) *India Today and Tomorrow*,Delhi, A.R. Desai (1959) *Social Background of Indian Nationalism*, Bombay; J.L. Nehru (1956) *The Discovery of India*, London; P.C. Joshi in an article "The Economic Background of Communalism in India" argues alongwith similar lines. However, Joshi holds that the impact of development on ascriptive groups varied from one region to another. "Hence to understand the basis of communalism it is necessary to study the problem at regional level". P.C. Joshi op. cit.

ted traders, money-lenders and professional classes, most of whom belonged to certain upper castes of the Hindu religious group;

(ii) the inherited attitudes and cultural traditions which inhibited feudal lords and artisans from securing benefits from the economic process, most of these feudal lords and artisans being Muslims.

The continued uneven economic development and differential access to the economic process of ascriptive groups due to "the lag"mentioned above, is assumed by these scholars to be the cause of communalism. This approach is inadequate because it explains only the reasons for the perception of deprivation. This perception when conditioned by communalism, is expressed communally. The more important subject in the present context, therefore, should be the explanation of the existence and persistence of communalism.

Economic Competition : Communalism and Communal Riots

Another approach tries to identify the socio-economic roots of communalism through a study of communal riots. According to the scholars subscribing to this approach, communal riots are caused by the competition and conflict between vested interests, viz. traders, industrialists etc. belonging to different ascriptive groups. They extend this argument about the cause of communal riots to the cause of communalism. Hence, communalism, to these scholars is caused by the clash of economic interests of persons belonging to different religious groups[7]. This approach is also inadequate. A pertinent question in this regard is : why does the clash of economic interests take a communal form ? The need is, therefore, to identify the basis of communalism. Another inadequacy of this approach is that it considers communal riots to be synonymous with communalism.

No doubt, communal rioting cannot be understood in isolation from a comprehension of the level and operation of communalism. Communal rioting as a conjunctural outcome of the pervasiveness of communalism has to be understood in terms of the linkages

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7. Asghar Ali Engineer (1984) - "The Cause of Communal Riots in Post-partition Period in India" in Communal Riots in Post Independence India, Asghar Ali Engineer (ed.) Sangam Books p.33

of communalism, communal politics and communal violence. But this does not mean that it is synonymous with communalism or it has its own logic and can be combated independently of the various complex processes unleashed by the changing socio-economic formations.

Poverty, inequality and competition for economic and other benefits are objective facts, but are disguised in communal discriminations due to the pervasiveness of elements of communal ideology. This can be illustrated by citing two examples. In Jaipur, the competition in the expanding gem and jewellery household industry between established traders, most of whom happen to be Hindus and the emerging traders, most of whom happen to be Muslims has not reached the stage of antagonism. The competition between these trading groups has provided one of the conditions for the growth of communalism, but the absence of communal antagonism, among other things has prevented the competition from manifesting in communal violence.

As opposed to this, communal violence has erupted and communalism continues to grow at Indore. The demand for tin-based products has increased and the product range diversified in the iron and tin manufacturing industries at Indore. Under the changed conditions, the traditional blacksmiths, most of whom happen to be Muslims, were displaced. Certain traders most of whom happen to be Hindus, invested capital, improved the technology and captured a major share of the market. The marginalization of traditional blacksmiths was interpreted communally by them and was projected as discrimination against "Muslims" by local political leaders and parties. The condition which contributed among other things, to the greater appeal of communalism was not competition *per se* but mainly the pervasiveness of communalism.

Electoral Politics, Modern Democratic Institutions cause Communalism

Some believe that the introduction of adult franchise and modern institutions of democratic representation have caused communaiism. It is felt that in the absence of corresponding modernization of society, the adoption of modern institutions of popular political participation by a plural society, which is organized along reli-

gious, caste or other ascriptive group lines, has led to the growth of communalism

Rajni Kothari holds that communal electoral politics causes communalism. "....numbers game does seem to have given rise to an ethnic calculus and ultimately to communal politics"[8]. The persistence of communal politics, no doubt, influences the voting behaviour of some sections of the people. It is precisely because communalism using less numerous religious or caste groups perceive democracy as synonymous with Hindu domination and/or Brahmanvad. It is further believed that the use of symbols and institutions associated with religious, caste or other ascriptive groups in politics causes communalism.

Both these notions partially explain the existence of communalism. This is only a partial explanation because it does not pose the question, why people respond and participate in politics which has communal overtone.

Neither of the above mentioned explanations serve to give us a clear and total picture of the basic factors responsible for the growing communal conflicts. Instead of seeing communalism as an expression of the result of disturbed psychic development we must look at it as a manifestation of prevailing social conditions. Further, these social conditions do have a significant role to play in the eruption of riots, but it is the perception of individuals which make certain social conditions undesirable or the underlying root cause of their deprivation. It is possible to create conditions which are so dehumanizing that people become barbaric. Their reaction to these conditions can be used as a microscope, which brings to the forefront the underlying texture of social relationship, through which people discharge social responsibilities.

It is also relevant to make a historical analysis and establish a relationship between the form and essence of communalism. Unfortunately, most of the studies on communalism either take into consideration economic changes or reduce it merely to a phenomenon related to culture, religion or politics. Both these approaches lack the perspective of totality and organic relationship between these variables.

An attempt should be made to comprehend and understand the necessary as well as sufficient conditions responsible for the

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8. Rajni Kothari, op. cit. p.6.

existence and persistence of communalism. The necessary conditions are those without which a phenomenon cannot exist. The necessary conditions as such do not give any idea about the frequency, form and intensity of communal eruptions. It is the sufficient conditions which determine the form, frequency and direction of the development of a situation though always deriving its life force from the necessary conditions. It is obvious that these conditions, necessary as well as sufficient, do not have a separate objective existence[9]. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend and understand the necessary as well as sufficient conditions responsible for the existence and persistence of communalism.

A realistic approach to understand and combat communalism should take into account the diversities of linguistic, cultural, religious and socio-economic patterns in India, as also a cumulative differentiation, in beliefs, value patterns and ideologies which has evolved overtime. This differentiation in response to the social exigencies has manifested in the form of mistrust, suspicion and antagonism amongst various religions, caste and ascriptive groups. For instance, the perception of these differentiations is reflected in the widely prevalent notions that democracy is a rule of the brute "majority" and that since Hindus are in a majority, the minorities will never come to power, that the polity is communal and votes are cast on communal considerations, that if capital circulation is restricted within guilds or "jamaats" formed on communal basis, it will bring in more profit, that jobs are not offered on the basis of skills or merit but accrue to persons due to their religious or caste group identities, and that cultural differences are based solely on religion. These notions are widely held and practised and they reflect the pervasiveness of communalism.

Religious, caste and ascriptive groups, no doubt, have been conscious of the differences between themselves and on occasions these differences were perceived and articulated through antagonistic notions and violent conflicts even in the days before British rule. These conflicts were mainly religious or casteist, but not communal which is something modern. But it is relevant to take into consideration the reservoir of mistrust and suspicion which was historically present and remained dormant during the initial decades of colonial rule in India and thereafter it surfaced with intensity under

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9. V.L. Allen, op. cit. pp.205-29

specific socio-economic conditions and political initiatives taken by the British ruling elite.

The British used and perpetuated the existing reservoir of perception of religio-cultural superiority or inferiority of one or the other communal group. They extended its logic to propagate that social placement of individuals is determined by religious beliefs or caste affiliation. Therefore, access to politico-economic opportunities and benefits is (or should be) regulated by the numerical strength of the religious or caste group to which they belong. In a given situation where sometimes these diversities coincide with class distinctions, mobilizations identify the sources of uneven development and differential access to distributive benefits on communal lines.

The British politics used the process of increasing surplus extraction and alienation of peasantry through increasing indebtedness to project it in terms of conflict between Hindu money lenders versus peasantry - the communal implications of which were too obvious. Consequently, the increasing landed inequality, differentiation within peasantry became less important in the perception of peasantry.

Further, the bifurcation of politics among Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus in terms of its content was also initiated by the British. It was hammered that the content of politics of Hindus was mainly political, whereas in the case of Muslims and Sikhs it was economic. So it was not only that their religion was different, but the content of politics was also dissimilar. From this it was concluded that to articulate these dissimilar interests the religious groups must necessarily have separate political organizations. This was very well responded to by the leaders claiming to represent the secular interests of the religious groups in politics.

There is also evidence of religious reform movements, like Arya Samaj, Singh Sabha Movements, Ahmadiya with their emphasis on Shuddhi, Amrit Prachar, Tabligh and Tanzim contributing to the resurgence of the culture and politics based on purity of religious practices and beliefs and critique of other religious group practices and beliefs at the popular level. So it was the retarded nature of capitalism, British politics of divide and rule, religious revivalist movements in a milieu where the

mistrust and suspicion amongst various religious groups was a historical fact, accentuated communal divisions. It is, therefore, relevant to point out that British policies like separate communal electorates, encouragement to communal organizations and thinking in politics, constitutional reforms only in terms of more relative communal basis, accentuated (but did not cause) the reality of communalism.

Even in the post independent phase this process could not be reversed. In 1947 what happened was the transfer of political power from colonial rulers and through which the resolution of the primary contradiction between the Indian people, irrespective of their caste, religion, on the one hand and British colonialism on the other. Mass nationalism was roused with varying political strategies adopted by the political parties to resolve this contradiction. However, it must be recognized that the national freedom movement did not have a unified ideology. This also in a way contributed to the growth of communalism.

Even after freedom from the British colonialism no fundamental changes were initiated. No doubt, a sustained thrust towards industrialization and intensive agricultural production was initiated with a view to enhance production. Consequently, the success of social and economic development sought to be measured by per capita income, growth rate and by referring to the large industrial base and the third largest technical manpower in the world and above all, in the growth of parliamentary institutions.

It tried to underplay the growing inequalities, consumerism, sexism and communalism. Moreover, capitalism in India made compromises with the remnants of feudalism for its political survival. For instance, even much sought after land reforms could not be implemented. The implimentation of land reforms would have helped the creation of market for mass consumption of goods and production of cheap raw materials for industries. Not only this, no basic changes were introduced in the bureaucratic frame. The non-faith in the people remained the dominant pattern of the functioning of the bureaucracy. The education system remained based on the Macaulay system of producing white collar workers and the dominant value of divide and rule as reflected in the content of education.

Further, India's democratic polity also could not bring

about much desired changes in the socio-cultural value patterns. On the contrary, it reinforced already existing divisions and antagonisms amongst various religious and caste groups. For instance, political leadership could not find the will to execute a universal and secular civil code. The Hindu Code of 1956 was an admission of defeat to communal thought. The fact that the issue of Urdu language, AMU Bill and the establishment of Banaras Hindu University were used as political ploys, indicates the level of operation of communalism. During this period the electoral politics was also riddled with mobilization along caste and religious group lines with the Shiromani Akali Dal, Indian Union Muslim League, Jan Sangh, Shiv Sena being only the most obvious examples. However, even the known non-communal and secular parties have allied with communal parties and organizations to form governments or to fight elections. The use of symbols deriving their legitimacy from religion, caste etc. for the purposes of elections also strengthened communal monoliths.

Above all, communally divisive politics and exclusiveness emerged as a dominant mode of political activity. This reinforced the belief that politics transcends class bariers and of course, not religious, caste or ethnicity and it is always monolithic. This kind of political activity emphasized the particularistic aspects of social existence. The politics based on communalism used particularistic aspects for intra-religious or caste mobilizations and underplayed universalistic cultural patterns. It is this specific nature of socio-cultural, economic and political developments which has provided the life force to the phenomenon of communalism. In other words, communalism acquired its assertiveness in politics and economic and social spheres from conflicts emanating from the specific nature of capitalist development. And in the presence of traditional structures and organizations, this assertiveness not only acquires colour from these, but also operates through them. The challenge posed by the developmental process to these traditional institutions was weak in terms of blocked economic development and limited opportunities. This, in turn, reaffirmed and consolidated the already existing reservoir of mistrust and suspicion amongst various caste divisions and religious groups. This however led to a fragmen-

tation as expressed in various caste and religious alliances and caste and religious conflicts within the system of castes and religions itself.

In a nutshell, communalism derives its life force from the conflicts arising out of the specific nature of capitalist[10] development and character of Indian State and above all from the reservoir of mistrust and suspicion prevalent among various religious, caste or ascriptive group. In a multi-ethnic, cultural religious and linguistic society the specific character of capitalism led to the creation of a national market and a Pan-Indian bourgeoisie and has also been marked by its historical incapacity to destroy feudalism. At the same time it could not accommodate the interests of the emerging class fractions constituting the ruling class at the regional level. This led to the struggle for an all round democratic and secular advancement of different national streams on the one hand and on the other it provided a necessary condition for the growth and consolidation of linguistic or cultural or religious monoliths.

Communalism, therefore, can be seen as one of the instruments of the ruling class politics to blur the real conflicts and draws its life force from the specific form of capitalist development and from the reservoir of mistrust and suspicion prevalent amongst various religious or caste groups According to Randhir Singh, "Communalism in contemporary India, as ideology and practice, is above all, an aspect of the politics of the ruling classes in a society with

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10. In this paper the term conflict has been used instead of using the term non-antagonistic contradiction (as characterized by Mao Tse Tung). According to Jorge Larrain, all contradictions in Society are antagonistic but not all conflicts in society are contradiction necessarily entails two extremes which can not stand without each other and which negate each other. The conflicts between monopoly capital and competitive capital, between employed and unemployed, between state and monopoly capital clearly do not entail two poles which cannot stand without each other. In otherwords, the so-called non-antagonistic contradiction is not a contradiction at all. It is not sufficient for one of the poles to be a partial condition of the other pole's existence, for a contradiction requires that each term is defined and becomes intelligible by its relations to the other term. It is true to be defined, unemployment requires employment, but employment does not require unemployment to exist. Jorge Larrain (1980) *The Concept of Ideology* New Delhi.

a massive feudal-colonial inheritance, deep religious divisions and undergoing its own, historically specific form of capitalist development"[11].

The conflicts arising out the specific nature of capitalist development are conditioned by the contradiction inherent in the Indian society. Communalism is not a direct manifestation of contradictions and is not a total ideology. The function of communal ideology is to conceal the real character of the conflicts by providing mystified "motives" and "banners" and mis-placed target. For example, the conflict between big and small capital and between landlord and capitalist farmers; between well entrenched and emerging traders and between employment and unemployment has been often concealed by communal ideology under the cover of religious and caste conflicts in India[12].

The retarded and slow nature of development in India has provided the basis to the existence and persistence of false or distorted perceptions, like communalism. The internal conflicts arising out of competition for the market within industrial capital and within the merchant capital have taken a communal form of competition. For instance, there is the dominance of low productivity small scale industrial units in Punjab. These small scale units have been at a disadvantageous position while competing with the products produced by medium and large scale units in the market[13]. Besides this, the medium and large industries show a fairly steady

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11. Randhir Singh (1980) *Theorising Communalism : A Fragmentary Note in the Marxist Mode, Economic and Political Weekly,* July 23, p.1546..ls2
12. It is necessary to point out that religion derives its life force from the contradictions inherent in the specific socio-economic conditions. Religion is an inverted consciousness produced by an inverted reality. The distinction between communalism being a product of conflicts, which are conditioned by contradictions and religion being a direct product of contradictions is an analytical distinction. Communalism can be said to be a distortion of oan inversion. The struggle against communalism, if launched as a part of the political programme of working class struggle, will demystify "motives", "banners" and misplaced target of the conflicts. These, in turn, shall help in understanding the basic contradictions of the Indian social system.
13. Ranjit Sau (1981) *India's Economic Development,* Orient Longman, New Delhi.
    Ajit Roy (1976) *Monopoly Capitalism in India,* Maya Prakash, Calcutta; S.L. Shetty, "Industrial Growth and Structure as seen through Annual Survey of Industries". *Economic and Political Weekly,* October 2, 1982.

and high profit rate while the profit rate of small industries has been fluctuating and is less as compared to that of medium and large industries. Government policy, though claiming to create conditions for the wider distribution of capital among small scale entrepreneurs, has failed to do so. This fact illustrates the stronger hold wielded by big capitalists on the institutions and the agencies of the government. As a consequence of this, the surplus, which has accumulated with the capitalist farmers and trading companies at the regional level, is put at a disadvantageous position to emerge as small or big industrial corporations. The emerging agrarian and trading interests at the regional level often project their disadvantageous position as a discrimination against the caste or religion to which they belong. This discrimination is said to be perpetrated by the Central government or other similar governing authority which is projected as a representative of the allegedly antagonistic caste, religious or regional group.

Not only this, in Punjab, the growth of agriculture created surpluses in the hands of capitalist farmers and rich peasants which flowed out of the confines of agriculture. The rural rich felt the need for fresh avenues of investment and began to branch out into trade in agricultural products, trade in general and small and medium industry. The lopsided character of economic development in general and industrial development in particular could provide only limited opportunities for investment in industry and trade, leading to intense competition among those already entrenched in these sectors and those wanting to enter. Both found it convenient to appeal to communal sentiments to mobilize the people and thus influence the political power wielders.

Further the conflict between well-entrenched traders and emerging traders quite often tends to perpetuate communal cleavages particularly when class distinctions coincide with religious group affiliations. For instance, in Mau (in Eastern Uttar Pradesh) there are around 138 yarn merchants out of whom 20 are wholesellers[14]. Amongst the retailers there has been a considerable increase in the number of traders during the past 10 years or so. Most of the new entrants in the yarn trade happen to be Muslims. These new entrants were weavers working on self-owned powerlooms and benefitted

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14. There are almost 40000 weavers and around 20000 handlooms in and around Mau. The handlooms are owned by weavers themselves and almost every household of "Ansari Muslims" have at least one handloom.

from the boom in nylon saree production during 1980-83 and the expanding market for powerloom products, mainly lungis[15]. Established traders in yarn perceived the emergence of the new traders as a threat to their profit. Some of them genuinely believed and others deliberately propagated that the new entrants had been facilitated by Gulf money and supported by weavers who also happened to be Muslims. It is interesting that none of the established traders mentioned the fluctuations in yarn output and speculation arising thereof as a cause for the emergence of a few new traders or the eclipse of a few established ones[16].

The internal conflict arising out of competition for market acquires a communal character of competition and antagonism. This is possible when caste or religious group differences overlap with class distinctions, communal politics is at a high pitch, religiosity is being promoted in the absence of an organized effort to remove fatalism, obscurantism, superstition etc. and of course, due to the specific socio cultural history of people. The lopsided character of economic development in general and industrial development in particular has inhibited opportunities for investment in industry and trade, leading to an intense competition among those already entrenched in these sectors and those wanting to enter them. Both find it convenient to make an appeal to communalism in order to mobilize the people and thus throw political power in the scale. Even if the interests of this emerging agrarian section, as a consequence of dependence through linkages, requirement for market, etc. converge with those of the well-entrenched industrialists, it would be wrong to conclude that the emerging agrarian and well-entrenched industrial interest might work together for the cause of secularization and democratization of Indian society. This subject requires deep study.

Another conflict i.e. between unemployment and employment has also contributed to the growth of communalism. For

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15. The share of the decentralized sector in the total cloth output in India has increased from 20.40 per cent in 1951 to 30.40 per cent in 1961; 46.20 per cent in 1971; and 61 per cent in 1981. Within the decentralized sector, the powerloom sector contributes more than handloom sector. The handloom sector has been producing less than its targets during successive five years plans. During the Sixth Plan production of handwoven cloth has been 3,300 million meters against the target of 4100 million meters.
16. For details see Report of *Communal Violence & Its Impact on Development & National Integration,* CRRID, Chandigarh, 1985 (unpublished).

instance our sample survey in 1986 of five large scale industries in Kota town revealed that out of 5039 workers only 0.37 per cent were Muslims. It was alleged that these industrialists particularly Sri Ram and J.K. Industries do not employ Muslims even though they have necessary weaving and engineering skills. It is possible that some of the managements of industrial groups may be employing their co- religionist or members of their own caste groups while discriminating against others. Such discrimination is a result of the pervasiveness of communal ideology and therefore should be opposed.

Further it is also interesting to note that sometimes data on religious groupwise distribution of jobs are used to reinforce the feeling of discrimination. For instance, in Maunath Bhanjan a small town in eastern Uttar Pradesh it was mentioned that no worker from the Muslim religious group found employment in the two spinning mills because they were owned by "Hindus". This propaganda has carried conviction among the pauperized or unemployed sections of Muslims and led to the reinforcement of communal leadership. Whereas, the self-employment as weavers of a majority of the members of the Muslim religious group was the main cause of their relative absence from the spinning mills.

The issues like unemployment and employment are used by communalism which leads to their acceptance among coreligionists because it benefits certain individuals to corner jobs, licenses, permits etc.

The growing unemployment often contributes to the perception of deprivation and discrimination along communal lines. The specific nature of economic development has generated demand for certain skills. Employment opportunities had a differential impact on various social groups since skills were unevenly distributed among these groups. Communalism conveniently overlook the fluctuations in economy and the dependence of recognition or devaluation of skills on market mechanism. Communalism always demands re-allocation of scarce job opportunities on caste or religious basis and in the process strengthening the irrational belief that society is organized on the basis of caste, religious, linguistic or regional group identities. The fact is that communalism can at most favour or discriminate against individuals but cannot create fresh job opportunities. It cannot resolve the problem of unemployment or

cause recognition of specific skills in the labour market on which employment so largely depends.

The conflict between the locals and the migrants has contributed to the growth of communalism. This conflict derives its life force from increasing competition for jobs, licenses etc. in order to have an access or control over political power and economic benefits. The main thrust of this conflict is to protect the interests of the local emerging middle classes and dominant agrarian interests. For instance, in Maharashtra, upto the mid-seventies migrant merchant manufacturers, small traders, industrial workers who happen to be Ansari, Pathans and Sheikhs from amongst the Muslim and Bhoi Urpi, Gujrati, Sindhi from amongst the Hindus were projected as usurpers by their counterpart local Maratha-kunbi competitors. But later on Shiv Sena used communalism to protect not only local Maratha rich peasants and big industrialists, but also the migrant Marwari and Gujarati Hindu big industrial magnates. Bal Thackeray the Shiv Sena leader observed : "those who give a livelihood to Marathis are ours, let them be either Tata or Birla; who cares". Therefore, communal thinking and practice adversely affected the interests of migrant Muslim workers.

Further, in Punjab the conflict between the local and the migrant labour has been used to gain a better bargain for political power. With the influx of the migratory labour, the local labour is finding it difficult to bargain in the labour market. The factional politics within Akali Dals has sharpened this conflict. The leadership of one faction raised the demand of dis-enfranchisement of migrant labour, which was resisted by the rich peasant-lobby. This demand was articulated to win over the support of small and marginal peasant and local landless labour. But this faction did not talk about the ouster of migrant labour, although a few pro-khalistan leaders have. They were of the view that migrant labourers are Hindus and they will never side with the cause of Khalistan, therefore, they must be thrown out. However, factional fight within the Akali Dal tried to communalize the issue, but they did not raise the extreme demand because the ouster of cheap labour would have meant less profit for big and medium landowning strata. It would have also resulted into the differentiation of peasantry in politics and in turn weakened the appeal of religion which helps them to project the interests of the rich peasantry as those of the whole Sikh community.

The conflict between local and migrant labour has been used to sharpen the polarization between trade unions, having their basis in religions in Ahmedabad and Vadodra in Gujarat. Migrants consitute around fortyeight per cent and fortyone per cent of the population in the agglomerations of Ahmedabad and Vadodra respectively. The majority of the migrants from Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Rajasthan, happened to be Hindus and the majority of the local labourers happened to be Muslims. These workers were skilled or semi-skilled, employed in various industrial units. The workers retrenched by the textile mill owners were mainly Muslims who perceived migrants to be their main enemy and vice- versa. The recession in the textile industry and consequently, the retrenchment of workers was encouraged on communal lines by the industrialists to have industrial peace. The communalization of this issue adversely affected the interests of the migrant labour. The internal conflict arising out of competition for market acquires a communal form of competition and antagonism.

Further, politics could not articulate these conflicts on non-communal lines. Rather it reinforced communal polarisation. This politics has appropriated those aspects of social discourse which were differentiating and antagonistic in nature. This process reached its peak in eighties. Much of the political space in the eightes came to be occupied by status-quoist policies and a 'stability' syndrome. The increasing crises of indian capitalism and the wrong choices made by the Indian ruling classes strenghtened the forces of 'stability' and 'status quo'. The inability to subsume the crises and its lack of will and vision to restructure society and politics, shifted the focus from the norms of dissent and consent to 'forced consensus' within the existing system of authority. Alternatives were seen in the formation of national government and evolving a 'consensus' on issues of national importance.

These ideas have been prompted to accomodate and absorb various sub-cultures and to neutralize the forces of dissent. A process of shifting the locus from one variety of ideological monotheism to another is taking shape and simultaneously it is negating the forces of ideological pluralism. This process of maintaining the status quo has been reinforced by the well entrenched middle class. The collective response of the middle class to the announcement of implementation of Mandal Commission recommen-

dations has proved this beyond doubt.

The transformational thrust occupied a large space in the political dialogue until the eighties. Populist slogans like "garibi hatao", "land to the tillers", "social justice for all", "anti-corruption" and "fight against authoritarianism" have been raised from time to time. All these slogans, alongwith the promise of building of a socialist society remained the hall-mark of Indian politics. The Congress promised what Nehru called the socialistic pattern of society by following a policy of industrialisation with government ownership. The state took upon itself the task of building up infrastructure like steel plants, oil refineries and machine tool factories etc. This was essential for the fast growth of private industries. Indian industrialists were unwilling and unable to undertake the construction and management of these heavy industries.

In other words, the national political leadership sought to realize the goal of socialism with the help of creating a large industrial and agricultural base and by developing science and techrology. The process of industrialization and even the policy of nationalization were used as an expedient means for increasing production and not as a means of attaining social justice or reordering society.

Another populist slogan of land reforms was used to create visions of equality. Land reforms and the way they were implemented, transformed big landowners from a class solely depend on land and feudal privileges to a class of rural entrepreneurs. These rural entrepreneurs no doubt retained substantial interest in land but made considerable investment in transport, warehouses, rice mills etc. All these measures threw up a class of privileged people who were gripped by a kind of "psychology". On the other hand, the same process multiplied and also marginalized poor sections.

At the same time, it must be acknowledged the populist slogans and the rhetoric of socialism provided a yardstic to measure the success and failure of the ruling classes. It also contributed in keeping alive the discourse of transformation of society. However, after the mid-eighties, the discourse was not as dominant as it was in the earlier phase. No doubt, the slogan of social justice and political equality was articulated by the Mandal Commission which

was appropriated b, the Janata Dal. But it could not succeed in capturing the larger space in political dialogue. However, it contributed in a limited way to keeping alive the hopes of forging alternatives for making society more equitable and just. It provided hopes to the down-trodden without providing any concrete gains. The Mandal Commission itself acknowledged it. To quote :

> When a backward class candidate becomes a collector or a superintendent of police, the material benefits accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin off of this phenomenon is tremendous; the entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially elevated

Therefore, the Mandal recommendations have nothing to do with equality and social justice. It was solely concerned with the strategy of co-option by multiplying caste cleavages and to achieve balance of interest. This in a limited way provided continuity to the discourse on transformational politics of the pre-1980 phase. But nevertheless, the dialogue it shaped revealed the structural as well as behavioural contradictions of society. These contradictions coloured various conflicts and gave rise to a number of protest movements.

Indian political leadership could not grapple with these conflicts by adopting a long-term approach towards their solution. The fear of competition in politics generated a pervasive sense of insecurity in political leadership. This led to their decreasing reliance on democratic processes for resolving social conflicts. The Indian political leadership could not resolve the paradox between the need for and the threat from liberal democratic institutions and norms of political practices. The choices were exercised in response to the threat posed by the democratic institutions and norms. As a result, participatory institutions were either made ineffective or defunct. The dissent was either muffled or projected as a threat to national unity. Because of this people in various parts of the country have been living in a hazy world of masked authoritarianism. The liberal democratic institutions and norms have been flouted and as a consequence power got personified in a few individuals.

The concentration of power in an individual has, in turn, reduced his capacity to resolve or even accommodate conflicts which have their roots in the emerging social and economic interests. Such a powerful leader comes to believe that it is possible to control events through force, manipulation or by generating fear. These leaders have curtailed the democratic functioning of the various institutions to strengthen their own position and frequently misuse the paramilitary forces and impose laws which curtail the democratic freedoms of the common man rather than of those people who openly flout the basic norms of democratic society. This process made institutions irrelevant and individuals, powerless to perform even minimum necessary functions. These powerless individuals are seen as all powerful by the people. This is a paradox.

In a situation of non-fulfillment of the genuine and legitimate demands, these individuals are identified as a source of people's discontent and therefore a target of cumulative frustration and anger. This gave a fillip to new political culture. This culture encouraged the physical elimination of opponents rather than outcompeting them by following the norms of democratic competition. The increasing trend of assassinating big and small political opponents rather than questioning the basic structures is a result of the centralization of political power in the being of individuals.

This contributed to a building up of a culture of violence. This culture of violence has become dominant in so far as the terms of political articulations are concerned. This in a way has questioned and undermined the ways of doing democratic politics. What is most serious is that both the state and individuals or collectivities consider the use of violence as a substitute of political action or mass mobilization. It seems that violence has become integral to political and social life. The dynamic process of social change generated expectations and caused mobilization of groups asserting for economic and political benefits and socio-cultural identity. These assertions both violent and non-violent manifested in the regional, linguistic, communal and agrarian forms. The liberal 'state structure' responded to these movements by excessively relying on the repressive state apparatus contributing to an unprecedental manifestation of collective political violence.

In other words, the moving away from massification of politics and increasing use of retrogressive tendencies like communalism, casteism and regional chauvinism, to deflect cumulative social anger gave a fillip to culture of violence.

These distortions have been present in the society in the past also. But the political space it occupied was limited. The constant reinforcement and sharpening of these discourses in society and its appropriation in politics has made communalism functional.

From this it can be inferred that communalism is not utterly disconnected with objective conditions. Communalism has an appeal among sections of people as communalism raises the genuine demands of people like more employment, security against competition by way of subsidies, fresh opportunities for economic well-being by way of licenses, quotas, permits etc. But communalism raised these demands on the basis of ascriptive group categories like caste, religion and region and not merit, comparative need etc. Besides, communalism does not ask for the dissolution of the conditions which create scarce socio-economic opportunities and the resultant competition. Instead, they seek a reallocation of scarce jobs, subsidies, quotas, licences etc. so as to favour the leaders of the pressure groups organized on communal lines. Hence, it can be seen that communalism raises social problems but interprets them in a distorted manner and suggests solutions to social problems which are distorted in their premises, opportunist in their approach and retrogressive in their impact.

Communalism does benefit the individual aspirants for High Court judgeship, Vice-chancellorship or Directorship of a hospital, applicants for other white-collar and blue-collar jobs, and also seekers for licences and quotas. These individual gains are short-term and in no way benefit the whole religious group in whose name they are sought. Those who fail to gain are naturally discontended. This discontentment is a result of scarce resources, distributive injustice, etc. and not because one "community" is competing against another for its own betterment or other's detriment. However, communal propaganda by communal, religious and political leaders seeks to give a colour to this struggle between or amongst classes or strata as one between "communities".

Since communalism has a social appeal, the electoral tactics adopted by most of the political parties has a communal content. It arouses expectations on communal lines which cannot be realized within the existing socioeconomic structure. Non-realization of such expectations reinforces the belief that a particular religious group is being discriminated against. The sense of discrimination gets confirmed when it receives the support of the polity or at least neutrality and passivity of political groups or institutions or agents of the state. In most of the recent communal riots this fact has become more apparent and glaring. The incidents in Delhi, Bhiwandi, Malegaon, Indore, Hyderabad and various other areas prove this point beyond doubt.

Chapter 3

Conditions and Manifestations of Communalism

Communal tensions are generated by the nature of socio-economic and political process. But they are imparted a communal colour by communal stereotypes, distorted version of history, religiosity, operational and unascertainable beliefs. These are pregnated with notions having a sense of discrimination, deprivation and hatred for other religious, caste or ethnic groups perceived to be antagonistic. These notions have their basis in larger assumptions of social living and way of life. Therefore, it is necessary to understand and analyse these notions in their proper social, cultural and historical context.

The following are the main manifestations and sufficient conditions for the growth of communalism:

a) Communal stereotypes, educational practices and demonstrative religiosity;
b) Communal politics : The main Propagator and consumer of communalism.
c) Communal violence

Communal Stereotypes, Educational Practices and Demonstrative Religiosity

Communal stereotypes are used to build up a collective ascriptive based identity. This identity is fashioned through social and political discourse. The main focus of this discourse is to reinforce the belief that the basic need of a communal monolith is to reclaim its history, culture and glory having its basis in an ascriptive framework of social analysis. In other words, the emphasis is to reclaim the control over those symbols, myths and legends which multiply communal cleavages and these are used to find answers and solutions to the problems and issues having their basis in the contemporary socio-economic and political realities.

The political strategy, as discussed earlier, envisioned is not transformational in nature. It reinforces and perpetuates existing inequalities. The gradations on the basis of communal categories blur the structure of inequalities in the cleavages of political, social

and economic nature. The process strengthens communal monoliths and conceals the structural inequalities. These monoliths constitute social and political reality of a sort; but of a sort only. Because communal monoliths are torn between the pragmatic acceptance and so far ineffective rejection by the specific path of capitalist development and secular perceptions. On the contrary, communal fragmentations help to maintain the existing order. It keeps divided the forces which can challenge and question the forces of status quo.

Therefore, communal forces try to strengthen and reinforce the communal monoliths by inciting fears and insecurities among their respective support base. This is also achieved through communal propaganda which is imbued with hatred and antagonistic assertions.

Invariably, communal propaganda has resulted in the formation of certain stereotypes, some of which are broadly common amongst sections which may be victims of elements of communal ideology or may be using this ideology or may only have inculcated some elements of this ideology.

The communal stereotypes widely prevalent among sections of the Hindu religious group are as follows:-

a) Muslims believe in one God and one Book and are more organized. They are unreasonable, fundamentalist and fanatical.
b) Muslims eat meat, are hot-blooded, keep at least big knives (and other deadly weapons too) and are initiators of communal violence which takes place in India. They derive their strength for violent assertions from tenets of Islam such as 'Jihad against Kafirs'.
c) Muslims are tribal in their outlook and to them religion is above everything else. They unite in politics and organize their housing in clusters on the basis of their religion.
d) Muslims are unhygienic, uneducated and unhealthy as they show no interest in the development of civic amenities and health educational facilities. Islam is an unscientific religion.
e) Muslims are immoral and polygamous. They want to numerically outnumber Hindus through conversions and by violating of the small family norm and establish another Pakistan in India.

f) Muslims are disloyal and unpatriotic. They are converting lower caste Hindus and purchasing real estate on the behest and with the financial support of Gulf countries.

Stereotypes prevalent amongst sections of the Muslims religious group were as follows:

a) Hindus are money-minded. They are always looking for ways of making money through any means. They charge interest on money, which is not permissible by our religion. While we impart moral teaching to our children, the Hindus teach their young ones the methods of spinning money.
b) Hindus are untrustworthy. They always work towards their narrow self-interests and can do it at anybody's cost, even their own kith and kin. They are not loyal too anyone except themselves. They are divided amongst themselves. Casteism is a proof of this and their selfish nature.
c) Hindus consider themselves to be superior. They do not interact with us. They do not like the idea that we must come at par with them and hence wherever Muslims improve economically they conspire to riot.
d) The administration is dominated by Hindus and is unfair to us. Even in a rioting situation we are at the receiving end from the administration. Development schemes don't benefit us, Government jobs are not given to us and all this is due to the Hindu character of the administration.

These stereotypes feed and fatten religious group identities, i.e. communalism. Communalism exploit the discrepancy between the self-perception of one religious group and perception of it by the antagonistic communal group, to spread fear and insecurity among their co-religionists. For example, Communalism often accuse "Hindus" to be vicious towards minorities and to be communal. Communalism of the other shade counters this accusation by reiterating that their secularism and tolerance is evident in allowing `Muslims' to live in India even after granting them `Pakistan' in 1947, whereas in Pakistan `Hindus' have been virtually eliminated. Similarly, communalism charges that `Muslims' are anti-national as they celebrate the victories of Pakistani sports teams over Indian teams.

Communalism of the other shade rebuts this charge by referring to the active participation of `Muslims' in the freedom struggle and in the two wars against Pakistan.

There are instances when communalism accepts the communal stereotypes propagated by communalism of the other shade. For example, communalism often brands the Indian State to be 'Hindu'. Communalism of the other shade accepts this and starts prescribing a code of conduct for all 'Muslims'. Similarly, communalism charges 'Muslims' with being strongly organized and blind supporters of their own co-religionsits.

Muslims accept this charge and claim that if they do not defend their religion the 'Hindus' will stamp out `Islam'. Communalism of all shades accept the belief that the gain of an individual belonging to a particular religious group is an achievement of the whole religious group and a loss of their own group.

There is a stereotype which proclaims that Muslims procreate faster so as to numerically outnumber other religious groups and thereafter establish a Muslim state in India. In a pamphlet dated 16th November, 1983, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad highlights data to prove that Hindus will become a minority in India by 2151 A.D. This can be challenged on the basis of facts gleaned from census data. The decline in the percentage share of annual compound growth rate in India between 1961-71 and 1971-81 of Hindu Population is (-) 0.20, whereas it is (-) 0.63 in the case of Muslims.

These facts belie the often repeated communal propaganda by communalism that 'Muslims are fanatically opposing the small family norm and are consciously increasing their numbers to elevate themselves from being a minority to becoming a majority in India.

The reason to prove that the communal stereotypes regarding the pre-defined expansion of population by Muslims are false is to emphasize the point that population growth is not a conspiracy of one religious group but a function of several factors. The growth of population is primarily due to factors like socio-economic conditions and receptivity of birth control measures among persons belonging to different classes, income strata and occupational groups. There may also be the possibility of a persecution complex, arising out of communal ideology, influencing the growth rate of population of religious groups in specific conditions. For example, in 5 of the 29 urban centres mentioned in the Table 3.1,

TABLE 3.1

RELIGIOUS GROUPWISE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE (1970-81) POPULATION IN SELECTED CITIES/TOWNS IN INDIA

Sr. No.		Percentage of Muslims (1971)	Percentage of Muslims (1981)	Growth Rate(1970-81) Muslims	Hindus
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1.	Srinagar (MC)	85.56	89.08	3.52	0.28
2.	Rampur (MB)	71.94	72.26	2.45	2.47
3.	Malegaon (M)	67.52	67.38	2.49	2.59
4.	Garden Reach (M)	60.49	64.77	2.82	0.94
5.	Moradabad (MB)	51.27	49.34	2.08	3.00
6.	Burhampur (M)	45.66	45.88	3.02	2.97
7.	Shajahanpur (MB)	45.44	46.16	3.34	3.20
8.	Gulbarga (M)	42.20	34.30	2.14	5.64
9.	Firozabad (MB)	40.02	35.44	2.96	5.09
10.	Saharanpur (MB)	38.60	31.16	0.56	4.26
11.	Hyderabad (MC)	38.10	37.59	2.54	2.84
12.	Nanded (M)	36.67	33.33	3.22	4.43
13.	Meerut (MB)	36.65	40.95	5.58	3.59
14.	Bhopal (MC)	36.57	27.94	5.58	9.84
15.	Bareilly (MB)	35.84	36.11	2.78	2.72
16.	Bihar (M)	35.80	38.72	5.04	3.72
17.	Aurangabad (M)	35.09	31.53	5.96	7.45
18.	Kurnool (M)	34.36	32.19	3.56	5.01
19.	Calicut (C)	33.32	35.06	2.19	1.30
20.	Bijapur (M)	33.20	32.67	3.38	3.59
21.	Aligarh (ME)	33.08	34.46	2.85	2.27
22.	Bellary (M)	30.42	28.30	4.12	5.27
23.	Bhagalpur (M)	30.17	28.97	2.30	2.91
24.	Nizamabad (M)	29.52	31.16	5.27	4.47
25.	Lucknow (MC)	29.46	29.90	1.95	1.69
26.	Muzaffarnagar (MB)	29.25	29.97	4.37	3.97
27.	Gorakhpur (MB)	25.97	25.53	2.16	2.41
28.	Varanasi (MC)	25.87	25.72	1.90	2.41
29.	Darbhanga (M)	25.20	26.00	3.25	2.85

Source (i) Census of India, 1971 paper 2 of 1971
(ii) Census of India, 1981 paper 4 of 1984

Hindus constitute a numerical minority. Three out of these five urban centres witnessed a higher annual compound population growth of Hindus as compared to that of Muslims. Similarly, in 7 out of the 12 urban centres where Muslims constitute 35 per cent to 50 per cent of the total population, the annual compound growth rate of the Hindu population was comparatively higher. Finally, 6 out of the remaining 12 urban centres where Muslims constituted less than 35 per cent but more than 25 per cent of the population also experienced a higher annual compound growth rate of the population of Hindus (See Table 3.1).

So while the communal stereotype about a 'Muslim conspiracy' to increase `their' population at a faster pace is denied by facts on the one hand, the influence of communalism and the sense of fear and persecution complex on the rate of population growth can be hypothesized on the other.

The failure of persons to agree to use birth control methods is related to the extent of the prevalence of fatalism, poverty etc. among them but not to the religion they profess.

Not only this communal stereotypes project Islam as socialistic and Hinduism as capitalistic in outlook. To quote[1] :

> There is also a marked difference in the economy of these two great communities. The Islamic economic system is socialistic in outlook. Islam is a proletarian faith which does not encourage the amassing of wealth. All accumulated wealth must be shared with the poor. Money should not be hoarded but kept in circulation. Through Zaket it ensures the distribution of wealth and circulation of money. With an organized system of Zaket an individual's locked up surplus must dissipate itself within a few decades. Islam does not permit usury. No usury means no banking capital. But Hinduism is a capitalist religion. The Hindus worship 'Lakshimi' as goddess of wealth and usury is one of their

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1. Kazi Said-ud-din Ahmad (1947), *The Communal Pattern of India,* Pakistan Literature Series No.2, Lahore, p.4

'Lakshimi' as goddess of wealth and usury is one of their principal sources of income. Most of the capitalists and industrial magnates, as it is, are Hindus.

Similarly, communalism propagate Islam as a closed and intolerant religion and Hinduism as an open and democratic religion. These stereotypes differ in emphasis and some times in form with reference to different inter religious interactions. For instance, in Punjab the Hindus and the Sikhs communal propagations have their basis in boundary definition and in the social and cultural roles and also placement.

In so far as the boundary definition is concerned a majority of the Sikhs allege that the Hindus refuse to recognize their separate identity and assert that Sikhs belong to their tradition. In this context some of them referred to an appeal issued by the Vishwa Hindu Parishad.[2] To quote :

> Today, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad has given a clarion call to all factions, sections, sects, sub-sects of all denominations of Hindus (Sanatan Dharmis, Arya Samajist, Buddhist, Jains, Radha Swamis, Nirankaris, Nam-Dharis, Sikhs, Ravidasis, Valmikis etc.) to unite together on a common platform to jointly struggle against the above mentioned foreign conspiracies.

A section of the Hindus claimed Sikhism as a branch of Hinduism. And alleged that it is dishonesty on the part of Sikhs to disown their roots and traditions. A section of the Sikhs on the other hand branded Hindus as traitors because they disowned Punjabi as their language. They also accuse Hindus of treating them as ignorant fools, lacking in commonsense and culturally inferior. Interestingly both the Hindus and the Sikhs felt that they were being treated as a second class citizens. For this they held each other responsible. This is contrary to the Hindu-Muslim relationship. Both these sections were suffering from a persecution complex.

The Hindus, though in a majority at the all India level, suffer from a minority complex within Punjab. The Sikhs, though a majority in Punjab, have a minority complex when they look to India

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2. An appeal issued by Vishwa Hindu Parishad, 1981.

as a whole and the character of the power structure at the centre[3]. The Sikhs who fear assimilation into Hindu religion aspire for strengthening of the revivalist fundamentalist tendencies in order to retain their separate identity. The Punjabi Hindus fear the domination by the Sikhs in Punjab and, therefore, have a strong tendency to identify themselves with the all India mainstream rather than the Punjabi mainstream.

The self-proclaimed Messiahs of both the Sikhs and theHindus play on the apprehensions,prejudices and fears of their co-religionists and exploit the discrepancies of self-perceptions between the two, to foster and promote their respective electoral interests. This attitude influences their reactions to the territorial integrity and development demands of Punjab, such as the demand for the inclusion of Punjabi speaking areas and construction of the Thein Dam; and Mini-Steel Plants etc. Communalism actively and vociferously advocates and agitates in favour of these demands, which it tends to project as the demands of the Sikhs only. The self proclaimed leadership of the Hindus does not actively participate and mobilize people on these demands. In the event of non-realization of such demands the feelings of Sikhs being discriminated against gets strengthened.

This kind of attitude may be the manifestation of as, explained earlier, the persecution complex suffered by both these groups.

In this way communal stereotypes aggravate fears, suspicions and mistrust between religious groups. The individuals who fall prey to communal ideology or some of its elements, seek refuge in religious group identities and also start reinforcing them by propagating communal ideology. Most of the individuals who are over - religious begin presuming that communalism is protecting their endangered religious group identities. The consequence this process leads to the maintenance and promotion of religious group

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3. Even before independence the minority persecution complex was taking shape. Muslims were a majority in Punjab, a minority in South Asia, and members of a great world community. Hindus were a minority in Punjab, a majority in South Asia and members of a unique but somewhat isolated community on a world wide scale. Only the Sikhs retained a consistent minority status whatever yard stick was used to measure them..... Majority and minority status then were not determined by statistics but perception was more often then not shaped by underlying fears. Kenneth Zones ,*Arya Dharam*. P.L. Printers, Delhi.

identities. The emphasis of communalism is on religious practices, festivals, processions etc. In fact, it is not religion as an ideology which imparts passion and intensity to communalism. It is demonstrative and aggressive religiosity which forms a major plank of communalism and makes it politically effective.

Demonstrative Religiosity and Growth of Communalism

Demonstrative religiosit [4] refers to a deep and intense emotional involvement with merely ritualistic aspects of religion and a tendency to generate competition on celebration of religious festivals among members of different religious groups and to underscore the universal economic and political interests of the unequal members of one religious group and these are projected as antagonistic to the members of other religious groups.

This kind of religiosity is the organizing principle commonly used by communalism. Repeated assertions regarding differences in religious practices and beliefs are elements which go into the making of a communal monolith. Every time a religious procession is disrupted or the public performance of religious practices is interfered with by rival communalism or even miscreants, these so called identities are projected to be in danger. Communalism tries to promote solidarity by exaggerating incidents when such processions or festivals have been infringed upon. A resolution issued in the form of a pamphlet on October 13, 1983 at Maunath Bhanjan in district Azamgarh of Uttar Pradesh is an illustration of this. Although the blame for untoward incidents following the infringement is laid squarely on the administration, the exaggeration of religious group discrimination and a panicky appeal to co-religionists for unity is clearly spelt out, in the resolution. Such frequent projections of danger further cement communal monoliths.

It has been observed that in the past religious celebrations were performed in places of worship without much fanfare. Lately communalism and vested interests started using religion to organize the people. Religious celebrations are conducted through huge processions with great pomp and show.

The celebrations of traditional festivals of the Hindus (like Shiv Ratri, Teej, Gangaur, Makar Sankranti, Dassera, Krishna

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4. Bipan Chandra (1984) op. cit. p. 203

Ashtami, Holi etc.) and of the Muslims (like Moharram, Id-ul-Isha, Idul-Milad-ul-Nabi etc.) often generate communal tensions. For instance, saffron flags were hoisted on Shivaji Jayanti all over Bhiwandi in 1984 and green flags were put in same town at all places on the day of Shab-e-Barat. These flags were seen and projected as a provocation challenging the honour of their religion. It is the spirit and manner of celebrating these festivals as manifestations of the religio-political strength of a particular group which causes tension rather than the celebration of religious festivals per se. The celebration of religious festivals,it appears is prompted by and further strengthens the elements of communalism.

The formation of social welfare organizations and credit societies on the basis of caste and religion has further reinforced the notion of divergent and dissimilar interests of members belonging to different religious or caste groups. Insterestingly these organizations had become active generally around early 1970s. The major thurst of their activities is public celebration of religious rituals and festivals, promotion of cultural and educational activities, extension of credit facilities, provision of hostel accommodation, to the co-religionists. In fact these are used to protect and promote the political and economic interests of the local leaders, traders, professionals, white-collared workers etc. under whose control these organizations generally function. During elections, concessions are sought (and sometimes successfully clinched) by the above mentioned vested interests on behalf of their respective caste or religious groups. The membership of the organizations patronizing these processions mostly consists of those known less for their involvement in religious affairs but more well known as political figures. Most of the members of such organizations are young, as in the case of 'Tarun Mandals' formed for the public performance of religious festivals at Pune. Similar organizations are active in Bhiwandi and are called 'Utsav Mandals' or 'Anjumans'. These organizations make planned efforts for mobilising members of different religious groups through the collection of donations and the allocation of responsibilities to celebrate religious rituals. To cite another example, the 'Durga Puja Mahasamiti' at Maunath Bhanjan (which functions under the supervision of the Ramlila Mela Samiti) co-ordinates the activities of all its mohalla-level units and some 'puja samitis' in villages. This 'Mahasamiti' consists of seven businessmen, three service workers

and one student. All members of the Mahasamiti are below 40 years but more than 25 years of age. Planned and organized efforts are made for the public performance of religious rituals.

The fanfare and pomp with which any religious festival is organized leads to a competitive response from persons claiming to represent other religious group. A result of such a competition is that members of different religious groups perceive their interests to be similar with their co-religionists and different from members of other religious groups. The impact of their efforts lead to the sharpening of religious group identities and the emergence of 'community leaders' who are expected to protect and promote 'Hindu interests', 'Muslim interests' and so on.

In this context, it must be pointed out that the increasing religiosity and dogmatic attitude and the mere identification of an individual or a group with a religion need not necessarily lead to communalism. This is evident from the assimilative outlook of a section of the emerging Muslim middle-class due to the convergence of their non- religious interests with the other sections of the society. Besides, it is apparent that in contemporary India the Hindus and the Muslims are not necessarily homogeneous among themselves and are riddled with numerous caste and class divisions which make them different from other members of the religious group to which they belong.

Educational Practices, Media and Communalism

Elements of communalism and their operation can also be discerned from the local vernacular press. The news has become a commodity, which caters to the perceived demands of the customers. Mass media caters to elements of communalism by misinterpreting history on communal lines. For instance, an interview with Gopal Godse, brother of Mahatma Gandhi's assassin, was published in a vernacular nespaper, "Gujarat Samachar", dated 21 July, 1983. Gopal Godse alleged that Mohammed Ali Jinha had converted the Quit India Movement into a "split India" stir. He accused Mahatma Gandhi of forcing the concept of Ahimsa on the Hindus, while calling Muslims brothers. The Muslims believed that the Hindus were "kafirs". This, Gopal Godse said, was unbearable. The last wish of his brother, Nathu Ram, was that the latter's ashes should be immersed in the Indus in Pakistan. He did not want his ashes to be 'contaminated'

by those of Gandhiji. The government of Pakistan refused this request as the 'land of the pure' could not be allowed to be polluted by the ashes of a 'kafir'. The ashes of his brother were kept in Pune and would be immersed in the Indus when an "Akhand Bharat" came into existence, Gopal Godse said.

The mass media, political parties and educational institutions (both formal and informal) use these notions to reinforce the idea that societies are organized on ascriptive group lines and competition between two communal groups is projected as a conflict between two religious groups. Communalists spare the communal categories of social analysis when it does not reinforce their point of view. For example, *Muslim India* presented data on Aligarh Muslim University identifying the strength of students, teachers, etc., on regional lines and not on religious group lines. Whereas in the case of Banaras Hindu University it used a religious category. It was alleged that this was an attempt to hide the gradual elimination of non-Muslims from the University. They further accuse the journal of dishonesty by always beating its breast on missed opportunities, but concealing its gain on the availed ones. They think it is confusing that on everything else *Muslim India* talks of Hindus, Muslims but on AMU uses other categories like regional groups.

Similarly, *Marmik* in its issues between April and September, 1967, under the editorship of Bal Thackeray and during the period of the Shiv Sena's anti-migrant tirade gave lists of persons who were executives in some industrial establishments and Government departments in Bombay. According to this weekly, 70 per cent of executives in the sample units of its survey were South Indians, whereas 75 out of the 1500 executives were Maharashtrians. *Marmik* has, since the early 1980s, begun using religion as an instrument to spread communal venom and mobilize a wider support base for the Shiv Sena.

Such provocations do not go unnoticed. They have a social appeal among certain sections of both religious groups. Communalists among the Hindus and the Muslims use such venomous items in perpetuating communal ideology. Such irresponsible literature is sold cheaply and has a disastrous effect on the harmonious relations between the two religious groups.

It is observed that the saleability of news items takes precedence over information and social desirability. It might be

worthwhile to examine the impact on society of the media industry which is organized on a profit-making basis. For example, in Punjab an incident occurred in which eight passengers of a bus were killed on September 12, 1984, near Udhowal when it was going from Amritsar to Pathankot.

Newspapers reported this incident and exaggerated the number of those killed at 20. Besides, newspapers attributed the killings to "Sikh terrorists" when it was actually the task of anti-social elements whose gang leader was a person named, Madan Lal [5].

This news became the pretext for rioting in Dhariwal town of Ferozepur district. Mass media adds to elements of communalism already prevalent in the minds of people by describing riots or other conflicts to be a fight between two religious groups rather than between two communal groups.

These distortions have been present in the society. They have been reflected in formal as well as informal educational practices. The constant reinforcement and sharpening of these distortions by educational practices has provided legitimacy and in the process it increased its appeal amongst the people.

The elements of communalism reflected in both the formal and the informal educational apparatus, hammer that the believers in Islam are culturally inferiors and politically and socially aliens. However, the formal educational practice has been projecting Muslims as invaders, despoilers of temples and culturally inferiors. Whereas, the non-formal educational practices have been emphasising the antagonism between the believers of Hinduism and Islam in extreme form. In other words, at the popular level, literature sold for easy reading and oral traditions tend to reinforce the antagonisms between religions. In this process impurity of the other religion is fabricated and propagated. For instance, the distortions orally transmitted were published in literature sold cheaply. An extract is being cited from a pamphlet entitled 'Rangila Rasul' published in 1920s which is still in wide circulation.

> Mohammad got married. He married many times. He contracted all types of marriages. He married virgins also. He enjoyed all types of marriages. He not only understood

5. This issue has been investigated by Brijinder Singh Panwar as a part of his M.Phil dissertation submitted to Punjab Agricultural University, Ludhiana, in July, 1986

> the good and evil of marriages but experienced them also. Mohammad's life is instructive, full of sermons and prayers, indeed Mohammad was a mentor (translated from Hindi).

This provocation was not the only one and, probably because of its sarcastic and venomous nature, it did not go unnoticed. The fanatics among the Muslims issued a rejoinder under the title 'Mukadas (or pure) Rasul'. Commenting on 'Rangila Rasul' Hazarat Ulomi of Deoband in district Saharanpur, said :

> "Rangila Rasul" is a proof of Arya Samaj's civilized behaviour and of the regard Aryans have for truth. The book is imbued with the famous attribute of the Samaj's literature that it hurts feelings, is harshly written, is dishonest and is blind in hatred.
>
> The teachings of the first Guru of the Samaj, called Swami Dayanand, come out clearly in this book. That such a dirty and stinking composition comes from an Arya is not surprising at all. However, it is very surprising that even after seeing such damaging and indecent sentences against their 'pure rasul' the Muslims have not reacted (translated from Urdu).[6]

It is clear from the above that popular literature published for easy reading bore the imprint of communal rivalry and antagonism.

Similarly there has been literature which painted the Hindu deities in the darkest possible colours. '*Ram ki Paheli*' authored by B.R. Ambedkar, which is quite widely circulated, accuses a Hindu deity, i.e. Rama to be lustful, alcoholic etc [7].

Similarly, certain communally-interpreted stories form a part of orally transmitted history. These stories have no historical evidence or documentation but are a part of the oral tradition of folklore. They are preserved as legends from one generation to another by word of mouth with distortions creeping into its text every now and then.

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6. *Mukadas Rasul* Roznama Bargive Press, Amritsar
7. B.R. Ambedkar (1963) *Ram ki paheli*, Buddist Publishing House, Jalandhar; See also Shambuk Muni (1984) *Ram Rajya Nyaya Natak* for similar inflamatory material.

In a developing society certain virtues are attributed to education. The fetishization of education and the elements of communal ideology in it alleviate every educated person as a responsible member of society and consequently provide legitimacy to communal ideas which a person has acquired in a process of learning.

These views may have been formed by the non-formal educational practices, but formal teaching is also not inconsistent with this. A cursory glance at the textbooks for schools, reveal that their content violates the very assumptions of scientific study. As is universally acknowledged, science provides a method for looking at issues, events and persons objectively. However, certain portions of the textbooks for schools do not appear to fulfill the criterion of scientific and objective analysis. At certain places, in history textbooks an impression is created that rulers were motivated in the past to fight with each other mainly after being infuriated by religious prejudices or on being inspired by religious sentiments.

For example, a passage in the book entitled "Apna Bharat" (Tarikh ki pahli kitab) says, 'Rana Udai Singh of the Sisodia dynasty was very proud of his Kshatriya status. In defence of religion and freedom he prepared himself to go to war against Akbar..." (translated from Urdu p.81).

Religiosity and fatalism are reinforced in "Sahayak Vachan" textbook included in the syllabus of Class V students in Madhya Pradesh. This textbook states that all positive characters and great men were invariably followers of deities like Shiv, Ganesh, Krishna, Parvati or Naag Devata. The book further propagates the superstition that a crow whose young ones were eaten by a snake and a begger who could not feed his family were blessed with happiness after they prayed to Lord Ganesh. The wide appeal of Hindu Gods is shown by indicating that even some 'Muslims' worshipped them. "... Allauddin was born in a poor family. His father was a small peasant who was a worshipper of Lord Shiva" [8].

Yet another passage is particularly offensive as it can arouse immediate emotive reaction due to reference to the Maratha feudal chieftain Shambaji, the son and successor of Chatrapati Shivaji. The passage says: Shambaji was produced before Emperor Auran-

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8. Bharat Bhushan (1983) "Ustad Allaudin Khan". *Sahayak Vachan* Class V, M.P. Pathya Pustak Nigam, p.21.

gazeb at Tulapur near Pune, who said that if Shambaji embraces Islam, he will be pardoned. Shambaji was infuriated at this and he replied boldly, "it does not matter if I loose my life, but I shall not disown my beloved religion. On hearing this reply, Aurangazeb ordered the execution of Shambaji... Shambaji sacrificed his life for the sake of his religion. This sacrifice is unparalled and it immortalized Shambaji.[9]

Such kind or examples can be gleaned from various textbooks prescribed for students of different standards in the states of India.

Such kind of communal bias is blatantly reflected in some of the text books on history. To quote,

> ....Turks were expansionists. They invaded India to spread Islam and other countries of Asia. They were plunderers who looted India's richness and went back. Turks succeeded in conquering India because being the followers of Islam, they had great unity among themselves. Everybody enjoyed equal rights. Hindus, who believed in division of functions on the basis of caste, had left the responsibillity of defending the country on just one caste, i.e. the Kshatriyas, whereas all Muslims had a strong will to conquer other nations to spread Islam. Their unity and will made their victory easy. For Muslims, battles with the Rajputs were crusades and death on the battlefield meant martyrdom. Their religion was their inspiration and unity their strength. The Rajputs could not defend their land because they fought the battles as religious crusades not using any underhand means but the Turks were never guided by ethical and moral values... They adopted treacherous and underhand means to win battles.[10]

A study of "Medieval History" by Romila Thapar would perhaps take the readers of these textbooks out of the communal quagmire. She writes: "The Turks and Mughals were ruling Indians who lived in much the same way as Indians in the early part of the medieval period. The Turks and Mughals made India their home-

9. *Apna Bharat,* Dooshari Kitab, page (translated from Urdu).
10. *Social Studies,* M.P.Pathya Pusthak Nigam, Class VIII, 1983, pp.25-26.
11. Romilla Thapar (1979), "Medieval India", *History and Civics,* A Text Book for Class VII, NCERT, p.3

land and became a part of the India's population."[11]

Misrepresentation of history is carried further.

> Mehmood Ghazni wanted to build a strong empire. He was a staunch Muslim who wanted to spread Islam. He required money to maintain his army. To collect money he invaded India seventeen times. He looted and plundered temples. He conquered Punjab and whole of North India, but never stayed back. His notorious attack is on Somnath temple where he disfigured the holy idol. This defiling of idols made him a religious leader and won him great acclaim among Muslims.[12]

Communalism inflicted on young students through such history writing hardens communal attitudes. It has long been established that temples during the time of these invasions (i.e. 1000 A.D.) were not merely places of worship but were store houses of state wealth. These temples were symbols of might and piety from where believers drew inspiration and their demolition may also have been resorted to demoralize the resisting armies.

Another instance of communal writings in history books is "...Mohammed Ghori vanquished the Rajputs by using all kinds of tricks.".[13] It has deliberately been ignored that Mohammad Ghori first invaded Multan, a Muslim fiefdom. He conqured all small kingdoms which came in his way. It was not the unity among all Muslims which brought the fall of "Hindu Rajas". Instead, it was the weak rulers and inferior technology and war tactics which were largely responsible for the defeat of India's rulers in the medieval period. But much explanations are strangely missing from textbooks.

Legends treated as history and reinforced through pamphlets,whose circulation even today would be more than the most erudite works of historical research. A brief description is reproduced from a play 'Prithviraj Chauhan', authored by Nayadas Singh Bachan Dehlavi, which is allegedly based on Chandra Kavi's description of his patron, Prithviraj Chauhan's encounter with Shahbuddin Mohammad Ghori resulting in the death of the latter. This is a patent distortion of documented historical facts. It might be noted

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12. *Social Studies* (1983), op cit. p.21
13. Ibid pp.23-25

that Mohammed Ghori died in 1206 after which Qutub-ud-din Aibak inaugurated the slave dynasty in India and also that Prithviraj Chauhan met Mohamad Ghori only twice in the battlefield of Tarrain in 1191 and 1192. But the pamphlet mentioned above narrates a fantastic story of the magnanimity of Prithviraj Chauhan who pardoned Shahbuddin Mohammad Ghori sixteen times after defeating him in battles. But on the seventeenth occasion, the playwright says, Ghori emerged victorious but could not reciprocate Prithviraj Chauhan's large-hearted gestures.

However, the heroism of Chauhan is depicted by demonstrating how he was blind-folded and yet, on a cursory description of Ghori's position in his court, shot an arrow straight into the latter's head and killed him.

Such interpretation of history tends to colour the past because of the animosities generated due to the contemporary socio-economic and political conditions. The rulers in the ancient and medieval period did not represent popular will nor the welfare of the people. These rulers were formulating their policies and practising politics, which was most conducive to preserve their authority or to expand their kingdoms.

The presentation of national heritage in religious or caste terms is based on the understanding that society was, or continues to be, organized on religious or caste basis. It is also assumed that members of different religions or caste groups in the past have lived a glorious life in an ideal ethos of harmony and spirit of collectivity. Hence, the most widespread values today are condemned as having degenerated by comparing them with a nostaligic glorious past. From this it is concluded that mixing of different cultural streams has corrupted the so called national culture. Therefore, it is propagated that cultural assimilation (bordering with Hindu chauvinism) is the best way of solving the problems relating to morality, degeneration of human values etc.

Inspite of the fact that there have been serious attempts to provide scientific basis to the writings on Indian history, politics continuous to disseminate communal orientations.

Research was initiated on new themes altogether in which communal categories did not enter at all.[14] Even these

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14. Harbans Mukhia (1983) op cit p.63

systematic and serious attempts could not make the desired impact. The need is to subjectively intervene into non-formal educational practices. It is these practices which occupy a large space in the society. These were themes like rural class structure, forms and magnitude of exploitation of medieval Indian peasantry, the significance of zamindars as a class, production technology, trade and commercial organization etc. An important role in this shift of focus was played by research on what came felicitiously to be called 'early medieval India' in Professor R.S. Sharma's terminology. This research made two significant contributions: one, it implicitly questioned the earlier clearly communal, periodization which divided medieval from ancient India at 1206 A.D., with the establishment of the Delhi Sultanate, for it, again implicitly, opened up the possibility of seeing an extensive continuum of social and economic history from around the seventh or eight to the thirteenth or fourteenth century, even as important changes occurred within the range of this continnum; two, it decisively shifted the emphasis from politico-administrative to socio-economic history, where communal categories in any case lose much of their significance.

Communal Politics - the main consumer of Communalism

Indian politics has been frequently appropriating the existing caste or religious group divisions as reflected in communal stere-

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15. Politics turns communal if political groups and parties mobilize people by reinforcing such perceptions as :
    a) ascriptive groups have separate and antagonistic social and economic interests;
    b) these interests can only be safeguarded or achieved by ascriptive groups organizing themselves in the political sphere along religious, caste or other ascriptive lines.
    c) privileges and concessions in political and economic spheres are sought and granted by political groups on the basis of the religious groups affiliation of people.
    d) communalists are the bona fide representatives of all members of religious or caste groups which they claim to represent; and
    e) representation in elected bodies, public employment, getting licences, payment of taxes etc. are/or should be based on religious group identities.

otypes, distorted version of history, religiosity, unascertainable beliefs which are full of hatred and contempt for any religious, caste or regional group perceived to be antagonistic[15]. The appropriation of communalism became excessive and blatant during the eighties. Communalism was, no doubt, being appropriated by politics even before the eighties. But it was more localized and subtle. It was mainly confined to the electoral arithmatic. During this period, even the Congress party allied with communal parties to fight elections and to form governments, for instance, in Kerala, in what is called the United Democratic Front. These alliances and concessions provided legitimacy to communalism and disarmed these non-communal political parties from launching an ideological and political struggle against communal forces and communal political parties. During the Janta period (1977-79) some leaders of a communal party demanded that NCERT text books on Indian History written by Professor(s) R.N. Sharma, Romila Thapar, Bipan Chandra should be proscribed because they make derogatory remarks against Hindus and are sympathetic to Muslims. As a result one textbook i.e. R.S. Sharma's Ancient Indian History was withdrawn in a hush-hush manner.

After the eighties communal politics not only appropriated localized communalism on an all-India scale, but initiated a process of communal redefinition of boundaries between the various religious and caste groups. For example, the caste bias of the Mandal Commission report and its use by politics by multiplying caste cleavages have provided a continuity to the caste system. Further the collective response of the upper castes to the Mandal Commission Report was equally casteist. This resulted in the formation of new caste alliances. Similarly, the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri Masjid issue and its appropriation at the national scale by mainstream politics strengthened communal monoliths and resulted in communal polarization. The areas governed by caste or religious ethics and beliefs systems became consistent with the politics pursued by the dominant political parties. This was a departure from the earlier phase in which political and social discourses were not consistent with each other. The interaction was merely confined to using some of the elements of social discourse in the realm of caste and religious ethical and belief systems. For example, the use of the notion of Ram Rajya by Gandhi was against colonial domination. Similarly, the Wahabis launched a holy war against landlords and

the British colonialists and appealed to Muslims to unite for the defence of their religion. The use of *Ram Rajya* by Gandhi was in reference to the country's civilization and it transcended the boundaries of caste and religion.

It was not to reinforce religious monoliths. In no way it propagated and projected *Ram Rajya* as synonymous with the Hindu identity. On the contrary, the recent use of the notion of *Ram Rajya* was anti-thetical to the Gandhian use of it. The meaning of the term Indian civilization is distorted to mean "Hindu" civilization. The believers of other religions are projected as culturally inferiors, politically and socially aliens. *Ram Rajya* is used to mean *Hindu Rajya* and Muslims are projected as enemies and are threatened for their non-compliance with what they project as their worldview. The central thrust of this politics is to bring to the foreground the need for establishing a monolith Hindu identity. Once this identity becomes recognized and established, the VHP believes, it will make a crucial difference in determining the personal, social and institutional relations to the benefit of the so called 'Hindu Samaj'. Further it is also argued that political interests of Hindus and the Muslims are not common because Hindus want to establish a Hindu state while 'Muslims' want to create a new Pakistan in India. For instance, Organizer Weekly, English Newspapers published a report on Hindu Solidarity Conference dated 11.3.1984. The following resolutions were passed in the conference :

> The Hindu voters all over the country vote only those who openly and publicly promise to work and fight for Hindu interests and defend the Hindu faith. It was very necessary to have a Hindu vote bank as the Hindu politicians were running after Minorities votes.

In this conference speakers demanded the declaration of India as a Hindu state in the interest of future of India and Hindus. It was felt that only a Hindu state could protect the Hindus and not a secular state because the way secularism has been practised in India, goes against the interests of Hindus.

A concern was also expressed over the so called decline in the Hindu population and rise in the population of Muslims and

Christians and it exhorted the Hindus to boycott family planning. It was alleged that Hindu politicians have done nothing for the Hindus, but had only betrayed their cause. The time has come for the Hindus to assert their rights and vote for those who can protect the interests of Hindus.

Similarly, an appeal issued by Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid Delhi to all Muslims voters to vote for a particular political party for the protection of their interests. During elections some political activists also raised communal slogans like - 'cow is our sacred mother, Bashr[16] eats cows'; 'he who does not have a tuft will not be elected' (jiske churki nahin, uske kursi nahin); 'Hindustan Mein Rehne Hoga to Bande Matram Kahna Hoga'; 'Jo Hindu hite ke Baat Karega, Vohi Desh Pe Raj Karega'. Constant reinforcement and sharpening of these has made communalism more politically functional. This functional aspect has made politics consistent with social discourse having communal overtones. These trends of politics trying to appropriate social discourse were visible even in initial years after independence. The concessions were granted to the communal forces. It was suggested that these concessions were out of conceptual error, i.e. the failure to meet communal demands would inflame communalism.

It was thought that by joining hands with communal parties to form governments or to fight elections would help subsuming these forces.

Not only this, the understanding that when two communal groups join hands, they can accommodate the socalled interest of their co-religionists, was another instance of the practice of communal politics. For example, in Punjab four Akali-Jana Sangh coalition were founded on communal arithmatic, i.e. Akalis represent Sikh interest and Jana Sangh represent Hindu interest.

There is always the possibility that non-realization of the needs or demands falsely projected and believed to be of the whole of the 'community' boomerang on the propagators of communal demands. Recent developments in Punjab illustrate the isolation of the Akali Dal-L, Bhartiya Janta Party (consisting of erstwhile Jan Sanghis in Punjab) and the Congress-I. The ground lost by these political parties has apparently been won by individuals or groups

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16. Bashr was the Congress candidate from Ghazipur district in the 1984 parliamentary election

projecting themselves as extreme communalists.

Another approach is to use and accommodate one variety of communalism to cash on with the other variety of communalism in politics by various political parties. It is interesting to note that during 1984 Lok Sabha elections the Congress-I propagated that the Akali Dal was posing a danger to the country's integrity and, therefore, the whole country should get united under the leadership of Rajiv Gandhi to save the country. Immediately after the elections, the accord was signed with the same Akali Dal and the danger posed to the country's integrity by the Anandpur Sahib resolution and the Akali Dal vanished over night. And this, in turn, hardened communal attitudes and transformed demagogy into a grave crisis. Communalism once started has a snowball effect. Earlier also the policy of appeasement adopted by the Congress by allowing Hindu as well as Sikh communalists to merge with the Congress on several occasions provided a fertile ground for communalism to grow. The Congress has in its fold both Hindu and Sikh communalists prospering within the party, weakening the secular forces in it. The net outcome is the flaring up of communalism at the cost of several innocent lives.

This approach has led to the reinforcement of fear psychosis and the reliance of the state on repressive measures to sustain and maintain its power. The comprehension of the problem did not match with the understanding of the emergence of various political and economic groups. Simultaneously, measures were taken to implement the understanding that unless a lesson is taught to the Sikhs, they will continue to create problems. For the first time this was implemented on a grand scale during Asiad by the then Chief Minister of Haryana. The members of the Sikh religious group were insulted, humiliated and tortured while passing through Haryana at the time of Asiad. Later on this approach reached its cruel height when Operation Bluestar and Woodrose were conducted. After Operation Bluestar and Woodrose, this policy of teaching a lesson continued and reached its peak after the dismissal of Barnala Government with the imposition of Governor's rule in May 1987. Communal coalitions, alliances and reactions continued to occupy a large political space. This practice of politics was not merely in response to its functional value but also rooted in the overall nature and character of the Indian State and politics.

Besides polity which uses communal ideology as part of

electoral politics, some agents of the state may also be influenced by communalism. These agents may discriminate against the members of one or the other religious group. An IAS officer under the influence of communal ideology may favour individuals belonging to his own religious or caste group. But this favouritism or discrimination is limited to a few individuals and it does not promote or protect the interests of the entire 'community'. The operation of communal ideology among agents of the state may effect developmental plan allocations, the criteria for subsidies and loans, utilization of allocated resources etc. This can, in turn, upset the pace of development. So, if those who implement Government policies are influenced by communal ideology and they sometimes are, then the expected rate of economic growth suffers. This may also contribute, among other things, to communal tensions.

An instance of the agents of the state being influenced by communal ideology can be noticed in the manner FIRs were registered after incidents of violence. The FIRs and their officially released summaries provided communal interpretation to the incidents of violence as illustrated below.

No distinction was made between communalists and other members of the particular religious group on which the communalists may be imposing themselves as leaders. The accused and complainant were identified not as individuals but as members of a particular religious group[17]. Violators of the law and

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17. For details see FIRs registered in Mangrol Police Station.'Kasba Mangrol Ke Rangbadi ke Balaji ki boundary ko lekar Dinank 24.6.85 ko 6 baje shaam ko Hindu Muslim Samudaye ke beech meain aapas mein patrao kiye..
Is par Muslim Samudaye ke khilaaf Mukadma number 46/85 Dhara 147, 148, 149, 307. 324. 353, 435, 427, Tajirate Hindi darji kiya..
Mukadma number 47/85 dhara 147,148,149,427,436, Tajirat Hindi dinank 24.6.85. Hindu samudaye ke swatantra Kumar, Hari Om Dharampal Vagera 32 Mulzimaan ke khilaf darz huva.
Mukadama number 46/85 ki ranjish ko lekar Shri Rasool Mohommad, Putra Hafix Mohammed Musalmaan, Bunkar Colony, Niwasi Mangrol ke Virudh Hindu Samudaye dwara Mukadma number 48/85 dhara 307 Tajirate, Hindu darz kiya gaya..

18. See FIR number 97/81 registered on the said date at Kaithoon Police Station. Dinank 12.9.81 ko 7.30 pratah S.H.O Bajrang Singh may japta ke bus stand Kaithoon ke paas pahnoonc̃a aur sadak pår khade 50-60 Hinduon ka samooh Dhariye, Gandasi, hatiyan aadi se lace the... (and they were saying that) Aaj Kaithoon ke Musalmano se nipat lo, jo hoga so dekha jayega.

likely to further strengthen the elements of communalism and communal stereotypes among the people at large.

The state has started interfering in the non-secular sphere of social activity. Rather than confining itself to protecting religions, it has started promoting them. For instance, in Jaipur a government department known as Devasthan Department has undertaken to train Pujaris. The Devasthan Department was created by the Government of Rajasthan to manage temple affairs. A three month course for training Pujaris was inaugurated on May 17, 1984, for a batch of 23 serving priests. Apparently, this course will increase the efficiency of the priests to perform religious rites. But with the plans to open a similar training centre at Kota and train 10 fresh applicants in the second batch at Jaipur, the government is bound to be seen as the promoter of Hindu religion. The instructors at the centre boast about the frequent demands for their trained pupils from temples within the country and outside. The fame of this state owned centre has obviously spread far and wide. The consequences of this fame invoking similar demands from trustees of places of worship of other religious groups and communalization of the issue should not be overlooked.

Communal politics has enough issues to rally support behind it. The government is supposed to negate these issues by practising secular principles and not feed communal politics by providing it a handle to misrepresent 'national and constitutional ideals'.

Demands of a similar nature could be raised by other communal groups,political parties or religious institutions. Such a situation will result into the strengthening of communal attitudes. Promotion or acceptance of religious demands raised by communal groups will result in new demands of a similar nature in order to protect and promote their economic and political interests.

It is necessary here to draw a distinction between state, polity and agents of state. Indian State is the instrument of the dominant classes to maintain their economic and political power. The ruling classes share the ideology of the dominant class in certain specific situations. In a situation where there is no single ruling class, power is shared by classes. Ruling classes therefore have divergent interests. In such a system the state enjoys

relative autonomy. The Indian State protects the interests of the ruling classes or strata which comprise rural and industrial bourgeoisie. These classes together may not be interested in using communalism, but a section from amongst these classes may use it. The Indian State is ruled by capital and not by religious and caste groups. The Indian State is a weak secular state but it is not a communal state. The Constitution and its practice reveal this dichotomy. For instance, concessions to ascriptive groups like reservation of jobs, seats in legislature, and the failure to enact a common civil code are clear cut examples of the weak secular character of the Indian State. Similarly, legal dichotomy is expressed in many ways. For example, a candidate's election can be rejected if he or she uses religious symbols during the election campaign under the Representation Act. But a political party organized on a religious basis is not disqualified from participation in the political process, including elections. On the other hand, secular is enshrined in the Preamble and state's non-interference in religious matters guaranteed by the Constitution.

Article 26(B) of the Constitution stipulates that the state shall not interfere in the exercise of the right of religious organizations to manage their own affairs in matters "of religion", unless they run counter to public order, health or morality. It is through invoking moral- cum-religious authority that religious institutions should administer their religious affairs rather than through drawing sanction from parliament, which is constitutionally committed to secularism.

Moreover, Article 51(A) says that it shall be the duty of every citizen to develop a scientific temper. Development of the scientific temper involves accepting the method of science for acquiring knowledge and recognizing that a scientific attitude dispels dogmas, superstitions and obscurantisms which are essentially spread in the name of religion.

Political mobilization, therefore, must take place to promote secularism, scientific temper, democratic consciousness and progressive culture. The state should not promote, administer or interfere in the affairs of religions. Therefore, it is necessary to identify not merely political parties or groups/individu-

als promoting and using communalism but also the forces whose interests are served with the pervasiveness of this ideology. To comprehend the phenomenon of communalism, it is necessary to explore its various underlying and obvious dimensions. The identification of dominant communal forces and groups trying to use communalism to maintain and promote their interests may also help in evolving a strategy to counter them.

Chapter 4

Communal Violence: A Manifestation of Communalism

During the last 44 years of independence, India has been rocked by thousands of violent incidents. An analysis of data reveals that more than twelve thousand incidents of communal riots took place in India. According to official estimates, these riots have taken a toll of more than 9000 lives. However, there are research studies which conclude that the official estimates underplay the intensity of these riots. According these studies more than 9000 lives fell to communal frenzy in only major riots in the mid-80s i.e. Meerut, Bhiwandi, Delhi, Bhagalpur. The riots became longer in duration and their intensity increased. For example, the number of persons injured and killed have been substantial after early 70s. In certain years such as 1978 and 1983 even though number of communal incidents have been less, but the number of person killed or injured has been on the higher side.(See Table 4.1). After 1964, the worst affected year was 1990. In 1964, more than one thousand communal incidents took place, whereas in 1990, more than fourteen hundred incidents were recorded.

Communal violence is an extreme manifestation and instrument of communalism. As an instrument of communalism, it broadens the scope of communal group identification. The actual assault or perceived threat on the basis of religion or caste group reinforces one's identification. "When one is subject to stray assault or mob attack upon the basis of his identification with a religious community, he is quickly impressed with the significance of that membership. Thus the accumulating nature of social violence in turn broadens and intensifies the basic tension upon which it feeds".[1] This in turn multiplies the appeal of elements of communal ideology and increases the conflict between communal groups.

As a manifestation it has a relationship with elements of communalism and politics which as a part of the social economic process transforms tensions into violence. Communal violence, there-

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1. Richard D. Lambert (1951), *Hindu-Muslim Riots,* unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, p.17.

Table 4.1
Frequency an[1] Intensity of Communal Riots in India 1954 to 1991

Years	Number of Incidents	Persons killed	Persons Injured
1954	54	34	512
1955	75	24	457
1956	82	35	575
1957	58	12	316
1958	40	7	369
1959	42	41	1344
1960	26	14	262
1961	92	108	593
1962	60	43	348
1963	61	26	489
1964	1074	1919	2053
1965	173	34	758
1966	144	45	467
1967	198	251	880
1968	346	133	1309
1970	521	298	1607
1971	321	103	1263
1972	240	69	1056

Cont.

Years	Number of Incidents	Persons killed	Persons Injured
1973	242	72	1318
1974	248	87	1123
1975	205	33	890
1976	169	39	794
1977	188	36	1122
1978	230	110	1853
1979	304	261	2379
1980	421	372	2691
1981	319	196	2613
1982	470	238	3025
1983	500	1143	3652
1984	476	445	4836
1985	525	328	3665
1986	764	418	5389
1987	711	383	3860
1988	611	223	3163
1989	706	802	3871
1990	1404	1248	6627
1991 up to Sept.	905	462	3307

Source: Communal Violence in India by P.R. Rajgopal.
Muslim India, September 1989.

fore, cannot be understood in isolation from the comprehension of the level of operation of communalism and politics. In other words, communal violence must be seen as a part of historical process and as a product of certain specific social conditions. It will be wrong, therefore, to take communal violence as an abberation. Communal violence in this context means injury or harm to an individual or group perceived to be competing or discriminating agent identified on the basis of communalism, for maintenance, acquisition, exercise or expansion of social, economic and political power. The common denominator in rioting and any other manifestation of violence is infliction of injury or harm on group or individual. The crucial distinctive characteristic is identification of target on the basis of communalism perceived as antagonistic to real or imaginary interests. In other words, the justification for the use of violence and target fixation in a rioting situation has basis in elements of communal ideology.

The notion that communal riots have their own dynamism and can be tackled independent of the various complex of processes unleashed by changing socio-economic formation is not only partial, but counter productive. For example, the Enquiry Commissions appointed by the Central Goverment to go into the causes of various communal riots approached the problem with methodology which is normally adopted to study ordinary crimes. The report submitted to the Home Ministry by various commissions like Jamshedpur Riots 1979), Sadar Bazar Disturbances (1974), Bhiwandi-Jalgaon Mahad Riots (1970), Sursand Riots (1969), the Jainpur and Suchetpur Riots (1969) and the Ahmed Nagar Riots (1967) highlighted the conjectural factors. These reports are descriptive in providing informations about the extent of loss of lives, the number of rioters involved, the duration of the riots etc. The implicit assumption is that a communal riot is nothing but physical violence resorted to by a conglomeration of individuals. It is considered like any other sporadic incident.

An analysis of a riot is lost in a description of the detail of the course of events. For instance, the immediate provocations like acts of sacrilege believed to have been committed by members of religious or caste groups perceived to be antagonistic, the publication of irresponsible literature, acts of crime, particularly sexual crime, labour disputes, public religious celebration and processions

etc. are seen as determining causes. Interestingly to preclude the possibility of communal riots, the attempts are made to tackle these issues. For instance, in Indore, the immediate cause of riot was a wrestling match between two sportsman who belonged to two different religious group. The administration banned the matches between the wrestlers belonging to two different religious groups. Similarly, in Bhopal it was thought that the imposition of Section 144 Cr.P.C would control rioting on Rang Panchami, Moharram etc. However, tne communal rioting was evaded on this occasion, it erupted at other times. [2]

Most often when the administrative authorities resort to changing routes of religious procesions or banning public celebration of religious festivals - this also provides an issue to the communal organizations to rally support. The public celebration of Shivaji Jayanti was banned in Bhiwandi in 1971. During the local municipal elections this was made an issue. The ban was described as an act of discrimination against Hindus. Instead of easing communal tensions the ban provided a tool to communal organizations to fan communal animosity. Further the permission to take out Shivaji Jayanti procession in 1984 in Bhiwandi led to the strong condemnation from the Muslim league and simultaneously organized the co-religionists to forestall the procession. In this manner a vicious circle starts. Therefore, to seek a solution, in changing routes or banning public celebrations of religious festivals, is to remain within the law and order framework.

The normal feature is that each incident of a communal riot starts with some criminal activity. It is widely believed that certain criminal activities like rioting, stabbing, kidnapping, murder, have greater probability of being converted into communal disturbances, particularly when members, i.e. victims or the criminals, belonging to two different religious groups are involved. In a communally surcharged environment acts of crimes are committed by the anti-social elements and criminals under the garb of protecting one's own community interest or the 'welfare of the fellow residents of the locality'. On acquiring the legitimate position in society by successfully justifying communal acts in community

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2. See for details, Communal Violence and its Impact on Development and National Integration in Madhya Pradesh, unpublished report CRRID, Chandigarh

interests, criminals are able to protect themselves as community or mohalla leaders. This fact poses a dilemma before the administration which could otherwise have treated and tried the criminal turned leaders as ordinary law breakers. These elements are the instruments used by vested interest and individuals or groups adhering to a normative value pattern which has its basis in communalism. In this context it must be understood that these elements are not used merely for incremental economic or political incentives. The purpose behind their involvement are many and there is something deeper in it.

Communal riots cannot be explained by giving a mono-causal explanation which is neither adequate nor desirable. The anti-social elements are merely the instruments used to achieve ends set by vested interests. Individuals or groups genuinely adhering to communal ideology may also use these riff-raff and may themselves actively participate in rioting.

The other participants in communal rioting can be categorized as follows : (a) instigators; (b) participant-instigators; (c) active participants; (d) accidental beneficiaries.

Instigators are those who hope to gain or do gain directly through the propagation of communal ideology and by engineering riots. These instigators are mainly drawn from amongst industrialists, traders, political and religious leaders.

These vested interests are involved in severe competition for maximising their profits or enhancing their political power. They mystify the real conflicts and instigate victims of communal ideology to attack misplaced targets. The victims of communal ideology and anti-social elements may not be actually involved in competition but are used as tools by these interests. Therefore, it must not be misconstrued that it is merely the competition for scarce resources which leads to communal rioting.

The participant instigators belong to the category of conformist incremental. This section provides content to communal ideology but maintains friendly relations with its counterparts in other religious groups. These sections are mainly drawn from amongst traders and other middle classes competing for jobs.

The active participants genuinely believe that they are the greatest benefactors of their 'community'. For them it is not a

question of buying a television set or getting a raise in salary. They are committed to the visionary idea of creating a new society in which the kafirs or aliens would have no right to exist. This section is a victim of communal ideology. These victims do not necessarily derive their rationalisation from immediate economic or political gains.

The other section of active participants in communal riots may be from among workers lacking class consciousness. They may resort to communal violence in the hope of transforming their wretched living conditions.

Accidental beneficiaries of a communal riot belong to sections who are neither victims of communal ideology nor vested interests. Agents of state may be able to whitewash their sins and politicians their misdeeds, small traders can earn a little more profits and landlords get eviction from their premises in a communal riot. These individuals do not belong to any group but may indirectly and accidentally benefit from a riot situation.

Another feature of communal incident is the geographic setting and locale. It is a popular belief that the areas inhabited by Muslims are prone to rioting. It is too simplistic a relationship for such a complex social phenomena. It is not always desirable to take the groups affected most by frequent rioting and infer that these are the groups which are experiencing greater violence. It is not the numbers or the concentration of a particular religious group which influences the possible locale for rioting. Rather it is the locational confrontation of antagonistic groups which provide a fertile ground for communal rioting.

Further, it is the cluster formation which renders residents claustrophobic and leaves a visual impact of being an organnized threat to the other religious groups which provides a fertile ground for the eruption of communal rioting. In the event of cluster formation, the strength and power of the perceived antagonistic group appears to be menacingly exaggerated and it builds up an inward looking attitude and delimits social interaction. So, it is the locational confrontation and cluster formation which act as a sufficient condition for communal rioting.

The understanding that communal rioting is essentially an urban phenomena may not be a valid generalization. The rural

areas are also experiencing communal riots. In the year 1985, fortysix per cent of the communal incidents took place in the rural areas. The form of communal violence in urban areas differs with the rural setting. It is because the urban areas provide a much broader scope for anonymous violent action which in turn adds ferocity to violent action. Whereas in the rural setting the violence is more inclusive and persistent.

In addition to the locale, participation and target fixation, circumstances of communal violence in terms of location of institutional power structure in relation to the competing communal groups influence the frequency and intensity of riots. Violence is more widespread and less intense and longer in duration if both the groups participating in these acts have the support of factions within the governmental structure. In a situation where a group is supported by or identified with the power that be it, may take brutal and inhumane form. Violence between communal groups without having any support from the power structure is less widespread, short in duration and less intense. Studies on communal violence have paid some attention to these situations. But less attention has been paid to a situation where groups involved in violence do not enjoy the support of any power centre. For instance, rioting between Shias and Sunnis did not attract much attention of the social analysts.

The present study is an attempt to understand and analyse communal violence in its totality. The approach adopted is multi-disciplinary and a comparative analysis of the following three situations has been attempted :

a) A comprehensive analysis of riot-free and riot-prone areas i.e. Maunath Bhanjan Town (riot prone) and Azamgarh Town (riot-free);
b) To ascertain the necessary and sufficient conditions causing communal riots in a situation which has a history of communal riots. A detailed study of Ahmedabad and Vadodra cities of Gujarat state has been undertaken.
c) To undertake a study in an area which has not experienced communal rioting so far, but communalism is an operative reality. This has been studied in Jaipur, Rajasthan.

Communal riots in Maunath Bhanjan and Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh. [3]

This is an attempt to make a comprehensive study of riot free and riot prone situations. This kind of study shall throw up sufficient insights on the factors mediating between communalism and its eruption into communal riots. The study covers two areas i.e. Azamgarh town (riot free) and Maunath Bhanjan (riot prone).

Mau has a history of communal rioting. For instance, in 1893, a dispute over the interpretation of government order prohibiting all cow sacrifices between members of two religious groups provided a fuel to communal elements. Consequently, riots erupted on this issue and engulfed the states of Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and Bombay.

It is interesting that elements of communal ideology are very much reflective in people's perceptions and in their everyday interactions, but its manifestation in the eruption of communal riots and large scale participation of people in actual acts of violence is not frequent. Alongwith the communal mode of political mobilizations, there has been a long history of mobilizations by the secular and left oriented politics also. It will be interesting to find out the impact of these two divergent forms of mobilizations on the social and political fabric of Mau.

From the data on communal riots in Mau, it is discernible that rioting is short lived and comparatively not so intense . To illustrate, in the riots in 1969, 17 persons were injured whereas in 1984, six were killed and 15 injured. Property worth Rs.11,281/- and Rs.48,980/- was destroyed in the riots of 1969 and 1984 respectively. The immediate cause of the riots in 1969 was the clash between Moharram processionists, certain persons obstructing it and the police. Similarly, in 1984 the riot was sparked off by a clash between Ram Lila Processionists, certain persons obstructing it and the police.

The distinct features of communal rioting in Mau are :

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3. This analysis is based on the research report on *Communal Violence and its Impact on National Integration and Development in Uttar Pradesh* (Azamgarh and Gazipur) written by Pramod Kumar, Bhupendra Yadav, Atul Sood and Vishalini Vimal, CRRID Chandigarh

a) Communal groups have not clashed openly. Instead sporadic incidents like stabbing, killing, arson, looting etc. have occurred.
b) The immediate provocation for communal riots has been an infringement of religious processions which themselves are occasions for the display of strength. The communal assertions of both groups are defensive and rooted in a minority persecution complex. These assertions and display of strength by the communal groups grow out of fear and are intended to ward off possible offence from the antagonistic groups.
c) Clustered living is a breeding ground for communalism and propels this to grow into extreme forms. Clusters render their residents psychologically claustrophobic and leave a visual impact of being an organized threat to other religious or communal groups. In both these towns the Muslims and the Hindus live in exclusive localities. Interestingly, in Azamgarh town Mixed localities were more in number as compared to Mau. This clearly shows exclusive clustered living is more pronounced in Mau. In Azamgarh town, there are thirtynine mohallas, out of these twenty seven are Hindu majority mohallas and nine are mixed mohallas. Whereas in Mau Nath Bhanjan there are a total of one hundred and nine mohallas, out of these thirty seven are Hindu majority, sixty three are Muslim majority and eight are Mixed mohallas. In Mau the polarization is between Hindu majority and Muslim majority mohallas, whereas in Azamgarh town, it is between Hindu majority and mixed mohallas (map 1 a,b).

Among the riot-hit mohallas in Mau the most severely affected is *pathantola*(78) which was rocked in both riots - in 1969 and 1984 - and was also affected in the communal incidents of 1980 and 1983. *Malik Tahirpura (65)* was the other riot-hit mohalla during the trouble in 1969. In 1984 the other riot hit mohallas were *Raghunathpura (98), Pura Dankabir (28), Pura Cheda (26) and Aurangabad (3).* The latter two mohallas were also affected during the communal incidents of 1983 alongwith *Mirza Hadipura* (67).

AZAMGARH TOWN
LOCATION OF MOHALLAS
Map -1a



MAP OF AZAMGARH CITY,
DISTT AZAMGARH

SOURCE: Field Study

AZAMGARH TOWN
MOHALLA WISE DISTRIBUTION OF
HINDU AND MUSLIM POPULATION
MAP-1b



SOURCE: Field Study

Apart from *Pathantola* (78), the other mohalla to be affected during 1980 was *Ghora Dalal ki Bari* (12). The figures in brackets indicate the location code of mohallas(for list of Mohallas see Appendix I). Riot hit areas in Mau were also identified (Map 2 a,b,c). The mohallas where riots had already occurred and those areas which are prone to further rioting were identified as riot-hit areas. It may be mentioned here that in the present study "riot" means a communal riot. Situations were identified where the authorities physically assaulted communal groups or the communal groups assaulted each other by attacking symbols or by destroying or looting property perceived to be belonging to other religious groups.

Further, sensitive mohallas, i.e. the ones which were communally tense, were identified. In these localities elements of communalism may exist, but in the absence of certain sufficient conditions, which are discussed in subsequent sections, actual rioting is kept at bay. The sensitive mohallas in Mau are *Ghas bazaar (50), Rajputana South (32), Idgah Chowk (12,3,26), Shadatpura and Mushipura (37) and Pura Bhikkan (81).* It was found that in Azamgarh town no mohalla could be classified as sensitive.

To sum up, cluster formations provide a fertile ground for cementing and strengthening communal loyalities, which could be used by communal organizations to spread communalism.

It delimits social interaction, exposure to diversities of culture etc. This builds an inward-looking attitude and in the process makes people less mobile to avail themselves of new opportunities.

Uneven, lopsided and slow development is interwoven with a situation where a particular religious group is clustered and nurses a deep-rooted persecution complex. This religious group perceives an immediate link between its deprivations and the underdevelopment of its area. This perception provides a leverage to vested interests to use human misery and the elements of communalism. These interests can also use such factors to emerge as 'community leaders' at the mohalla level and to strengthen their electoral position in Municipal elections. In a situation of communal rioting such so-called 'community leaders' appear as *Messiahs* who look after their own religious group through Ram Lila mela committees, Muslim welfare committees etc. These leaders inflame passions by counting the injured and those killed on religious group lines. Such projections perpetuate antagonism between religious groups. These so-called 'community leaders' start asking for puni-

MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN
LOCATION OF MOHALLAS
MAP-2a



MAP OF
MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN,
DISTT AZAMGARH

SOURCE: Field Study

MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN

MOHALLA WISE DISTRIBUTION OF
HINDU AND MUSLIM POPULATION
MAP-2b



SOURCE: Field Study

MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN

RIOT PRONE MOHALLAS

MAP-2c



MAP OF
MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN.
DISTT AZAMGARH

HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS

MUSLIM MAJORITY MOHALLAS

MOHALLAS WITH MIXED POPULATION

RIOT HIT MOHALLAS

SENSITIVE MOHALLAS

SOURCE: Field Study

tive measures against members of other religious groups and administrative personnel on a communal basis after riots. In certain situations these demands for punitive action are granted by the administration and this further legitimizes the leadership of the so-called 'community leaders' amongst their respective religious groups.

Locational confrontation of mohallas inhabited by diverse religious groups makes the identification of "targets" under the influence of communal ideology easier. The targets so identified become more accessible in the event of communal rioting. Besides, such a settlement pattern exaggerates the number and strength of the perceived antagonistic group. Consequently, a threat is perceived to one's own existence and also to the religious group one may happen to belong to. Like in other riot-hit towns and cities, in Mau too, mohallas inhabited mostly by members of one religious group are in locational confrontation with mohallas with a majority of the residents belonging to the other religious group. For instance, the lower strata Muslim-majority mohallas of *Pathan Tola* (78) is in locational confrontation with *Chamar Tola Uttar* (10), *Khatik Tola Uttar* (21) and *Allauddinpura* (1) which are lower strata Hindu majority mohallas. *Pathan Tola* (78) was the site of communal incidents in 1969, 1980, 1983 and 1984. Similarly, *Raghnathpura* (98) which was the site of communal violence in 1984 is a Muslim majority lower strata mohalla and is in locational confrontation with *Chamar Tola Dakshin* (8) and *Khatik Tola Dakshin* (19) which are lower strata Hindu majority mohallas.(map 2d)

PARTICIPATION

The participation in the riots is limited. The sections which participate are usually hired riff raffs, a small number of local weavers, petty shop keepers and hawkers. Villagers from the neighbouring areas also mobilized on communal lines. In the rural areas also the notion of commonality of religious group interests is gaining ground. The traditional land owning interests which mostly belong to the higher castes, i.e. Thakurs, Bhumihars and Brahmins are increasingly resorting to the propagation and use of religious group identities. One of the reasons for use of religious group identity and not caste was to checkmate the consolidation of the strength of middle peasants who mostly belong to intermediate castes and consequently to have a larger group so as to have an

MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN

CLUSTER WISE DISTRIBUTION
OF POPULATION
MAP-2d



MAP OF MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN,
DISTT AZAMGARH

HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS
MUSLIM MAJORITY MOHALLAS
MOHALLAS WITH MIXED POPULATION

LEGEND

CLUSTER I	LOWER STRATA	
CLUSTER II	LOWER MIDDLE STRATA	
CLUSTER III	MIDDLE AND UPPER MIDDLE STRATA	

SOURCE: Field Study

KRISHAN CHAND

advantage in electoral politics. This trend may provide motivation to a section of rural population who happen to be daily commuters in the towns to participate in riots. Nineteen eightyfour riots were clear pointers towards this trend. Urban areas provide larger space for anonymous action. It also provides a broader social identity i.e. religious group, place of residence and occupation etc.

The economic and political vested interests instigate communal riots by providing content and public expression to communal ideology in its extreme form. These vested interests mobilize and use incremental communalists coming from the middle strata on issues like discrimination in jobs, licences, subsidies etc. The individual losses and failures are projected and believed to be the letting down of the whole religious or caste group.

The victims of communal ideology attack the life and property of antagonistic communal groups. The victims of communal ideology, thereby, are misdirected to avenge their miseries by attacking displaced targets. Sections among weavers who happened to be Muslims and rustics from nearby villages who happened to be Hindus, participated in the communal riots in October, 1984. Whereas some weavers are reported to have indulged in physical violence in some mohallas of Mau, the villagers are reported to have stolen or destroyed property in industrial sheds and agricultural fields on the outer fringe of the town.

The anti-social elements participate in and prolong communal riots. The vested interests patronize anti-social elements some of whom come to acquire the status of mohalla level 'community' leaders. The victims of communal ideology and incremental communalism may also encourage and legitimize the acts of anti-social elements by identifying these acts to be serving community interests. During the riots in 1969 at Mau a Moharram procession was stoned by anti-social elements. When the police tried to intervene, a pitched battle ensued between the small police force and the anti-social elements, delinquent youth, mischief-mongers etc. Similarly, during the riots in 1984, anti-social elements provoked violence when a religious procession was passing through the narrow lanes of the town. Certain incidents of arson by anti-social elements also took place during these riots.

During communal riots, rumours and gossip contribute to aggravating the situation by giving communal colour to individual

acts of violence and crime. For instance, it was rumoured during the communal riots of October, 1984, at Mau that copies of the 'Holi Koran' had been burnt and electric fans, mats etc. stolen from several mosques by 'Hindu policemen'. The tension arising from this rumour and the alleged involvement of policemen, particularly personnel of the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC), turned large mobs of people violent at several places. Mr. Indira Deo Singh, Sub Divisional Magistrate of Ghosi, was murdered when he went to pacify one such mob in Raghunathpura mohalla. Earlier, in 1948, also a rumour was floated that "Muslims" had occupied the site on which the "Ram Bharat Milap" procession assembles. In 1983, rumours were rife about the imposition of a one-sided curfew to harass women and plunder the property of one religious group. Interestingly, this rumour was spread by communalists trying to appropriate symbols having their basis in both the religions to incite communal frenzy.

A section which is neither a vested nor an incremental communalist nor a victim of communal ideology, but which may abet rioting is that of accidental beneficiaries. These accidental beneficiaries may be from among agents of the state who want to whitewash their ommissions or politicians who want to cover up their misdeeds. They can also be from among small traders who can earn a little more profit or landlords who want their premises evicted in a riot. These individuals cannot be said to belong to any groups as such, but they may indirectly and accidentally benefit from a rioting situation.

Communal Terms of Political and Social Discourse Accentuate Communal Rioting

It was interesting to find out that the terms of social and political discourse in Mau reflected a strong communal bias, whereas in Azamgarh communal bias was not as strong. For instance, in Mau the Communal interpretation of riots by middle and lower rung administrative personnel and the local newspapers provide excuses for further communal rioting. The FIRs registered on the occurrence of the riots provide a communal interpretation as illustrated below.

1) Criminal acts and criminals are identified on religious group lines. For example, "Muslim samudai ke logon ko girftar

kar liya gaya...(Inhonne) goli se pargana adhikari, ghosi ko ghail kia".

2) No distinction is made between communalists and the religious group to which they may belong. For example, a deputation of the highly communal Ram Lila Committee or Durga Puja Mahasamiti are treated as if they represent the whole Hindu religious group.
3) Majority and minority are identified on religious group basis. For example, "Raghunathpura main bahusankhyak Musalmano dwara alpsankhyak Hinduon par hamla..."
4) Lives lost and property damaged is recorded using religious group categories. For instance, "Hindu varg ka char logo mare gaye... Musalman varge ke 29,760 rupaion kee sampati nashti hui..."[4]

This also perpetrates communal interpretation of various events and causes communal tensions. This can also be inferred from the communal stereotypes, oral history and penetration of religiosity. The communal stereotypes in Azamgarh were mainly trying to reinforce the commonality of interests of the members of a religious group. And the belief that the norms, and value patterns of one's own religious group were pure; whereas, the members of other religious group have undemocratic attitude and communal outlook. For example, in Azamgarh a section from amongst Hindu religious group perceived and projected Muslims as any civic sense. Whereas, a section from amongst the Muslim religious group perceived Hindus as untrustworthy, undemo cratic and material in outlook.

In the case of Mau, due to its specific demographic composition economic activity and political history, the communal stereotypes prevalent were more antagonistic in content. For instance, some members of Hindu religious group type the Muslims as immoral. To quote, "Muslim claim to be inheritors of great moral traditions, but they marry as many times as they want and are morally corrupt. The result of these practices is that from 1901,

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4. See for details,FIR's registered with the Sadar Thana Mau Nath Bhanjan, Azamgarh District, Uttar Pradesh

when Muslims constituted only half of Mau's population, they have increased to three-fourths of the population today. Mau is the Karachi of India".

Further they are typed as Anti-women and exploiters of their children. "Muslim women are compelled to perform three duties religiously :

(a) keep the home;
(b) procreate; and
(c) weave

They keep their women in 'purdah' and ogle at 'Hindu' women and harass unescorted women. The labour of children is abused for filling reels. Naturally, then, the Muslim menfolk can sit around, gossip, discuss politics, indulge in crime and participate in riots"

Not only this, they live under unhygenic conditions and spend their resources in conspicuous consumption. They like to live in dirty surroundings, wear dirty clothes, leave their children uneducated and exhibit their cultural backwardness as their poverty".

A large number of traders, middle and lower class workers and professionals among the Hindus felt that Muslims were in a majority and this led to their over-bearing social behaviour. "They promote religious institutions, build them like medieval fortresses, use them to store arms and ammunition and spread fanaticism". "We cannot celebrate our festivals at the places and in the manner we desire. A dog, a pig and a whore can pass these Masjids but our revered Durgaji is prohibited by Muslims". "What is the Tajia ? It is a mere headload of dead bodies carried through the streets with great pride under police protection". "These Muslims walk in the middle of the road unlike good citizens who should observe all the laws of the land, including traffic rules. This is the exorbitant price we pay to permit their continued residence in our country".

The specific nature of development in Mau, particularly the distribution and formation of skills, has also led to some typical beliefs amongst communal Muslims. Many of the traders and other middle strata individuals among the Muslims felt that the increase in the recurrence of rioting in Mau was due to the betterment in the economic condition of Muslims. "The economic prosperity of Muslims cannot be tolerated by Hindus and rioting is the best and the easiest way to make us insecure and destroy us. Riots also limit our movement outside our clusters and this helps them to

maintain their position in the market". "Everywhere in India, including Mau, traditional handicrafts have been destroyed by the Hindu-Bania traders. In their quest for greater and greater profits they eliminated the fine skills of the craftsmen. These skills are our heritage. They have been handed down through generations by our forefathers who formed them with their blood. These craftsmen used to get liberal support from the Mughal rulers". "Hindus are only interested in displaying their wealth and proving Muslim inferiority. Their marriages, child birth and religious ceremonies are performed with great fanfare. Their religious ceremonies are deliberately made pompous to provoke a jealous reaction from us".

"Hindus don't think Muslims are a part of India and its culture and history. They accuse our institutions of religious education to be centres for spreading religious bigotry and disloyalty. They accuse us of building these Madrasas on"Khairat" (or alms) from gulf countries".

Hindus have no secular traditions or practices about which they boast so much. If we praise a folk hero who happens to be a Muslim (a medieval ruler, a military genius or an excellent sportsman) we are branded communal. But if Hindus praise such a hero they cite it as evidence for being secular, sportsman like etc. Why don't they declare officially that India is a "Hindu Rashtra", when unofficially it so ?

These stereotypes feed and fatten religious group identities, i.e. communalism. The communalism exploit the discrepancy between the self-perception of one religious group and perception of it by the antagonistic communal group to spread fear and insecurity among their co-religionists. For example, communalism often accuse 'Hindus' to be vicious towards minorities and to be communal. The communalism counter this accusation by reiterating that their secularism and tolerance is evident in allowing 'Muslims' to live in India even after granting 'them' Pakistan in 1947, whereas in Pakistan 'Hindus' have been virtually eliminated. Similarly, communalism charge that 'Muslims' are anti-national as they celebrate the victories of Pakistani sports teams over Indian teams. Communalism of other shade rebut this charge by referring to the active participation of 'Muslims' in the freedom struggle and in the two wars against Pakistan.

There are instances when communalism accepts the communal stereotypes propagated by rival communalism. For example,

Communalism often brands the Indian State to be 'Hindu'. Communalism of the other variety accept this and start prescribing a code of conduct for all 'Muslims'. Similarly, communalism charges 'Muslims' with being strongly organized and blind supporters of their own co-religionists. Communalism of the other shade accepts this charge and claim that if they do not defend their religion the 'Hindus' will stamp out Islam. Communalism of all shades accept the belief that the gain of an individual belonging to a particular religious group is an achievement of the whole religious group and a loss of their own group.

In this way communal stereotypes aggravate fears, suspicions and mistrust between religious groups. Communal ideology is able to win more and more adherants through a self-generating process. Thus, the communalism of one group, instead of emasculating the communalism of another group, feeds and fattens it through violence or high-pitched propaganda.

Religiosity, Reinforces Communal Antagonism

Communalism uses religiosity for boundary definition in political and other spheres. Its emphasis remain on religious practices, festivals, processions etc. It tries to promote solidarity by exaggerating incidents when such processions or festivals have been infringed upon.

Communalism is also behind the increase of religious ceremonies and processions like 'Bhagwati Jagran', 'Durga Puja procesions', 'Rath yatras', 'Tajias' etc. For instance between 1976 and 1984 the number of mohalla-level 'Durga puja samitis' has increased from 1 to 19 and each of these samitis instals its own durga idol at Mau (map 2E). The members of these samitis are mohalla level political leaders and young businessmen. An alarming feature of this increase is the spill over of 'durga puja samitis' into some villages around Mau like Dumrao, Paligad, Mahuabari, Gokulpura etc. One of these i.e. Kurti Jafarpur, experienced communal tension in this connection in October, 1984. The Hindu religious processions organized by communalists with the wide participation of their co-religionists are 'Laxmi Pujan', 'Saraswati Pujan', 'Ganesh Pujan' etc. Tajias on Moharram are also taken out in grand processions in Mau and Azamgarh towns.

These religious processions have increased in number and


MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN
MOHALLAS IN WHICH DURGA IDOLS ARE INSTALLED
MAP-2e
MAP OF MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN,
DISTT AZAMGARH
HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS
MUSLIM MAJORITY MOHALLAS
MOHALLAS WITH MIXED POPULATION
DURGA IDOLS
SOURCE: Field Study

scale of participation/organization over the years. The membership of the organization patronizing these processions mostly consists of those who may not be religious but may have their own political interests to serve. Most of these members are young. For example, the Durga Puja Mahasamiti at Mau (which functions under the supervision of the Ramlila Mela Samiti) coordinates the activities of all its mohalla level units and some puja samitis in villages. This Mahasamiti consists of seven businessman, three service workers and one student. All members of the Mahasamiti are below 40 years but more than 25 years of age. Planned and organized efforts are made for the public performance of religious rituals. The effect of this will be in widening the impact of the organizations planning these efforts, in sharpening the communal cleavages and also throwing up 'community' leaders to protect and promote 'Hindu interest', 'Muslim interests' and so on. Even the scale of organizing the public performance of religious rituals becomes an issue for competition among different shades of communalism.

Oral History Distorts Facts

Antagonistic perceptions between religious groups are sought to be inflamed by communalism through the distortion of history. The history of the founding of Maunath Bhanjan is subjected to controversy. Communalism propagates that Maunath Bhanjan was founded by a 'Hindu Nat' or acrobat whose name was Mau. The other shade of communalism, however, propagate that the acrobat called Mau was defeated by Malik Tahir, a military general. To establish their claim of being the original inhabitants of Mau, the communalists quite vigourously spread their own versions of the history of the founding of Mau.

Besides, *Ram ki paheli* authored by B.R. Ambedkar is a pamphlet which is quite widely circulated in Mau. This pamphlet accuses a Hindu deity i.e. Rama, to be lustful, alcoholic etc. The pamphlet is only one from amongst those which inflames religious group passions. [5] History as interpreted in Azamgarh town does not have a very strong communal streak due to the relatively little perva-

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5. B.R. Ambedkar (1983) *Ram Ki Paheli.* Buddhist Publishing House Jalandhar (translated from English), See also *Ram Rajya Natak* by Shambuk-Muni-Dalidan p73 (1984) for similar inflamatory material.

siveness of communal ideology.

All these instances point towards the misuse of history by the communalists as a vehicle for communal propaganda, spreading obscurantist beliefs etc. The entire discussion above illustrates the fact that religious differences are transformed into religious group identities by the propagation of communal ideology.

Political Economy of Communal Riots

Social tensions are generated by the specific nature of development and ruling class politics but they are imparted a communal colour by increasing religiosity and communal politics. Religiosity imparts passion and intensity to communalism. The extent of religiosity in Mau is very high. Even minor variations in the public performance of religious rituals (for example, the place for the installation of the idol of Goddess Durga or the choice of a site for a mosque) evokes violent reactions.

These violent reactions are the outcome of a constant reinforcement of religious group identities through the propagation of elements of ideology. Threats to these identities are hammered on by a section of traders in yarn, most of whom happen to be 'Marwari Hindus', 'Grihasthas' who happen to be 'Ansari Muslims', some general merchants who happen to be both 'Sindhis' and 'Ansari Muslims', some local political leaders of Rightwing groups. (Political groups of the Left do not propagate communalism, but have occasionally used it). These interests are involved in severe competition in maximising their economic and political gains. There is a growing tendency to maximise political gains by adopting short cuts in terms of usage of primordial identities, money and muscle power, communal slogans, obscurantist issues etc.

Similarly, economic benefits are sought through the formation of guilds for capital circulation along ascriptive categories, communal employment preferences, disinclination to use techniques of advertisement for sales promotion or professionalized management for efficiency or to buy advanced technology. Such orientations of economic and political vested interests cause the projection of competition, which is a product of objective conditions, as a communal competition. Communalism, therefore, expects every industrial worker to help his co-religionist industrialist to out

religious group. For example, in Maunath Bhanjan (called Mau for short), some of the sizing and calendaring plant owners who happen to be Muslims often resort to the propaganda that 'Muslim' workers are not employed by those entrepreneurs who are Hindus, whereas their own attendance rolls do not have many workers from the Muslim religious group. In Mau there are 12 sizing units, 1 dyeing and bleaching unit and 6 calendaring units. On an average, 1200 workers find employment in these units daily. CRRID sample survey covered around 30 per cent of these aforementioned cloth finishing units, which employed 36 per cent of the workers. Out of the units taken for sampling 66 per cent were owned by entrepreneurs who happened to be Muslims and only 18 per cent of the workforce employed by them belonged to the Muslim religious group (Table 4.2).

Similarly, the traders and manufacturers said that no worker from the Muslim religious group found employment in the two spinning mills at Mau since these were owned by Hindus. This propaganda has carried conviction among the pauperized or unemployed sections of Muslims and led to the establishment or reinforcement of the 'leadership' of co-religionist traders and manufacturers.

A majority of the workers employed in the two spinning mills are from neighbouring villages. Most of these workers belong to small or marginal peasantry and with growing pressure on land, as also corruption, some wards of middle peasants are able to bribe their way to employment in these mills. Self employment as weavers, among a majority of the members of the Muslim religious group is the main cause of their relative absence from the spinning mills.[6] Not only this, competition in trade is projected and perceived by some as communal competition in this town. A brief history of evolution of cloth production may help to understand the reasons for polarization on communal lines.

Mau has a long history of cloth production. However, this town was able to develop as a centre for handlooms in eastern U.P.

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6. The management of the mills gave the following details of the workforce. In Swadeshi Textile Mill, out of 800 workers only 1 per cent were those who happened to be Muslims. And in U.P. Spinning Cooperative Mill which employs 2700 workers, 4.40 per cent workers happened to be Muslims. In both Mills more than 90 per cent of the workers were from nearby villages and were daily commuters to the town.

particularly after the adoption of the programme to boycott foreign goods and promote hand-woven "khaddar" (or coarse cotton cloth) by the Indian National Congress during the 1930s. It is widely believed that the weavers of Mau wove nets used by the allied armed forces during the Second World War due to the predominant control of British colonialism over the Indian economy and also due to the collaborationist stance of the Muslim League during this War. The weavers in Mau happen to be Ansari Muslims and some of them were under the influence of the Muslim League during this period. In Mau, the handloom sector has since been growing but it is adversely affected by competition from the mechanized sector and is subjected to the fluctuations in the prices of cotton and yarn.

Table 4.2

RESULTS OF SAMPLE SURVEY OF UNITS INVOLVED IN ACTIVITIES ALLIED WITH CLOTH PRODUCTION

S.No. (1)	Particulars (2)	Units (3)
1.	Number of sampled units	6
2.	Total workers	433
3.	Religious Group affiliation of owners	4 M, 2 H
4.	Workers employed by owners who happened to be Muslims	245
5.	Workers employed by owners who happened to be Hindus	188
6.	Reiigious group affiliation of workers employed by owners who happened to be Muslim	45M,200H
7.	Religious group affiliation of workers employed by owners who happened to be Hindus	188 H

Source: CRRID Field Survey

Note : H indicates owners/workers who happened to be Hindus

M indicates owners/workers who happened to be Muslims

In the natural process of technological change, powerlooms were first introduced in Mau around 1961. The ownership of the powerlooms is of two kinds: (1) Powerlooms owned by "textile owners" (merchant-manufacturers). Around 90 "textile owners" directly own almost 60 per cent (or 3,000) of the powerlooms in Mau.

In the early seventies, the total number of "textile owners" was around 250 and they directly owned almost 5000 powerlooms. Despite a decrease in the number of powerlooms since then, their concentration in fewer hands is discernible and it is widely believed that around 20 big "textile owners" control a major chunk of this business. Most of the "textile owners" in Mau happen to be Ansari Muslims and they are enrolled in a Powerloom Association whose Executive was last elected in 1974. However, most of the bigger "textile owners" happen to be "bania" and marwari" Hindus.

(2) Powerlooms/pedallooms owned by weavers, a majority of whom weave on 'Bani' (or as contract labourers) for merchant-manufacturers. Since the slump in powerlooms around the mid-seventies, the ownership pattern of powerlooms has altered slightly, whereas before the slump, the traders and the weavers owned almost an equal number of powerlooms. At present this balance has shifted in favour of the traders. A majority of the powerlooms are operated by traders, while around 40 per cent are still operated by weavers. A class of middle-men has also recently emerged in the powerloom sector. These middle-men are getting "orders" for cloth production from "textile owners" and are sub-contracting these orders to weavers who own powerlooms.

The cloth produced on powerlooms in Mau faces stiff competition from the products of other powerloom centres, viz. Bhiwandi and Malegaon (in Maharashtra) and Burhanpur and Ichhapur (in Madhya Pradesh). Most of the produce of Mau's powerlooms is marketed with great difficulty by "textile owners" within Uttar Pradesh (U.P). Centres for wholesale purchase of gray cloth, coarse sarees and "dhotis" are at Kanpur, Agra, Khurja, Lucknow etc. Lungis are mostly sold at the weekly cloth "haat" in Khalilabad (Gorakhpur district) where terrycot produced on powerlooms in Mau is also sent for finishing. The two problems which are often stated to be obstructing the growth of the powerloom sector in Mau are :

(a) The dearth of a finishing plant for terrycot or blended fabrics through which alone the powerloom sector can look for a

bright future and compete with other powerloom centres in India;

(b) The unequal competition in the production of coarse cotton cloth which the powerloom sector faces from the heavily subsidized cloth of mills. The 'textile owners' opined that consumers could get cheap cloth produced on powerlooms without any subsidy from the government, hence mill production should be desubsidized.

The size of the handloom market in Mau has been growing. However, the varieties of produce have varied according to the change in tastes and fashions and the competition from the powerloom sector etc. In 1950s coarse "Khaddar", cotton sarees and muslin bedsheets were woven on handlooms. During the 1960s there was a shift to fine cotton sarees production together with the coarse "khaddar". The finer sarees and "lungis" in addition to the products previously woven were produced in the 1970s. And period 1980s lungis, nylon sarees and texturized sarees engaged almost all the handlooms of Mau. Though lungis and fine cotton sarees continue to be woven, the production of nylon sarees has been substantially reduced these days.

The handlooms are owned by weavers themselves and almost every household of "Ansari Muslims" has at least one handloom. There are almost 40000 weavers and around 20000 handlooms in and around Mau. These weavers face an absolute famine of working capital and have little contact with traders from outside, nor do they have facilities for direct marketing. Hence the weaver is largely dependent on the wholesale and retail traders, brokers, 'grihasthas' (or merchant manufacturers) and other intermediaries. Though Mau has been taken up for special attention under the Intensive Handloom Development Programme by the U.P. Handloom Corporation, only 700 weavers (600 weavers supply uncontrolled cloth and 100 weavers supply controlled cloth) are said to be benefitting from this measure. Similarly, 478 cooperative societies (in 1983) were registered in district Azamgarh with the Industries Department, Government of U.P, but only a small fraction among them was found to be operating effectively. The registration of societies in excess of these actually functioning is motivated by the desire of vested interest to misappropriate the subsidies on raw materials and rebate of finished products offered by the Govern-

ment for the benefit of weavers. So, the weavers are still not able to pull themselves out from the clutches of middlemen.

The trading sections involved with the handlooms are the yarn traders and commission agents. The commission agents are mostly 'Marwari Hindus', and their number is not more than 25 out of whom some are 'Muslims' also. These commission agents have traditionally been a prominent link between the traders of Bengal, Bihar, Assam and Orissa and the local 'grihasthas' (or merchant-manufacturers). Almost all the 'grihasthas' happen to be Muslims. Depending on the terms of contract and the market conditions, they charge a commision ranging from 1 to 2 per cent from the 'grihasthas', the trader from outside or from both. During the time of boom of certain handloom products, these commision agents are reported to have been bypassed by 'grihasthas'. Two occasions usually mentioned in this connection are the boom for fine cotton sarees between 1966-69 and for nylon blended sarees between 1980-83.

Yarn traders have formed a 'Yarn Trade Federation' consisting of around 138 members, only 20 out of whom are wholesalers, four or five happen to be 'Deshvali' (sons of the soil), 'Mahajans' and others are 'Marwari Hindus'. Amongst the retailers, there has ben a considerable increase of traders, particularly those who happen to be Muslims, during the past 10 years or so. The source of capital for these newly emerged traders is stated to lie in the powerloom boom of early 1970 and the nylon sarees boom of 1980-83. This new section of yarn traders is projected to threaten the established yarn wholesalers. Our field survey revealed that this new section is involved in getting handloom products manufactured as "grihasthas" and it also weaves on few self owned handlooms. Some of them are working simultaneously as small commission agents.

The impact of fluctuations in the prices of yarn is projected communally. The emergence of retailers of yarn during the early seventies is perceived by wholesalers, most of whom happen to be Hindus, as the emergence of "Muslims in yarn trade". Even the reasons for the emergence and the growing prosperity of the new retailers are based on factors like "Muslim traders sell their product to Muslim weavers on credit. We cannot do so and hence are at a disadvantage. We can bear with less profits, but not payments which may never be made by these Muslims, who instigate riots to absolve themselves of credit liabilities".

Such beliefs arise from actual or pretended ignorance about market conditions in the household industry operating within a capitalist economy. The emergence of retailers in the trade of yarn could possibly be attributed to :

(a) surplus accumulation amongst sections of weavers during the different booms in the local cloth market, viz. 1966-69, 1980-83 etc.
(b) the gradual emergence of small brokers as merchant manufacturers and yarn traders.

Trade in cloth particularly has a greater credit component, some of which is advanced by organized credit institutions but much more by wholesalers, middlemen and retailers. The amount of credit varies with the market demand of commodities, i.e. the higher the demand, more the likelihood of faster circulation of money leading to cash payments. Inversely, in conditions of relative depression which have been plaguing Mau since 1984, payments on a credit basis have become more predominant. Such compulsions of the market are projected as benefitting only one section of traders who happen to be Muslims. Competition arising from a clash of economic interests is thereby given the form of communal antagonism.

Perception along communal lines is also discernible amongst cloth traders and 'grihasthas' (or merchant manufacturers). Sections amongst the 'grihasthas', most of whom happen to be Muslims, have started direct wholesale trading in handloom products during the past 10 years or so and are engaged in stiff competition with established commission agents and cloth traders, most of whom happen to be Hindus. These sections project themselves as the benefactors of the whole religious group by organizing and financing social service institutions. It is also projected by them that their profits will benefit the religious group as a whole.

Common religious group affinity between the weavers and the 'grihasthas' is used by the latter to create an impression that 'Marwari and Bania traders' had a monopoly over handloom trade in the past and this was responsible for the destruction of the craft of weaving and the deprivation of weavers. Such propaganda and postures are utilized to bargain with the weavers for deflating wages and competing in the market for a favourable position. The competition for market amongst the traders belonging to both relig-

ious groups is thus fought in a communal guise.

Religious group identities are also used by some traders to lease, rent, evict or occupy shops. Given the high population density of Mau and an inadequate shopping area, there is stiff competition for shops, particularly those located in the crowded chowk areas.

Besides traders, these fluctuations have further pauperized the weavers who were already impoverished. The weavers are dependent on yarn traders, merchant-manufacturers or 'grihasthas' and commission agents. Though these weavers own handlooms, they are totally dependent on these middlemen for earning their livelihood as they do not possess capital.[7]

The prices of handloom products remain so low that the employment of family labour becomes necessary. CRRID sample survey reveals that the earnings of family labour range from Rs.16 to Rs 42 per day. These earnings depend upon the nature of the product produced, work availability, craftsmanship etc, apart from other factors which affect the textile industry as a whole. It was also found that the average size of families was considerably large. The intense competition in trade,decline in real wages of workers and fluctuations in the prices of yarn and other raw materials and retrogressive trends in textile industry are providing necessary conditions for the growth of Communalism in Mau. This fact reduced the

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7. The weavers in Mau are linked with the handloom market through the intermediaries in the following ways:

1. They are dependent on 'grihasthas'. These 'grihasthas' are said to be around 300 to 500 in number. The 'grihasthas' are mostly 'Ansari Muslims'. Those among them with approximate businesses of Rs.50 lakh per season are four to five, those with Rs.20 to Rs.50 lakh are 15 to 20, those with Rs.10 to 20 lakh are 40 to 50 and the rest have a business of Rs.10 lakh or less. These grihasthas sell the produce of weavers through commission agents or directly to wholesale traders outside Mau. They get handloom products manufacturered as per the market requirements from the weavers under the following two systems.

a) The *'Poat or Dhara'* system — the 'grihasthas' has a stock of yarn, colour and starch which he 'sells' (but actually loans) on a premium to the weavers. The weaver, on completing the order, 'sells' the finished product to the same 'grihastha' and pays a certain commission to him for buying it. The price of the finished product is usually depreciated and that of the raw material inflated by the 'grihasthas' as immediate cash transactions seldom take place. Helpless weavers, therefore, have to bear the losses due to fluctuations in the market price of products. The 'Poat or Dhara' system

Contd. ⟶

per head earnings of a weaver's family.

Unlike Mau, Azamgarh is not experiencing intense competition in trade, industry and for jobs. Azamgarh, being a district town, is a small centre for general trade and commerce. In 1984-85 there were 3762 shops and establishments registered, out of which only 15 per cent were owned by traders who happened to be Muslims. There is, however, an impression that migrants who happen to be Muslims are investing, a portion of their huge earnings and remittances from the gulf in general trade. As a possible consequence of this investment and the likelihood of the emergence of these sections as big traders, established traders, most of whom happen to be Hindus feel concerned. Competition per se is related to the direction and pace of development. But its perception as competition between traders of two religious groups is caused by the operation of communal ideology and, in turn, it reinforces this ideology. However, in the case of Azamgarh this competition is yet to acquire a communal form.

This is not to deny any perception of competition on communal lines. These perceptions are a reflection of the pervasiveness of communalism among sections of traders or employers and are not a logical outcome of the laws of political economy. Nevertheless, it can also not be denied that the perception of communal

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is generally resorted to only by the bigger 'grihasthas' today, though it was widely prevalent some 20 years ago.

b) *"Baani"* system, the 'grihasthas' advance raw material and a certain percentage of working expenses to the weavers. The weavers are paid predetermined piece wages on completing the order. This is more prevalent today.

2. The weavers can sell their produce directly to the commission agents who market the finished product. The raw material and other working expenses are borne by the weavers in this case. Depending upon the demand for the finished product and the actual terms of contract between the weaver and the commission agent, the produce of this category of weavers is marketed. This system of marketing is nominal today, but was widely prevalent during the nylon saree boom between 1980-83. The commission agents may sometimes order the manufacture of certain specific products through brokers from weavers on the "Baani system".

Contd. ⟶

competition may merely be a consequence of communal propaganda by certain vested interests.

The notion of interest being based on religion is widely prevalent. The prevalence of this notion confirms and multiplies the sense of discrimination amongst members of one religious group if an entrepreneur amongst them fails to get a dealership or a licence etc.

In the realm of agriculture too, the notion of commonality of religious group interests is gaining ground in the district, Azamgarh. The traditional landowning interests, which mostly belong to the higher castes, i.e. Thakurs, Bhumihars and Brahmins, are increasingly resorting to the propagation and use of religious group identities. The reasons for this trend of preference for religion as compared to caste is to checkmate the consolidation of the strength of middle peasants who mostly belong to intermediate castes and also to formulate a larger group so as to have an advantage in electoral politics. Even the Harijans are being increasingly brought to the fold of Hinduism so as to serve as volunteers in these larger groups. This trend of creating and consolidating religious group identities is reflected in a marked increase in the number of new temples and the renovation of old ones through the 'donation of labour' of 'shramdaan' by all castes.

In Azamgarh district, for historical reasons, there is a sizable educated middle class. As early as in 1931 (the last Census to enumerate population according to castes) the district had a literacy rate which was more than the State's average in the case of

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3. The weaver is sometimes linked with the market through "brokers". These "brokers" often weave on their own handlooms also. They perform the role of agents of bigger 'grihasthas' or commission agents. They place the orders to weavers usually on the "Baani system" and keep a share of the profit for themselves at the cost of the earnings of weavers.

Similarly , in one of the villages in Azamgarh district the Sarpanch reported a small stir organized by the landless 'Harijans' of the village against landlords, most of whom are Thakurs, to avenge their exploitation. The stir was organized by 'Harijans' and excluded the landless and marginal peasants of other casters including Thakur's. Thus due to the operation of communalism, the identification of interests is often made on communal basis by both propertied and propertyless sections. This blurs the possible non-communal solution of the socio-economic problems.

almost all caters of Hindus and Muslims as a whole. For want of job opportunities locally, it is widely believed that out-migration of literate and educated persons, as also others, was very high from this district. The same trend continues to this day.

The competition for employment in the job market is also being used to breed religious group antagonism. The Shibli National Post Graduate College, Azamgarh (whose foundation was laid in 1882), is enviously designated 'mini-Aligarh muslim University' by Hindu communalist. This envy is further inflamed by scarcity of jobs as revealed by unemployment figures. In February, 1985 around 2800 applicants were registered with the employment exchange at Azamgarh town. The employment exchange at Azamgarh had 29179 applicants on its live register for 1984-85 out of which only 22 could get jobs.

The same is the case at Mau. The employment exchange at Maunath Bhanjan serves the Muhamdabad Gohna and Ghosi tehsils of Azamgarh district. Applicants registered with this exchange during the year 1984-85 numbered 5581 out of which more than 65 per cent were educated upto the high school level or above.

Table 4.3

Literacy Rates in District Azamgarh in Uttar Pradesh During 1931

Caste/ Religious Groups	District/ State	Azamgarh	Uttar Pradesh
(1)		(2)	(3)
Brahmins		15.60	13.94
Depressed Classes		0.20	0.33
Other Hindus		5.37	4.70
Muslims		7.50	4.90

Source : 1931 Census

With the intake of applicants being minimal in the services and with limited opportunities for industrial employment, competition for jobs is very stiff. Such a situation was used by communalists to propagate the point that under employment or unemployment of their co-religionists was due to the over employment of members of the other religious group. Such propaganda further exacerbated the sense of discrimination, fears and anxieties among religious groups.

The aforementioned examples from trade and industry, agriculture, the service sector and the distribution of social amenities show that the competition, for resources is not intense in Azamgarh, distribution of benefits is not perceived on religious group lines as it is done in case of Mau. Further, communalism is yet to acquire antagonistic overtones in Azamgarh. An analysis of the nature of politics shall help to understand the factors responsible for the eruption of communal riots in Mau and their absence in Azamgarh town.

Party Politics Communalism and Communal Rioting

Communal politics is the main consumer and propagator of communalism through communal stereotypes, distorted versions of history, religiosity, irrational and unascertainable notions which are full of hatred for and contempt against the other religious group. Communal organizations and political groups use such kind of propaganda to cash upon electoral politics or to strengthen their support cases.

The extent of penetration of communalism in a specific situation shall influence the success or failure of particular political leaders or groups viz-a-viz:

a) the communal content adopted by them as their ideology and used by them in their political programmes;
b) the dexterity with which they can use communalism without even owning the same;
c) the rejection of communalism in their political programmes and in actual practice.

A critical evaluation of election results, electoral alliances and political movements in Azamgarh and Mau towns under study, reveals the decline in the electoral strength of left and secular

TABLE 4.4

PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES POLLED BY VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES IN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS FROM AZAMGARH DISTRICT DURING THE PERIOD 1952-80

Sr. No.	Political Parties / Years	1952	1957	1962	1967	1969	1974	1977	1980
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
1.	Congress	31.93	28.55	27.85	26.36	26.51	23.57	28.79	-
2.	Congress(I)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36.32
3.	Congress(O)	-	-	-	-	-	7.50	-	-
4.	Congress(S)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.65
5.	Hindu Maha Sabha	-	-	-	-	0.13	-	-	-
6.	Jan Sangh	5.61	8.57	13.06	19.01	13.12	9.41	-	-
7.	B.J.P.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.69
8.	C P I	3.70	12.00	16.32	8.43	7.20	6.07	9.51	8.34
9.	C P M	-	-	-	6.07	2.07	2.54	0.77	0.82
10.	P S P	-	24.00	25.09	6.15	1.33	-	-	-
11.	S S P	-	-	-	21.15	19.82	-	-	-
12.	Socialist	18.94	-	7.54	-	1.10	3.85	-	-

Sr. No.	Political Parties / Years	1952	1957	1962	1967	1969	1974	1977	1980
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
13.	U.P.R.S.P	2.76	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
14.	K.M.P.P.	13.73	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
15.	Majdoor Parishad	-	-	-	-	0.11	-	-	-
16.	B.K.D.	-	-	-	-	14.53	33.86	-	-
17.	J.P.(S)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20.84
18.	J.P.(Rajnarain)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.72
19.	Janta Party	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.34
20.	Janata	-	-	-	-	-	-	45.06	-
21.	Swatantra	-	-	5.67	1.78	0.76	0.03	-	-
22.	R.R.P.	2.97	1.01	0.18	-	-	-	-	-
23.	R P I	-	-	2.16	5.15	9.76	-	-	0.70
24.	Muslim Majlis	-	-	-	-	-	0.05	-	-
25.	Others	-	-	-	-	0.53	1.19	-	-
26.	Independents	20.27	25.88	2.13	5.92	3.04	11.92	15.86	11.58
All Parties :		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source : Election Commission Reports

forces, particularly after 1969 in Azamgarh and Mau. In the first election to the U.P. Legislative Assembly in district Azamgarh the political groups of the left (i.e. CPI, PSP, KMPP and UPRSP) secured 39.22 per cent of the valid votes polled and 3 out of the 14 seats in the district were won by them. These groups were able to muster as much as 49.13 per cent of the valid votes polled in 1962 in Azamgarh district. In 1969 mid-term Legislative Assembly poll these groups registered a marked decline and polled only 31.52 per cent votes but won 5 seats out of the 14 seats in the district. Since this election, different political groups of the left have been continuously losing electoral support, i.e. 1974 they poled 12.46 per cent in 1977 only 10.28 per cent and in 1980 even less than 10 per cent. (Table 4.4) This trend continued in subsequent elections.

Before and after the attainment of Independence, these political groups of the left were able to consolidate their political strength through various mass movements launched by them in the region as a whole. The most notable among these movements were the "Hari Begar Nazrana Movement" launched after the formation of All India Kisan Sabha in 1936. the movement was aimed at putting an end to willful ejectments of tenants by `zamindars' (i.e. Nazrana), tilling the `zamindars' land without wages (i.e. Hari), and doing errands for `zaminadars' without wages(i.e. Begar). The positive demands put forward by activists who launched the *Hari Begar Nazrana movement* were security of tenure to tenant and relief from arrears and debts. The slogans raised during this movement were `Abolition of Zamindari' and `Land to the Tiller'. The *Hari Begar Nazrana Movement* continued in its different forms till the legal abolition of `zamindari' in 1952. These struggles threw up progressive leaders like Sarjoo Pandey, Jharkhanda Rai, Jai Bahadur Singh, Pabbar Ram etc. who commanded great respect in their area.

The fervour of the nationalist movement in Azamgarh district owed much to the militant efforts of the different political groups of the left. These groups tried to generate nationalist and secular consciousness among masses between 1942 and 1946 through plays like 'Tadapti Duniya' and 'Bhagat Singh Ki Phaansi' as also through 30 night schools in and around Nandganj and a monthly newspaper called 'Azad'. Police repression was let loose on these activists and the night schools and the newspaper were forced to close down.

A simultaneous trend of caste mobilization is also revealed

in the movement launched by Bharat Singh Yadavacharya and J.P.Chaudhry in 1930 through what they called the 'Triveni Sangam'. This was a confederation of several lower and intermediate castes like Yadav, Nonia, Mean, Kushwaha, Rajbhar, Kurmi etc. The issues on which these castes were mobilized were the right to wear the sacred thread called 'Janeyu' and to study in Gurukuls. Both these privileges were considered the birth-right of solely the higher castes. During the pre-partition period the Muslim League, Hindu Mahasabha and Arya Samaj were also active in mobilizing people around religious group identities. Notwithstanding the restricted franchise, it is interesting to note that Muslim League won all but one, of the Mohammadan reserved seats in Azamgarh district in the two elections to the U.P. Legislative Assembly in 1937 and 1946. Similarly, the Hindu Mahasabha, though it performed very badly in these elections, registered its presence and emerged as a second important political group after the Congress in the general constituencies in these districts. These communal groups and organizations weakened the peasant and other progressive movements.

After the legal abolition of 'zamindari', the political groups of the left continued their struggles with the main thrust on agriculture and for those working in this sector. The movements launched by these groups were:

a) Anti-Eviction Movement in 1953 which widely spread to Azamgarh and was meant to protect the tenurial right of the tenants.
b) Anti-repression Campaign in 1954.
c) Movement against increase in Canal rates and Panchayat and District Board Taxes in 1953.
d) Anti consolidation movement in 1955 as land consolidating departments were allocating infertile land to small peasants under the influence of big landowners who wanted to grab all the fertile patches in their respective villages.
e) Movements for increase in price of sugar cane and immediate payment of peasant's dues in 1952 and 1955.
f) Movement for a new food and land reforms policy in 1955, 1958 and 1962.
g) Movements for the fulfillment of demands of landless labourers and other agricultural labourers in 1959 and 1970.

All these movements have greatly checked the extent of pervasiveness of communalism in Azamgarh district. But the political groups of the left, which led these movements, did not wage a consistent ideological political struggle against communalism. The absence of this struggle led to the strengthening of communal forces. The strength of communal forces can be gauged from the electoral support to political groups which own communal ideology and propagate it also. In Azamgarh district during the first U.P. Legislative Assembly elections in 1952, Jan Sangh was able to get 5.61 per cent of the total valid votes polled and it reached a peak of 19.61 per cent in the Legislative Assembly elections in 1967. Thereafter, a decline set in and Jan Sangh was able to muster only 13.12 per cent in 1969 and 9.41 per cent in 1974. (Table 4.4)

The limited appeal of communal forces indicates that the extent of pervasiveness of communalism is not so widespread in the district. This also reflects the validity of the argument that society, economy and more so, polity is not divided along religious lines. However, under the influence of communalism the social, economic and political interests may appear to be divided on communal lines.

It may be highlighted that the nature of development in agriculture continues to employ around 80 per cent of the workforce and it is also the major contributor to the income of the district. The tertiary sector has experienced only limited expansion and the secondary sector has not expanded in any significant way. The major support base of Jan Sangh is from sections amongst traders, white-collar workers and few landowning individuals. The limited development of tertiary sector and the limited formation of religious group identities, has controlled the growth of communalism to a weak incremental form in Azamgarh district.

The non-communal political groups, like Congress, Janata Party, Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD, now reformed as Dalit Mazdoor Kisan Party) etc., have used elements of communalism from time to time without owning it. BKD emerged in 1969 as a sizable political force polling 14.53 per cent of the total valid votes in that year and 33.86 per cent in the 1974 Legislative Assembly elections in Azamgarh district. The use of caste group affiliations in electoral politics by organizing the small and middle peasants not according to their actual social placement, but

as intermediate caste groups in opposition to higher castes is commonly stated to be the reason behind the emergence of BKD. The appeal of this party vastly increased due to its voicing the issue of reservation in public employment for members of the intermediate caste groups.

The emerging trends in Azamgarh district are:

a) There is a tendency among the main political groups to use religious symbols alongwith caste group affinities so as to widen their appeal among different caste groups in response to the increasing competition in politics. For instance, the 'Ram Janam Bhumi Liberation Movement' was not discouraged by any political group. So, instead of promoting a scientific outlook and rational values, the main political groups appear to be giving tacit support to obscurantism and reactionary ideas. Besides these communal slogans, a demand for holy status for the village Harpur (Tehsil Jamania) was raised at election time . Harpur is said to be the birth place of Parsuram, a legendary figure in Hindu mythology.

b) The vacuum caused by the gradual eclipse of the leaders who had participated in socio-political movements and had a rural background is being sought to be filled by the leaders who are the product of that social milieu which promotes opportunism, unprincipled politicking and communal orientation in Azamgarh district.

Mau is the only place which has experienced frequent communal incidents. These incidents are a reflection of the pervasiveness of communalism, particularly among the trading sections and finds expression through communal stereotypes. The communal stereotypes are more antagonistic in Mau as compared to Azamgarh town. This may be due to the persistence of minority-majority persecution complex among communal Hindus and majority-minority persecution complex among communal Muslims.Muslims form 66 per cent of Mau's population as compared to 25 per cent in Azamgarh Municipal Board (MB). Communalists, while declaring themselves a persecuted minority in Mau, propagate that there is a threat to their survival from 'Muslims' and therefore, all 'Hindus' should unite. Further, they urge co-religionists to project their unity

in politics and through public performance of religious rituals. In electoral politics, the impact of this communal propaganda can be inferred from the percentage of votes polled by Jan Sangh. In 1957 Jan Sangh secured 22.20 per cent votes, in 1962 it mustered 26.53 per cent votes and in 1967 it got 32.27 per cent votes polled for Legislative Assembly elections from the constituency in which Mau falls. Ever since then, Jan Sangh (reformed as Bharatiya Janata Party in 1980) could secure around 18 per cent votes in subsequent Legislative Assembly elections with the exception of 1980. (Table 4.5). In the subsequent elections B.J.P. continued to improve its position and support base.

The organized antagonistic assertion in social activities by communal Hindus is reflected by the increase in religious processions, tightly knit organizations conducting these processions etc. The religious organizations were seen to play a dominant role in politics. For example, the office-bearers of the Ram Lila Mela Committee, which is the apex body of all other 'Hindu' organizations, are also active political workers and leaders. Similarly, some of the patrons of Madrassas and Masjids participate in electoral politics as in the case of Mufta-ul-uloom. Even while these patrons may not be contesting elections themselves, they often lend their support to political groups as they did in the 1985 Legislative Assembly elections when they supported a BJP candidate. These alliances in no way alleviate mistrust and suspicion prevalent among members of these communal political groups. Some activists related to the politics of the patrons of Mufta-ul-uloom appeared apprehensive of BJP even after voting for it, remarking "we have committed suicide".

Communist Party of India(CPI), which is one of the main political groups in Mau, has a substantial support base amongst weavers (a majority of whom happen to be Muslims). Due to the pervasiveness of fatalism and elements of communalism among some weavers, the left forces have not been able to mobilize all the weavers despite several movements they have launched on their demands. Mau has been a centre of trade union activity under the influence of left parties. A trade union of weavers by the name of 'Bunker Union' was established in 1952, by CPI. During the 1950s several agitatións were organized by this union asking for marketing facilities for finished products, financial help to produce raw materials and formation of a law for weavers co-operatives in the

TABLE : 4.5

PERCENTAGE OF VALID VOTES POLLED BY VARIOUS POLITICAL PARTIES IN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS FROM MAUNATH BHANJAN TOWN DURING THE PERIOD 1957-85

A

Sr. No.	Political Parties / Years	1957	1967	1974	1977	1980	1985
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
1.	Congress	27.75	22.51	-	-	-	-
2.	Congress(I)	-	-	-	-	22.82	16.95
3.	Congress(S)	-	-	2.63		-	-
4.	Congress(J)	-	-	-	-	-	1.55
5.	Jan Sangh	22.20	32.27	17.93	-	-	-
6.	B.J.P.	-	-	-	-	8.07	18.91
7.	C.P.I.	23.75	14.60	25.85	45.88	14.10	38.79
8.	C.P.M.	-	15.38	17.71	6.01	-	-
9.	P.S.P.	21.20	10.13	-	-	-	-
10.	S.S.P.	-	3.45	-	-	-	-
11.	Muslim League	-	-	0.67	-	-	-
12.	B.K.D.	-	-	16.32	-	-	-
13.	J.P.	-	-	-	46.03	-	1.82

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
14.	Janata (J.P.)	-	-	-	-	2.51	-
15.	J.P. Charan Singh(Secular)	-	-	-	-	1.12	-
16.	J.P. Raj Narain (Secular)	-	-	-	-	10.23	-
17.	R.P.I.(K)	-	-	-	-	2.22	-
18.	S.S.D.	-	-	1.10	-	-	-
19.	Lok Dal	-	-	-	-	-	11.34
20.	Door Darshi party	-	-	-	-	-	0.72
21.	Independents	5.10	1.66	17.78	2.08	38.93	9.92
	All Parties	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

B

During 1962

Parties	Congress	Jan Sangh	P.S.P.	C.P.I.	Others
% Ratio (100)	22.55	26.53	18.95	27.32	4.65

C

During 1969

Parties	Jan Sangh	C.P.I.	BKD	Others
% Ratio (100)	18.00	18.77	23.52	39.71

Source : Election Commission Reports

handloom sector etc. It is generally believed that apart from the formation of a few co-operatives, no sizable gain accrued to weavers as a consequence of these agitations. In early 1970's , particularly in 1973, a state wide movement seeking stability in yarn prices, marketing facilities etc. was launched jointly by the Communist Party of India (Marxist) affiliated 'Bunker Union' and the CPI and Congress affiliated 'Bunker Majlis-e-Amal'. This movement achieved considerable gains, viz. formation of U.P. Handloom Corporations to market the produce of weavers and rationing of yarn to registered weavers at controlled prices. The ration cards on which weavers were to be provided subsidized yarn by the Industries Department of the Government of Uttar Pradesh could only partially meet the yarn needs of weavers and as per respondents who were weavers the government did not supply yarn for more than two months in 1973. On similar issues of yarn and marketing, an agitation under the leadership of the Left forces was launched in 1980 also. Despite efforts towards organized and collective action and certain facilities provided by the government, the weavers continue to languish in poverty. These weavers are very poor and their poverty has grown over the years. "Our fathers weaved sarees independently and sold them in the market. With the money they acquired from sales they could buy yarn and go on to weave again. We weave on 'Bani' (contract labour) for 'grihasthas' (or merchant-manufacturers) and depend on him for market and raw material. Our sons will become wage labourers".

Some of the weavers in Mau believed that they were impoverished because the handloom traders and other middle men have swallowed major gains and benefits since the intensive commercialization of handloom products. It is this section which constituted major support base of CPI. "We are being licked away by grihasthas who are like termites". These grihasthas, most of whom also happen to be Muslims, are taken as an exploitative occupational group by some of the weavers. The weavers were convinced that 'grihasthas' were indifferent to religion when it came to their trade. "These grihasthas are from amongst us but have no personal relations with us". When asked as to how could the 'grihasthas' exploit them, these weavers felt that in the absence of working capital, per force they had to beg the 'grihastha' for work and fall prey to exploitation. Further they opined that this dependence restricts the possibility of a weaver's organization being militant

and effective.

Some of the weavers particularly those with a smack of education thought that like other traditional crafts, the handloom sector is unprofitably placed in relation to the powerlooms and textile mills. They saw the cause of their poverty in the decay of traditional crafts. Negligence by the government was often given as a cause for this decay.

Communal violence and the communally tense environment of Mau has left traces of communalism amongst some sections of these weavers as revealed by our field survey. Besides, political groups and other vested interests are perpetuating religious, caste and sect affinities to maintain the existing socio-economic and political arrangements. Some of the weavers under the influence of this ideology even reprimanded those leaders who combined in themselves the role of political as well as religious leaders. "It is the nature of Indians that they do not mix religion and politics in a desired manner. Politics without religion breeds immorality".

Some other weavers, however, felt that politics should be separated from religion and votes should be cast only to the deserving candidates. They, however, complained that BJP had united the "Hindus" and if there is any communalism in politics at Mau it is because "Hindus" are organized.

The perception of weavers about their miserable economic conditions was that the government was not rescuing them and God was not helping them. They reposed tremendous faith in God for rectifying their plight. "We must work hard and God will reward us". Some of them regretted that they could not even pray five times a day. They, however, praised the 'grihasthas' for being devout Muslims and promoters of Islam. Fatalism, particularly, makes weavers amenable to communal propaganda. When social life is conceived as given and unchangeable it becomes very easy for vested interests to use traditional loyalties like caste, religion, sect in the name of God, common good and social stability. For instance, the 'grihasthas',middle men and brokers from amongst Muslims often become 'nazims' of religious institutions to project themselves as leaders of 'all Muslims' and thereby, serve the 'Divine Cause', 'Common Good of Muslims' etc. This helps the vested interests to maintain affinity with the weavers while the relation between the two sections are put under severe strain by a direct clash of economic interests. The impact of all this was one of the factors

leading to perception like "Hindu traders have destroyed traditional crafts everywhere in India. Given half a chance, they will destroy handlooms in Mau by devaluing skilled craftsmanship and encouraging mass production".

When asked whether anything was wrong with the political system or with the people operating it, most of the weavers thought the political system was mainly to blame for making the masses irrelevant in politics and it leaves no hope for weavers to improve their economic conditions. They feel that:

a) several of the political rights ensured by the constitution become inoperative in social practice as the political system caters to the rich.
b) their role in the present political system has been reduced to simple voters that no representative is accountable to them and they cannot become their own representatives as election expenses are very heavy.

The preponderance of unprincipled politics, organization of 'Hindus' by communal organizations and emasculation of the common voters by the money-oriented political system are cited by weavers as factors for their political deprivation. Propaganda about the organization of 'Hindus' is carried out by the Jamat and the Tabliq with the active support of some political leaders and economic vested interests. This results in increasing elements of religiosity amongst weavers as expressed by their increasing participation in religious processions like prophet Mohmmed's birthday, Milads etc.

Elements of communalism are no doubt prevalent among weavers in Mau. However, simultaneously there is a streak of secular thinking among them. Some of the weavers condemn 'Hindu' traders more than co-religionist 'grihasthas', while identifying both as the source of their miseries. On the other hand, these weavers are not antagonistic towards their fellow workers who may be 'Hindus'.

It is interesting that some traders constitute the support base of the political groups of the left and most of them belong to the Ahl-e-Hadis sect of Muslims. Most of the traders support the congress, irrespective of their religious group affiliation. some of the traders,

who were also local-level leaders of congress, were quite in contrast with the professed secular principles of the party. After extensive interviews with these leaders and the perception about them among general public, it can be said that they openly use and propagate communalism.

On partition of India in 1947, a section of the Muslim League joined CPI, under the leadership of Maulana Abdul Baki. Ever since then a general impression has been created that CPI in Mau is Muslim League in disguise. This impression has been created by the -

a) propaganda of the rival political groups;
b) policy of protecting "minorities" which resulted into the appeasement of communalists.

CPI, as also some other political groups, did not make any distinction between communalism of the religious 'minorities' and the religious 'minorities' as such. The failure to make this vital distinction resulted into the legitmization of communal propaganda that 'minorities' face persecution as society is divided along religious group lines, Further, this failure or conceptual error led to the appeasement of 'minority' communalism and the demands articulated by communalism got wider acceptance when professedly secular parties also voiced them without shedding the communal overtones in these demands.

The widespread electoral support to the political groups of the left is not derived from ideology, programme and policy only. This was discerned during the course of our field survey. Some traders, like some of the weavers, opined that religion and politics should be mixed so as to provide a moral basis to politics. In the 1957 Legislative Assembly elections the political groups of the left polled 44.95 per cent in the constituency in which Mau fell. The maximum number of votes, i.e. 51.89 per cent, were secured by these groups in the 1977 Legislative Assembly elections. These groups have never polled less than 35 per cent votes in Legislative Assembly elections from Mau constituency but for 1969 and 1980 (Table 4.5).

The data on electoral politics, electoral alliances and political movements reveals that the extent of pervasiveness of com-

munal ideology has a bearing on politics. The nature of contemporary politics in Mau is dominated by two kinds of groups, viz. those who are patently communal and those who use communalism. However, in Azamgarh the political groups merely use communalism to feed the perceptions of people regarding the existence of "Hindu interests", "Muslim interests" and so on. Secondly, the communal stereotypes at Mau are antagonistic as compared to Azamgarh. Thirdly, the persecution complex arising from the perception of discrimination against "minorities" is pervasive among members of both the religious groups in Mau and, therefore, the people feel a necessity to politically assert themselves. The extent of politicalisation is less and the nature of persecution complex is milder in Azamgarh. Fourthly, in Mau, religious group identities are sought to be reinforced for political purposes by Madrasas and the Ram Lila Committee, in a more sympathetic manner as compared to Azamgarh. Fifthly, religious processions and public performance of religious rituals at Mau are directly contributing to the stoking of communal fires whereas at Azamgarh they are only contributing to obscurantism.

Chapter 5

Communal Riots : A Historically Continuous Phenomenon

(A study of Ahmedabad and Vadodara, Gujarat)

There has been a manifold increase in the frequency and intensity of communal riots since the mid-sixties in Gujarat. An analysis of data reveals that between the mid-fifties and upto the late sixties the incidents of communal rioting were negligible in Gujarat and moderate in India. Communal rioting increased during the mid-sixties in India. In the same period in Gujarat rioting became frequent and ranked second in India. Thereafter the number of communal incidents started declining until the eighties. In the beginning of the eighties communal incidents began rising again (see table 5.1).

Interestingly, the most developed districts i.e. Ahmedabad and Vadodara are representative of the general trend experienced by Gujarat in terms of the frequency of communal rioting. A detailed study of these two areas shall help us to understand the locale, participation and reasons for the frequent eruption of communal riots. There was negligible rioting up to the mid-sixties in these two districts also. However, there was a manifold increase in communal eruptions and social tensions during the decade between the mid-sixties and seventies. In 1969, 1970 and 1971 social tensions were more frequent. The riots in 1969 in Ahmedabad and Vadodara were the severest. The frequency, intensity and duration of communal rioting and other forms of tensions after the mid-seventies continue unabated.

Rioting in Ahmedabad between two religious groups took place in 1927, 1941, 1946, 1950, 1953 and 1969. The 1969 riot engulfed the whole of Ahmedabad. About 1000 lives were lost and property worth Rs.33.70 crore destroyed.

The first riot in Vadodara took place in 1927. The second riot in the city in 1969 was basically a fallout of the riot in Ahmedabad. Then more recently, Vadodara witnessed communal rioting in September, 1981, which continued for about a year and a half, aggravating in October, 1982, to dangerous proportions.

Locale and Participation [1]

Locational confrontation of mohallas inhabited by diverse religious groups makes the identification of 'targets' easier. Like in other riot hit towns, in these two cities mohallas inhabited by members of one religious group are in locational confrontation with mohallas inhabited by the other religious group. It is these mohallas which are more vulnerable to communal rioting. For instance, Ahmedabad, *Sarohiwad Nagoriwad* (Shahpur) Muslim majority mohallas open out into the Hindu-majority mohalla of *Autheswhar* in the west and *Dariapur* in the east (map 3a,b). In the case of Vadodara, *Navapura* and *Lalbagh*, which are Muslim majority mohallas, open out into Hindu-majority mohallas, viz. *Avdhutnagar* and *Shankar society* in the south and *Goya gate* and the *Maratha* mohalla in the north. Similarly, the Muslim-majority mohallas of *Panigate Badri* and *Mughalpura* open out into the Hindu majority mohallas of *Mehtapole* and *Mandai* in the north and *Chandani* and *Patelpole* in the west.(map 4a,b)

In Ahmedabad the mohallas of one religious group in locational confrontation with those of the others are generally riot prone and so are the mixed localities. In Vadodara, however, the Hindu-majority mohallas are generally riot-hit, though a few Muslim-majority mohallas and mixed localities are also riot-hit. In Ahmedabad *Wadegaon* and *Naginapole, Dariapur and Kalupur, Ambajee Mata and Chandan Talwadi/Dabgarwar, Raikhad and Jamalpur, Saranpur and Haraamwalipole, Bapunagar and Rakhial, Naginawad* and *Cheepawad* are the numerous examples of mohallas in locational confrontation with each other. The mixed localities of Ahmedabad which are also riot-hit are *Delhi Chakla, Saraspur, Teen Darwaza, Panch Kuan* etc (map 3c). In Vadodara the Hindu-majority mohallas which are riot-hit are *Champaner Gate, Babanpur,*

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1. See for details Pramod Kumar et el (1985) *Communal Violence and its Impact on Development and National Integration in Gujarat* CRRID, Chandigarh.
   The settlement pattern of Ahmedabad and Vadodara cities is divided into three categories viz. mohalla, pole and chawls. A mohalla is a large unit and it does not have any particular shape and structure. A chawl is a smaller unit, generally consisting of not more than six houses and often owned by a single owner. Poles are bigger than chawls. Both chawls and poles have a symmetrical shape and planned pattern.

TABLE 5.1

Five Yearly Incidence of Communal Disturbance in India and selected States from 1956 to 1980

	1956-1960		1961-1965		1966-1970		1971-1975		1976-1980	
	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R	I	R
India	238	-	1959	-	1739	-	1256	-	1318	-
Andhra Pradesh	11	V	29	VIII	82	VII	59	IX	107	V
Assam	11	V	42	VI	74	VIII	62	VIII	62	-
Bihar	42	II	475	II	420	I	197	II	206	II
Gujarat	-	-	22	IX	245	II	110	VI	113	IV
Madhya Pradesh	14	IV	38	VII	94	VI	120	V	86	VII
Maharashtra	14	IV	525	I	221	III	191	III	92	VI
Rajasthan	10	VII	3	-	44	-	65	VII	48	-
Uttar Pradesh	62	I	54	V	182	IV	220	I	241	I
West Bengal	38	III	383	III	119	V	146	IV	124	III

I == Incidence of Communal Disturbance

R == Rank amongst the states in India

Source :

1. Ministry of Home Affairs, Bulletins for the National Integration Council.
2. The Communal Edge to Plural Societies in India & malaysia, by Ratna Naidu, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd. (Ghaziabad), 1980.
3. The nature & Origin of Communal Ritos in India, by N.C. Sexana in Book - `Communal Riots in Post Independence India', edited by Asghar Ali Engineer, Sangam Books - 1984.


COMPARATIVE GRAPH OF INCIDENTS OF COMMUNAL DISTURBANCES IN BIHAR, UTTAR PRADESH, RAJASTHAN, MAHARASHTRA AND INDIA OVER A BLOCK OF FIVE YEARS FROM 1956–1980
NUMBER OF COMMUNAL INCIDENTS
BIHAR
UTTAR PRADESH
RAJASTHAN
MAHARASHTRA
INDIA
1956-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
1976-80
42
475
420
197
206
62
54
182
220
241
10
3
44
65
48
14
525
221
191
92
238
1256
1318
1739
1959

AHMEDABAD CITY
LOCATION OF MOHALLAS
MAP-3a



MAP OF AHMEDABAD CITY
DISTT AHMEDABAD

SOURCE: Field Study

AHMEDABAD CITY
MOHALLA WISE DISTRIBUTION OF
HINDU AND MUSLIM POPULATION
MAP-3b



MAP OF AHMEDABAD CITY
DISTT AHMEDABAD

KRISHAN CHAND

MUSLIM MAJORITY MOHALLAS

HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS

MOHALLAS WITH MIXED POPULATION

SOURCE: Field Study

AHMEDABAD CITY
RIOT PRONE AREAS
MAP-3c



MAP OF AHMEDABAD CITY
DISTT AHMEDABAD

KRISHAN CHAND

MUSLIM MAJORITY MOHALLAS

HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS

MOHALLAS WITH MIXED POPULATION

RIOT HIT AREAS

SENSITIVE AREAS

SOURCE: Field Study

BARODA CITY
LOCATION OF MOHALLAS
MAP-4a



KRISHAN CHAND

SOURCE: Field Study

BARODA CITY

MOHALLA WISE DISTRIBUTION OF
HINDU AND MUSLIM POPULATION
MAP-4b



MAP BARODA CITY
DISTT. BARODA

MUSLIM MAJORITY MOHALLAS

HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS

MOHALLAS WITH MIXED POPULATION

KRISHAN CHAND

SOURCE: Field Study

Bhoi-wad, Nava Bazaar, Ahmedabadi pole, Raopura, Dandia, Bhesana, Phanderao and Chaukhandi. The Muslim-majority mohallas and mixed localities of Vadodara which are riot hit are *Panigate, Mughalpura, Lehripura, Lalbagh, Nava pura, Barampura, Kohli Phata and Jagotri. (see map 4c)*

It was observed that there is some sort of a communal segregation even in the hutment colonies of Ahmedabad and Vadodara. The Hindu-majority slums are located near Hindu- majority mohallas. Residents of slums in *Jamalpur, Ellis Bridge, Behranpur, Rajpur Hamirpur* etc. are predominantly Muslims. These slums of Ahmedabad are located in mohallas numerically dominated by Muslims. The residents of slums in *Sarangpur, Maninagar, Kankaria, Khokara Mehmedabad* etc. are by and large Hindus and are part of localities where Hindus are in a majority. The slums of *Asarwa, Amariwadi, Shahibagh, Shaherkotada, Paldi* etc. are localities which are inhabited by both Hindus and Muslims.

About 60 per cent of the hutment dwellers in Ahmedabad are from various districts of Uttar Pradesh (i.e. Aligarh, Agra, Allahabad, Pratpgarh, Sultanpur, Azamgarh, Gonda, Etah etc.) and Bihar (Patna, Gaya, Ranchi etc.). These migrants come from both rural and urban areas. However, in Vadodara, a majority of the migrants either belong to Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh or are from districts in Gujarat (e.g. Khaira, Amreli, Junagadh, Kutch etc.).

In both cities, a majority of the hutment dwellers are daily wage earners. A small number of them are employed on a monthly basis, particularly those who are working in industries and factories as skilled and semi-skilled workers, and a small fraction of them are white-collar employees.

A few hutment dwellers are engaged as carriers of illicit liquor and are hired to carry out other criminal activities.

It is significant to note that almost all the riot hit and crime-prone mohallas in Ahmedabad and Vadodara are located in the heart of the two cities. It was seen that criminal activities are also concentrated in walled areas or the old cities and the crime rate tends to diminish as one moves away from the centre of the cities.

Inspite of the fact that the walled cities are better covered by police stations and chowkies as compared to the newly extended areas. It is interesting to note that both Hindu-majority and Muslim majority mohallas are riot hit and crime prone. A few of these mohallas are even located in close proximity to the police stations

BARODA CITY
RIOT PRONE AREAS
MAP-4c



MAP OF BARODA CITY,
DISTT BARODA

SOURCE: Field Study

and chowkies. The occurrence of crime under the very nose of the police may be due to the elusive nature of the criminals and the inability of the police to traverse narrow bylanes as speedily as the criminals do. But the main cause is lack of will on the part of the police to apprehend criminals. Police personnel are known to get 'hafta' (weekly payment) from the bootleggers in their respective localities. Therefore, the police does not act effectively. It is not very uncommon that bootleggers and antisocial elements control even the actions of the police.

Our field investigations indicated that the role of crime in sparking off communal riots is not insignificant. It was discovered that each incident of communal rioting started with some criminal activity. Further, instigators who have vested interests patronize antisocial elements to use them in a situation when communal tensions are simmering.

Since boot-leggers and anti-social elements operate on communal and caste-divisions at the mohalla level, it was seen that communal riots occurred in those mohallas where the frequency of crime was noticeably high.

Participation

The existence and persistence of communal riots needs to be explained with reference to the per··asivness of communal ideology amongst various classes, strata and other groups of people interacting with the social milieu. Communal riots cannot be explained by the conspiracy theory or by blaming the riff raff or anti social elements or merely saying that these are the handiwork of vested interests. This is not to overlook the planned nature of communal riots which, of course, is a recent phenomenon. The process of communalization leading to antagonism hatred and rioting can be understood by referring to the ideological orientation of the people. The antisocial elements are the instruments used to achieve ends by vested interests and individuals or groups genuinely adhering to a normative value pattern which has its basis in communal ideology. In this context it must be understood that these antisocial elements are not used merely for incremental economic incentives.

The motives behind using this section as an instrument for fanning communal frenzy can be many. But the question which one has to bear in mind is that it is not only the instruments, but also the

victims of communal ideology who participate in riots. These victims may not necessarily derive their rationalization from the immediate economic or political gains acruing to them.

Communal violence may also be engineered by vested interests involved in a severe competition for maximising their profits by mystifying the real conflicts to suit their interests. It can also be inferred that in other circumstances the victims of communal ideology may not be actually involved in competition but are being used as tools by the vested interests. It must not be misconstrued from the above arguments that it is the competition for scarce resources or merely a matter of conflicting religious practices which leads to communal violence. It is assertiveness deriving its life force from communal antagonism which is the crucial mediating factor and is based on the pattern of development.

The active participants and participant-instigators belong to the category of conformist and incremental communalism. These sections are drawn from amongst the skilled, semi- skilled and unskilled workers, petty shopkeepers; traders; small manufacturers; white-collar workers; bootleggers; speculators; and gambling den owners. In Ahmedabad, these participants belong to the Vaghari, Lua Patel, Kadia, Suthar, Panchal, Brahmin, Maratha and Sindhi castes of the Hindus. Those in the same category amongst the Muslims are Ghaunchis, Pathans, Quereshis, Mansuris, Kuza Farosha, Vohras and Cheepas. In Vadodara, the conformist and incremental communalism has its appeal amongst the Marathas, Ranas, Bhois, Patels, Shahs, Brahmins, Rajputs, Vagharis etc. Amongst the Muslims, this section is drawn from the Qureshi, Pathan, Tai, Dudhwala, Memon, Sayyid and Gahaunchi sects.

In Vadodara, the unemployment and underemployment of Bhois, Ranas and Marathas is perceived by these groups to be the result of the reservation policy. These three castes were generally employed as menials in the court of the Gakewads. They were active participants in communal riots. The workers in the optical industry are normally Muslims and there is severe competition among the manufacturers in the market. The manufacturers and traders in this business generally reinforce the religious identities of their employees. This helps them to compete in the market.

A similar trend is witnessed in the calico-printing industry in Ahmedabad. Cheepa and Marwari manufacturers are involved in intense competition and the workforce is mainly drawn from the Cheepas.

The active participant-instigators are mainly drawn from amongst the traders and the members of the middle class competing for jobs. Particularly, the propagators of communal ideology are Patels and migrant Muslims involved in iron scrap trading, Sindhis and Muslims in the retail trade.

The competition for jobs is filtered through communal ideology.

The instigators are mainly drawn from amongst the industrialists and the political and religious leaders. The accidental beneficiaries can be identified as a section of the migrants, antisocial elements etc.

Target Fixation

In a rioting situation the targets are fixed on the basis of ideology, pragmatic considerations and easy access. The targets identified on the basis of ideology have a continuity. There are localities which are the targets of attack in almost every communal riot. The illicit liquor trade has been providing sufficient pragmatic consideration in identification of targets.

Reasons For the Growth of Communalism and Eruption of Communal Rioting

The growth of Communalism can be explained by the pecularity of the developments that Gujarat experienced in 19th century onwords.

It must be mentioned that Gujarat did not have a history of caste rigidity and religious fanaticism. The manifestations of caste rigidity such as purity, pollution and exclusiveness were not pronounced in social interactions amonst and between castes. However, the overlapping of caste and class resulted into intermeshing of ideology of caste identities and class positions. This in turn shaped the people's movements and politics of the state. The overlapping of caste and class positions reinforced the existing class structure. There

were, however, regional variations. For instance,the extent of exploitation of the lower castes was more in two thirds of Gujarat under the princely rule as compared to British ruled districts[2]. The dominant castes in the urban areas were Brahmins and Banias and it was Patidars and Kanbis in the rural areas (see Table 5.2). These castes continue to dominate the social structure. It is noteworthy that these castes became the major target of attack even in inter-religious conflicts. For instance, even if individuals belonging to a depressed group attacked the other religious group (muslims), the attacked group directed its attack upon the highest prestige group in the religious group of attackers (Hindus). In most of the communal riots in Gujarat this was a noticeable trend. This point will be discussed in detail later.

The interventions and response of social reformers, the British colonialists and the development strategy to ameliorate the conditions of depressed castes led to caste fragmentations expressed in various caste alliances and caste conflicts within the caste structure itself. These interventions were not powerful enough either to subsume the caste structure or replace it all together. In fact it questioned and weakened caste prejudices, but at the same time it made caste associations an instrument of political mobilization and bargain. For instance, the number of legislations passed by the British colonialists accentuated caste and religious group antagonisms. The Caste Disabilities Removal Act of 1850 facilitated mobility across religion and caste. Further in 1858 under the pressure from social reformers the British government legislated that all schools run by the government would be open to all castes of its subjects without distinction. In 1923, the Government passed a resolution that no grants would be given to any aided educational institution which refused admission to the children of the depressed classes. In the same year the Bombay legislative council recommended that untouchables be allowed to use all public facilities which were built out of public funds. Inspite of all these regulations the government machinary never made any serious efforts to implement these.

The Act of 1919 provided separate communal electorates

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2. John R.Wood (1984) 'British Versus Princely legacies and the Political integragtion of Gujarat', *The Journal of Asian Studies* Vol. XLIV , No. 1, pp. 65-99

TABLE 5.2
POPULATION OF GUJARAT BY RELIGION, CASTE AND TABLE IN 1931

Category	Population	Percent
Higher Caste		
Brahmin	289,796	4.06
Baniya	208,739	2.96
Rajput	345,727	4.85
Others	80,321	1.13
Middle Caste		
Bhatwad	143,477	2.01
Bhat, Barot	23,549	0.33
Bhoi	26,992	0.38
Kharva	13,792	0.19
Koli	1,729,039	24.22
Machhi	39,382	0.55
Kanbi, Patidat	868,030	12.16
Mali	8,669	0.12
Artisan Castes	437,762	6.13
Others	309,670	4.34
Lower Caste		
Depressed and untouchables	511,866	7.17
Other backward castes	161,381	2.26
Others		
Aboriginal	1,260,374	17.65
Muslim	609,301	8.53
Christian	52,940	0.74
Parsi	15,086	0.21
Others	3,283	0.05
Total	7,139,179	100.00

Reproduced form Ghanshyam Shah(1975:9). He compiled this table taking figures form reports the census of several politico administrative units into consideration.

and reservation of seats for the depressed classes in Provincial Legislative Councils which were, however, withdrawn in 1935 following the 'Poona Pact', between Mahatma Gandhi and Dr. Ambedkar. This pact gave increased number of seats in the legislature to the depressed classes. The communal representations were solely concerned with the politics of counterpoise and co-option by multiplying caste cleavages and to achieve a balance of interests.

The participation of upper and middle castes in the national freedom movement was also a kind of self-assertion as a caste group. For example, in these movements solidarity was achieved through caste panchayats. So it was the assertion of the peasants both as a caste and class.

Similarly, the movements launched by Gujarat Kisan Sabha used caste, caste alliances and caste and class over laping as a basis to provide thrust to their assertions on political and economic issues. For instance, the Kisan Sabha Movement against the Talukdars of Avadh gained considerable strength in certain localities from the community support of Kurmi tenants. Solidarity was maintaned by the threat of caste boycott [3]. Further, the Kisan Sabha leader, Baba Ram Chandra, who was a Brahmin, established a Kurmi Kshatriya Sabha. Therefore, the issues were economic and mobilizations were communal in form. Gujarat Kisan Sabha launched movements on demands like fixation of interest rates on loans taken by peasants at six per cent; land revenues to be in proportion to the income from land; all indirect taxes on land to be abolished; ownership rights on land to be given to the tiller.[4]

In February 1938 Kisan Sabha organized a procession to protest against the practice of taking a half share rent and *Halipratha* (system of bonded labour). In this around ten to twelve thousand Kisans participated. In April, 1938, Kisan Sabha organized a protest against the 200 per cent increase in the rent to be paid by tenants. The landlords seized the crops of the tenants. It led to a fight and subsequently police firing.

In the years 1938-39 the Gujarat Kisan committee mobilized kisans of Mangrol and Mandvi talukas and an agreement was reached with the landlords of Mangrol taluka. The terms of agreement were :

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3. David Hardiman (1981) *Peasant Nationalists of Gujarat*, Oxford Delhi, pp. 250-251.
4. D.W. Farrell (1971) 'The Rowlatt Satyagraha in Delhi', Ravinder Kumar's , *Essay on Gandhian Politics: The Rowlatt Satyagraha of 1919*, p. 228.

(1) old tenants who paid rent as per old government rules should pay rent as per those rules;
(2) tenants not effected by the old rules should pay rent as in previous year and should not be asked to pay more rent;
(3) those tenants and landlords who wanted changes in the rent agreement should be bound by governments decisions on rent to be paid;
(4) till the government gives a decision,Landlords should not evict tenants from their land; and
(5) the practice of bonded labour, i.e. *halpiratha*, should be recognized as slavery.

From 1940 to 1946 the Kisan Sabha mobilized kisans in Baroda, Surat, Broach, Mehsana districts and the issues raised were ownership rights to the tiller and reduction of half share rent charged from tenants by landlords.[5]

In all these processions, meetings and agitations, the small peasants and agricultural labourers were mobilized. These sections of small peasants and landless labourers could achieve greater cohesion and unity on the basis of caste. For instance, the Baraiyas had less formal organization than the Patidars, but when it came to political action, they were able to unite with great cohesion, even in many cases within Patidar dominated villages, the Ekta movement of Avadh (1922) was largely a movement of Pasis, an untouchable caste which was able to achieve political solidarity.[6] Caste solidarity has remained a crucial factor in promising solace and security to the depressed classes.

Religion based mobilizations by the national freedom movement leadership were also quite predominant. The reason for this was to organize a larger group so as to take advantage of religion based solidarity in the anti-colonial struggle. For instance, when Gandhiji launched the Non-Cooperation Movement, he visited two main centres in Kheda, Dakor and Vadtal. Similarly the salt satyagraha was launched on Mahi festival during the Hindu month of Chaitra.[7] In other words, religious symbols, festivals and imagery were used to transmit political messages. The nationalist songs used the form and

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5. See for details, L.S. Vishwanath (1985), 'Gujarat Kisan Sabha, 1936-56,'. *Economic and Political Weekly*, July, pp.1197-1199.
6. David Hardiman op. cit. p. 253.
7. Ibid pp. 243-44.

imagery of religious bhajans. The political leaders were seen as gods.[8] These mobilization in the context of a polarized society having religious biases and prejudices as a basis of social interaction, transformed religion based perceptions into communal ones.

Religious, caste and ascriptive groups no doubt, have been concious of the differences between themselves and on occasions these differences were perceived and articulated through antagonistic notions and violent conflicts even in the days before British rule and anti-colonial struggle in both Punjab and Gujarat. But it is relevant to take into consideration the reservoir of mistrust and suspicion which was historically present and remained dormant during the initial decades of colonial rule in India and thereafter, it surfaced with intensity under specific socio-economic conditions and political initiatives taken by the British ruling elite. Therefore, communalism was not conspired into existence by the British. However, once communalism appeared due to the social conditions prevailing in India, the British used it to perpetuate their rule. And this continues even after independence of these colonies.

After independence, the specific nature of capitalist development in Gujarat has also created specific conditions for the existence and persistence of communalism. Agriculture dominates the economy. Industrial development is of the 'conclave' type. Textiles constitute the major industry together with consumer goods, chemicals and petro-chemicals and engineering being the new industries. The growth of agriculture has not yet been adequately accompanied by structural changes. Such an unbalanced development has built into itself the sources of tensions.

The following are some of the specific features in the early phase of development in Gujarat;

a) rapid economic development ;
b) contribution of external input to rapid economic development;
c) initiation of the process of structural transformation;
d) emergence and accommodation of emerging interests in politics;
e) relative absence of communal and social tensions.

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8. Ghanshyam Shah (1974) 'Traditional Society and Political Mobilization, the experience of Bardoli Satyagraha (1920-28), *Contribution to Indian Sociology*, N.S. No. 8, p. 106.

From 1960-61 to 1964-65 the compound growth rate of the State Domestic Product (SDP) was 6.09 per cent and the per capita growth rate 3..41 per cent at 1960-61 prices. All major constituents - manufacturing, large-scale manufacturing, agriculture and infrastructures - show a substantial growth rate during this period (See Table 5.3). This period can be called one of a boom or upswing in Gujarat's economy.

It was during this period that Gujarat's economy underwent structural changes. Fairly intensive and extensive investments were made by expatriate Gujaratis contributed to the process of structural transformation. There was a shift in the shares of various industries in terms of total value added. In the large scale sector the share of textiles declined from 61.68 to 51.24, chemicals increased from 7.27 to 9.91, miscellaneous chemical products from 5.01 to 5.72 and machinary from 2.81 to 4.22 between 1961-65. During the same period, in the small scale sector there was a shift in the total value added by various industries. The share of textiles fell from 17.80 to 14.82, tobacco manufacturing increased from 4.24 to 7.84, the manufacturing of metal products from 5.64 to 6.54 and iron and steel basic industries from 1.92 to 3.14.

The number of workers employed in the large and small-scale sectors registered an increase. For instance, the large scale sector is predominant in Vadodara and the small-scale in Ahmedabad. Out of the total industrial workers in Gujarat in the large-scale sector, Vadodara's share increased from 8.43 to 11.73 per cent between 1960-65. In the small-scale sector in Ahmedabad during the same period the percentage of workers employed increased from 25.78 in 1960 to 26.25 in 1965.

The building of infrastructural facilities such as schools, hospitals, technical training institutes, strengthening of communication networks, initiated the process of the formation of middle classes.

This phase was characterized by the relative absence of social and communal tensions. However, communalism was used and elements of communalism were propagated by powerful political and economic groups to strengthen their position.

The economic upswing led to the emergence of new political interests. Political groups and mobilizations attempted to subsume dissimilar and divergent interests by using caste and religious group identities.

TABLE 5.3

RATE GROWTH OF NDP, SDP(GUJARAT) AND SOME MAJOR SECTORS IN GUJARAT (1960-61 TO 1974-75)

Sr. No.		Trend Rate of Growth	R2	Compound Rate of Growth 1960-61 to 1964-65	1964-65 to 1969-70	1960-70 to 1974-75	1960-61 to 1974-75
1.	NDP(India)	3.22	0.96	4.71	2.58	2.19	3.04
2.	SDP(Gujarat)	2.41	0.64	6.09	1.29	-0.75	1.90
3.	Per Capita SDP (Gujarat)	-0.15	0.007	3.41	-1.23	-3.18	-0.63
4.	All Manufacturing	4.92	0.90	3.16	6.26	8.22	6.06
5.	Large Scale Manufacturing (Gujarat)	5.25	0.81	4.21	12.99	2.00	6.45
6.	Agriculture(Gujarat)	0.30	0.004	7.14	-1.43	-6.56	-0.96
7.	Infrastructure (Gujarat)	3.52	0.97	5.09	2.86	2.41	3.33

Source: Calculated from data available in National Accounts Statistics, Central Statistical Organisations, New Delhi, and data obtained from Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Gujarat. All the data are in 1960-61 constant prices.

The second phase, from 1964 to 1975, was characterized by a downward trend in Gujarat's economy[9].

The agricultural sector was unable to show a positive rate of growth during this period. The compound rate of growth of agriculture was 1.43 per cent and 6.56 between 1964-65 and 1969-70; and 1969-70 and 1974-75 respectively. The number of crops whose output declined during this period was 48. Agriculture contributed a dominant share to the economic activity of Gujarat, that is, 40 per cent of the state's product and employed 70 per cent of its population.

In this phase structural transformation did not take place to the extent that fluctuations in agricultural growth necessitated. The existing industrial base underwent a crisis, which could not be matched with a diversification process.[10] The shift in occupational structures was not in consonance with the process of the formation, absorption and displacement of skills, particularly in the case of Vadodara and Ahmedabad.

This crisis also resounded in politics. The differentiation within the peasantry, intense competition in industry and for jobs and also the factionalism within the political parties sharpened the edge of communal polarizations. The political uncertainty, during this phase, made the insecure politicians mobilize people by using all that was available in the social discourse.

The 1969 split in the Congress introduced an era of coalition politics. The Congress under the leadership of Indira Gandhi mobilized backward castes. Till 1967 Kolis, Rajputs, poor Patidars, Bereeya and Adivasi middle and rich cultivators were mobilized by Khedut Samaj, but after the split this reservoir was used and politics of KHAM (Kshatriya, Harijan, Adivasi and Muslim) was introduced in Gujarat. This tendency helped Congress to improve its electoral performance. It secured Eighty three per cent of the Vidhan Sabha seats in the 1972 elections.

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9. As much as 6,26 per cent and 8.22 per cent between 1964-65 and 1969-70 and 1969-70 and 1974-75 respectively. The growth rate of largescale manufacturing units fell to 2.00 percent between 1969-70 and 1974-75 compared to 12.99 between 1964-65 and 1969-70 and 4.21 between 1960-61 and 1964-65.
10. The compound rate of growth of the SDP was 1.29 per cent betwen 1964-65 and 1969-70 and 0.75 during 1969-70 and 1974-75, which is significantly lower than that between the 1960-65 period. The per capita SDP became negative betwcen 1964-65 and 1969-70 and 1969-70 and 1974-75.

The traditionally dominant economic and political interests from amongst the Kshatriyas and the Patels could not be represented in sufficient numbers (Table 5.4). The representation of legislators who were agriculturists declined, from 32 per cent in 1962 to 28 per cent in 1972 and legislators who were from trade, industry and the former princely strata increased and the legislators who were doctors, engineers, journalists and teachers declined from 17 per cent to 11 per cent (Table 5.5). Similar trends were noticed in both Ahmedabad and Vadodra districts, where the number of legislatures belonging to the agricultural sector decreased and the representation from trade and industry increased. This may have been a result of the rich peasants branching out into industry, especially in the case of Vadodara. For instance, in Vadodara, Patels from Kheda, Bharuch etc. have invested in small and middle level ancillaries, manufacturing plastic and rubber products, engineering goods and chemicals. The availability of such avenues for investing the surplus generated in the agrarian sector explains the absence of demands for state autonomy or slogan for secession, unlike in Punjab. However, the inadequate accommodation of interests of the emerging middle strata was reflected in agitations and assertions which were incremental in nature. This was also visible in the use of communalism for incremental benefits.

The implementation of the land ceiling act was opposed by the Khedut Samaj in 1973. The movement secured the support of Koli, Rajput, Bereeya and Adivasi middle and rich cultivators. It also got a half hearted support from poor Pattidars.

Simultaneously, the mobilizations of agricultural labourers, small and marginal farmers was undertaken under the banner of Khet Mazdur Parishad by Congress (I). The Communal riots of 1969 and the Nav Nirman Movement in 1974 were the manifestation of an economic crisis and the increased use of communal ideology. The 1969 communal riots were used to retrench Muslim workers who perceived the Hindu migrant workers from U.P, Bihar and Rajasthan mostly skilled and semi-skilled workers as their main enemy. These migrant workers in turn constituted the main contingent of the riots.

The necessary conditions for the above mentioned assertions were: a crisis in the textile industry, insufficient diversification of existing industries, the displacement of skills and their non-absorption contributed in the acceleration of the unemployment rate, increas-

TABLE 5.4
Caste Composition of Gujarat Legislators, 1960-80

(Percentage within brackets)

Caste Groups	1960-62	1963-67	1967-71	1972-74	1975-80
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Brahmins	20 (15.00)	29 (19.00)	25 (15.00)	18 (10.70)	24 (13.20)
Vanias including Jains	22 (19.00)	19 (12.00)	25 (15.00)	22 (13.00)	14 (8.10)
Lehva	7 (5.00)	16 (10.30)	19 (11.00)	16 (9.50)	27 (9.00)
Kanbis Kadva	4 (3.00)	17 (11.00)	14 (8.30)	16 (9.50)	17 (9.00)
Rajputs	9 (7.00)	14 (9.00)	27 (16.00)	24 (14.20)	28 (15.40)
Kolis	2 (1.60)	1 (0.65)	3 (2.00)	10 (6.00)	8 (4.20)
Kathis	1 (0.80)	-	1 (0.60)	-	1 (0.50)
Lohanas	2 (1.60)	5 (3.20)	5 (3.00)	4 (2.40)	4 (2.10)
Other backward castes	7 (5.00)	7 (4.50)	4 (2.40)	9 (5.30)	5 (2.00)
Ahirs	-	-	-	4 (2.40)	4 (2.10)
Muslims	4 (3.00)	9 (5.80)	3 (2.00)	3 (2.00)	5 (2.10)
Sch. castes	10 (8.00)	11 (7.00)	11 (7.00)	11 (7.00)	14 (6.60)
Sch. tribes	15 (11.00)	21 (13.50)	22 (13.00)	22 (13.00)	27 (14.30)
Others	1 (0.80)	2 (1.30)	3 (2.00)	5 (3.00)	4 (2.10)
No contact or not verified	28 (22.00)	3 (2.00)	6 (3.50)	8 (4.80)	-
Total	132	154	168	168	182

Sources : `Nagindas Sanghavi Vidhan Sabha Profile Gujarat, E.P.W., May 10, 1980.

Note : Based on personal interviews

TABLE 5.5
Professions of Gujarat Legislators, 1960-80

(Percentage within brackets)

Main source of income	1960-62	1962-67	1967-71	1972-74	1975-80
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Agriculture	23 (17.00)	49 (32.00)	44 (27.00)	47 (28.00)	61 (33.00)
Trade/Industry	15 (15.10)	20 (13.00)	26 (15.60)	27 (16.20)	31 (16.70)
Law	16 (12.00)	18 (11.80)	24 (14.40)	30 (18.00)	31 (16.70)
Medicine	1 (0.75)	6 (3.85)	5 (3.00)	5 (3.00)	4 (2.20)
Teaching	3 (2.20)	10 (6.50)	8 (4.80)	10 (6.00)	12 (6.60)
Journalism	3 ((3.20)	9 (5.90)	4 (1.20)	3 (1.20)	2 (1.10)
Private service	2 (1.50)	5 (3.25)	4 (2.40)	3 (1.80)	2 (1.10)
Ex-Govt. service party workers or professional	-	-	2 (1.20)	2 (1.20)	
Politicians	10 (8.00)	13 (8.00)	8 (4.80)	13 (8.00)	13 (7.00)
Labour	1 (0.75)	1 (0.60)	2 (1.20)	2 (1.20)	1 (0.50)
Unearned income category(ex-princes)	3 (5.20)	7 (4.50)	15 (9.00)	8 (4.80)	4 (2.20)
House wives	5 (3.70)	8 (5.10)	5 (3.00)	3 (1.80)	-
Engineer	-	1 (0.60)	1 (0.60)	1 (0.60)	4 (2.20)
Others	-	-	3 (1.80)	-	-
Not contacted/	50 (38.00)	7 (4.50)	19 (1.80)	15 (9.00)	17 (9.50)
Total	132	154	168	168	182

Source : Nagindas Sanghani, Vidhan Sabha Profile Gujarat, E.P.W., May 10, 1980.

Note : Based on personal interviews

ing migration and the use and spread of communalism. The changing structure displaced skills and urban middle classes. The traders, the new industrialists, former princes turned industrialists constituted the new emerging elite.

The social and economic discontentment which was developing in India became a convenient field in the specific situation of Gujarat. Factionalism within Congress also contributed to the emerging crisis. This found expression in the 1969 communal riots and the Nav-Nirman movement of 1974. The year 1969 brought differentiation within society to the fore. The rich and middle peasants emerged as a political force and provided support base to anti-congress forces, while a large section of backward classes and Muslims provided a support base to Congress (I). These new political alignments did not mitigate the crisis in Gujarat's economy and politics. For instance, in the 1975 Vidhan Sabha elections no single party was able to get absolute majority. The number of seats won by Congress(I) declined from eightythree per cent to forty one per cent and Congress (O) increased from nine per cent to thirtyone per cent. The Jan Sangh share increased from one per cent to nine per cent.

Caste and religious group identities were reinforced and articulated in politics. The political parties competing for legislative power had same support bases which made the competition intense, with the result political mobilizations used ascriptive identities to out compete each other.

However, the marginal recovery of the economy in mid-seventies only triggered severe competition among different economic groups. This recovery did not match the growth rate of the first phase. The compound rate of growth of the S.D.P was 1.41 per cent from 1975-76 to 1979-80. The compound growth of the per capita S.D.P was 0.9 per cent during this period, whereas it was 3.18 per cent from 1970 to 1975. The agricultural sector maintained its negative rate of growth but relatively improved it to 1.23 per cent and it was 6.5 per cent in 1970-75. The manufacturing sector grew at the rate of 7 per cent during 1975-80 and the increase in the ex-factory value of output was 65.5 per cent during this period.

This brought about severe competition amongst manufacturers, traders and the working class. On the other hand, the decline of non-communal political parties and formation of new political alliances amongst political parties representing the same economic

interests began to search for communal support in the system of competitive politics. This is related to the intense competition for markets and jobs. The transformation of a section of the farmers into modern industrialists and their interest in the larger market has prevented parochialism to find roots in Gujarat unlike Punjab.

Consequently the political space occupied by non-communal parties was being increasingly appropriated by parties like Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP). The Bharatiya Janta Party multiplied its support from 1.33 per cent of the total valid votes polled in the 1972 elections. The BJP secured 13.02 per cent of the votes in the 1980 elections for the Vidhan Sabha. This increase in the percentage of votes indicates that communal appeal can be used to mobilize a section of the Hindus for reaping electoral gains.

The 1980 elections also indicate that there is an increasing tendency amongst the traders, irrespective of their religious group, to join hands for maintaining and enhancing their share in economic power. For instance, some of the petty Muslim traders dealing in iron scrap and living in the Devajipura and other areas have shown an inclination for the BJP. Further, the emerging middle class amongst the Muslim religious group has acquired a kind of assimilative tone and is making overtures to the BJP. This trend is, however, not visible amongst the sections which are the victims of communal ideology and continue to place their hopes in the Congress(I). Communalism and development, thus, constitute a vicious circle. The use and operation of communal ideology in economic and political decision-making adversely affects development: there are non-priority and non-productive investments, slow rate of capital formation, restricted labour flow, decrease in the importance of ability and achievement and slow rate of technical progress. Besides, various social and political maligancies arise. Social and political factors, in turn, affect the aforesaid factors.

In the case of Gujarat, the guild formation by Gujarati traders-turned-industrialists and the prevalence of the 'Jamat' system amongst Muslim traders have led to the restricted circulation of capital. Such a development leads to the non-accessibility of liquidity to other sections of society which may have greater skills, access to technological information, availability of cheaper and better raw materials, etc.

The restricted flow of labour due to the discrimination in jobs, the reluctance to migrate etc. affects skill formation. The non-

optimum utilization of existing skills leads to a lower capital output and capital-labour ratio. The employment of labour on a communal basis in textile mills and other manufacturing units in Ahmedabad and Vadodara is a case in point. Trade and business dealings on communal lines rather than on the basis of economic rationality affects the demand and supply equation.

A sample survey of various industries in Ahmedabad and Vadodra show that there was concious discrimination practised against Muslims. For instance, in powerlooms of Ahmedabad only 10.4 per cent of the workers came from the Muslim religious group, 19.4 per cent were migrants from U.P. and the rest were locals belonging to the Hindu religious group. Earlier handlooms were generally owned by Muslim weavers. But with the advent of powerlooms in 1950 they were outcompeted and at present only 4 to 5 per cent of the powerloom owners are Muslims. (Table 5.6) The owners of powerlooms preferred to employ their co-religionists. Out of 623 workers in the CRRID sample, 565 were Hindus. The 95 per cent of the owners who were Hindus employed 91.4 per cent of the total work force out of which 95 percent were from their own religious group.

Table 5.6

Sample Survey of Small Scale Industries in Ahmedabad and Vadodara

Industry	Religion of the owners		Number of units owned		Religion of the workers	
	Hindu	Muslims	H	M	H	M
Powerlooms Ahmedabad	25 (87.6)	4 (13.4)	554* (98.9)	93* (11.1)	565 (91.7)	58 (9.3)
Engineering Ahmedabad	44 (93.7)	3 (6.3)	44 (93.7)	3 (6.3)	946 (95.3)	47 (4.7)
Optical Vadodara	5 (71.5)	2 (28.5)	5 (71.5)	2 (28.5)	24 (11.0)	200 (89.0)

* Powerlooms owned

Source : CRRID Field Survey 1983.

The recruitment of workers in Mills is also based on caste and religious identities. The total number of workers employed in the year 1983 in fifty seven mills is 1,50,000. Out of these 50,000 are in the weaving section, 35,000 in spinning, 13,000 in bleaching and printing and the rest are packers, stampers, clerks etc. Generally workers from amongst Wagharis and Harijans are engaged in spinning; Harijans, Patels and Brahmins in sizing; Marwaris in blow room and cart sections; Patels, Muslims and Brahmins in ordinary loomshade; migrants from UP and a few Muslims in processing; migrants from UP and Marwaris in beam-carrying; and Patels, who have displaced Muslims, in the drawing section.

The weavers who happened to be Muslims formed a majority of the workforce in the Mills till the mid or late sixties. The fluctuations in the employment figures due to the crisis in the Textile industry was greater during the years 1968-69, 1969- 70 and 1971-72. The retrenchment of workers adversely affected the Muslims. This was due to their relative absence from trade unions.

A sample of forty eight small scale engineering units in Ahmedabad shows that six per cent of the owners who happened to be Muslims employed 2.9 per cent of the total workforce, out of which 66 per cent were Muslims and 34 per cent Hindus. Out of the remaining 94 per cent of the work force, 96 per cent were Hindus and 4 per cent Muslims.

Such a trend clearly shows that the workers displaced from the textile industry could not find alternative employment in the engineering industry.

The CRRID sample survey of small scale engineering units in Vadodara shows that 11 per cent of the owners who happened to be Muslims, employed 5 per cent of the total work force, of which 28 per cent were Hindus. Eighty nine per cent owners who happened to be Hindus employed 95 per cent of the total work force, of which 11 per cent were Muslims. Around 25 per cent came from surrounding villages and an equal number were migrants from outside the state.

Another industry in Vadodara where communal polarisation was visible was in the optical industry. There were 62 spectacle frame making units and 37 lens manufacturers.

The CRRID sample survey shows that 71.5 per cent of the owners were Muslims employing 93 per cent of the total workforce. Of these workers, 84 per cent were Muslims. The remaining 28.5 per cent owners were Hindus. They employed 7 per cent of the total workforce. Out of these 81 per cent were Muslims.

Previously traders and manufacturers who happened to be Hindus controlled this trade. Recently traders and exporters who happened to be Memons and Bohras have now entred and captured this trade. This has provided a communal edge to the competition.

The persistence of communal ideology, the crisis in the textile industry, the slow pace of the process of diversification of industries, the non-absorption and displacement of existing skills and the large influx of migrant workers characterize the socio-economic milieu of Gujarat. Further, the emergence of new interest groups leads to an aggravation of problems in the absence of institutional mechanisms to accommodate such interests. The example mentioned above highlights the prevalence of communal ideology as is evident from the recruitment of workers and business transactions on the basis of religious group identities.

Competition and job recruitment are, therefore, perceived communally. The workers from the Muslim and the Hindu religious groups are perceived to be involved in a zero-sum game. The data on perception will make this point amply clear. The recruitment of workers is also influenced by considerations of caste and religion. The aim is to divide the workers into small groups and, thereby, reduce their power of bargaining.

The crisis in the textile industry was caused by the introduction of power looms, resultant over-production and certain stringent Government regulations. This was reflected in the fluctuations in the quantity of cloth and yarn produced by mills in Gujarat.

There arose the necessity of retrenching workers due to the crisis mentioned above. The workforce belonging to the Muslim religious group became a handy victim of the policy of retrenchment because there was negligible representation of the Muslim workers in the main trade union. The main trade union is the Majoor Mahajan, which has a majority of workers from the Hindu religious group on its rolls. The workforce belonging to the Muslim religious group has formed its own union called the Sarni Kamgar Sabha. The Bombay Trade Union Act, applicable here, stipulates that only the 'majority' trade union can negotiate with the management.

The displaced sections have not been sufficiently absorbed due to reasons like job discriminations, non-marketable skills, reduced bargaining power because of the large influx of migrants etc.

Migrants constitute 48.46 per cent and 41.47 per cent of the

total population in the urban agglomerations of Ahmedabad and Vadodara respectively. The proportion of migrant workers to the total number of workers is significantly higher in Ahmedabad (71.12 per cent) as compared to Vadodara (53.42 per cent). Migrants, particularly of the seasonal and single unit type are more likely to fall prey to communal propaganda and to participate in rioting as they have no socio-cultural roots and are assured anonymity at the place of migration. This kind of violence is anomic in nature.

This influx of migrants has created social tensions of various kinds. For instance, in Ahmedabad during the 1969 riot a large number of migrant workers were active participants. These workers were skilled or semi-skilled and were employed in different industrial units. The retrenched workers of textile mills, who happened to be Muslims, perceived the migrants to be their direct enemies. This situation was created and used by industrialists to escape the wrath of retrenched workers.

The competition in the ironscrap trade, between traders who were migrants from Aligarh, Etah and Agra, and Gujarati traders, was perceived on communal lines. The local unemployed and under employed workers, a considerable number of them being Muslims and a large number of migrants were involved in the bootlegging business. A clash between two carriers belonging to different bootlegger king-pins was also perceived on communal lines. Such a perception led to the strengthening of communal identities.

The bootleggers and anti-social elements in Ahmedabad and Vadodara oprerate on communal and caste divisions. There is a certain connivance between bootlegger kingpins and local politicians. These kingpins are seen by the carriers, who are mostly their own co-religionists, as their benefactors. The politicians protect the king-pins for electoral and financial reasons. Often these kingpins and carriers are used to engineer riots.

It was observed that the elite formation amongst the Muslims on communal lines at the municipal level, in the absence of any substantial recruitment in the state legislature and Parliament, disillusioned the ranks and the leadership so mobilized.

These two areas i.e. Ahmedabad and Vadodara are representative of a situation which has most of the necessary and sufficient conditions for thegrowth of communalism and eruption of communal rioting. It has a reservior of mistrust and fear between two religious groups, communal segregation in population settlement patterns, over-

lapping of religious caste and occupational identities, educational practices (both formal and informal) imbued with elements of Communalism, demonstrative religiosity are used to redefine religious boundaries. Not only are, the economic gains and losses interpreted on communal lines. Trade unions and other non-communal organisation are functioning within the communal framework. The riff-raffs, lumpenised working population is available in abundance to provide the teeth to the communal tongue. Above all, communal politics is practiced without the fear of the going against the secularity of the Indian Constitution.

Chapter 6

Communal Violence : A Subterrainian Phenomenon *

(A Study of Jaipur Riots)

Communalism in Jaipur has not surfaced in a violent form. However, communalism is being shaped by various processes, but the sufficient conditions necessary for it to take violent form are still in the nascent stage. Jaipur has a tradition of communal harmony. It is still projected in political and social discourse as a reality. Cleavages of caste are widely used rather than the religious group ones. The use of caste cleavages leaves a retrogressive impact on inter-caste group relationships. This is not denying the fact that it is restraining the growth of religious antagonism.

The sharing of religious symbols and other practices across religions is still prevalent. For example, the followers from among both the Hindus and the Muslims of Peers and Mazhars are numerous. Simultaneously, the appeal of VHP amongst the Hindus and Tabliq and Deobandi movements among the Muslims are making their impact. Their nascent attempts at purification and boundary definition may widen the gulf between the Hindus and the Muslims.

Further, the economic development of Jaipur has yet to reach a stage where the inherent conflicts and contradictions are sharpened so as to cause antagonism between big well entrenched traders and the new entrants, over non-expanding economic opportunities. This antagonism is one of the reasons for the communal rivalries in Punjab between well entrenched Hindu traders and Jat Sikh peasants in general trade and industry; in Vadodra between Alvi Bohras and the fledging Patels in the optical industry, in Moradabad between well entrenched Hindu and Muslim exporters of Brass ware; in Bhiwandi between well-entrenched Marwari/Gujarati and Ansari Pow-

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* This is based on the research report on Communal violence and its impact on Development and National Integration in Rajasthan (Jaipur) written by Pramod Kumar, Bhupendra Yadav and Atul Sood.

erloom owners etc. Competition in trade is a result of market mechanisms. In situations where religious group identities overlap with strata or class distinctions, it is possible for competition when it becomes fierce, to be fought on communal lines.

Further the bourgeoining middle class has out-paced employment opportunities available in the agricultural and industrial sectors. A significant proportion of this middle class in the service sector in Jaipur was composed of migrants from outside Rajasthan. This situation has forced the emerging local middle class to be in competition amongst themselves and also with the migrants from outside the state for scarce opportunities and resources.

This competition is sharpening the edge of communalism. But communalism has not acquired teeth because the elements of communalism are not very pervasive in the ranks of workers. With workers, communalism becomes an instrument for fighting their miseries and deprivation just as in Ahmedabad, Jamshedpur etc. Communalism in Jaipur has not partaken the agression strewn in the life of workers. This could be one of the reasons that it has not led to communal rioting.

Jaipur is also not the hot bed of communal politics. Demands are not identified on religious group lines and are articulated by the leaders as such, irrespective of their faith. In other words, Hindu and Muslim interests are recognized, but leaders are not yet considered as Hindu leaders or Muslim leaders. Further these interests are also not considered antagonistic.

The points of tensions resulting into violence have yet to acquire a concrete form. In the absence of tradition of violence, faith in existing authoritative system (slowly decaying) and in the impartiality of the repressive state apparatus, relatively small number of riff-raffs who are still caught in a dilemma of much to lose and little to gain as an immediate reward of looting, are some of the factors which are checking the eruption of communal rioting.

There are certain other factors which are abetting the eruption of communal rioting. Jaipur is witnessing a tendency where boundaries are being defined and social distance is being maintained by different religious groups. This tendency may aggravate and breed inter-religious group antagonism, thereby, creating

sufficient conditions for rioting. It has been noticed that the extent of religiosity is quite high in Jaipur. There was a spurt in number of temples and mosques in Jaipur after 1970. A glance at the public engagement columns of local newspapers also gives ample evidence of the extent of religiosity here. Religion as a belief system is being projected as an ideology of religious group identity. The outcome of this change is that the members of different religious groups are beginning to consider their interests to be dissimilar. The spread of religiosity has obscured from rational human comprehensions the political and economic processes of contemporary reality. The rate at which economy is undergoing transformation is not evenly matched by changes in socio-cultural institutions. This has created a crisis of social identity. In such a situation where miseries and gains could not be justified with the help of available scientific tools, naturally the final resort would be supernatural explanations, as expressed in reinforced faith in rituals, religious practices and fate. For instance, in Gem and Jewellary industry in Jaipur, the increase in exports, profits and turnover of a section of merchant manufacturers and decreasing profits of direct producers and real wages of workers, has strengthened their belief in fatalism. In a situation of scarce resources and a relatively stagnant economy, competition for jobs, subsidies, licences etc. along communal lines benefit some individuals for a short while. Consequently, communalism evolves a self-serving rationale, 'a non-appointment would convince that the others will not let his "community" go ahead and an appointment will show that communalism paid. Communalism thus operated through a built-in accelerator'. Communalism, thus, has its own social appeal. Mobilized along caste and religious lines in politics, the deprivations and frustrations outlined above may plunge the people of the state in a communal strife.

In a situation of intensifying competition, political parties mobilize groups by feeding to their jaundiced perception, i.e. benefits are distributed on religious/caste lines. For instance, perception of the absence of workers from among the Muslims in large and medium industries and white collared jobs in Jaipur is being used as a tool to garner votes. The language question was also raised in the Assembly in 1976 and after. This question was communalized in order to appeal to the new emerging educated middle strata

amongst the Hindus and the Muslims. Communal politics, therefore, does not function in a vaccuum.

Therefore Jaipur known for its communal harmony, may not be an exception to the increasing eruption of communal rioting in the state and the country, in the near future. Jaipur has already started showing symptoms of communal rioting. A glance at the F.I.R registered with the police from 1974 to 1983 indicates that 1974-76 Jaipur reported 13 minor communal incidents with 14 localities identified as communally tense. In 1978 and 1981 there were 1 and 2 incidents respectively. However, from 1978 onwards the reports of incidents of communal rioting and tensions spurted with the highest figure being 26 in 1981 (See Table 6.1).

An analysis of these FIRs registered on communal rioting and tensions during the last decade indicates that mohallas with mixed population and Muslim majority (in confrontation with those having Hindu majority) were sensitive and riot-prone. The immediate causes as registered were dispute over places of worship/cremation etc.(24), sexual crimes (10), old personal rivalries (7) and miscellaneous (21). A careful reading of these FIRs and further investigations reveal that communal colour was imparted to even ordinary crimes. This may have been done to help the anti-social elements involved in them to gain the sympathy of their respective religious groups. Crimes have not assumed menacing proportions in Jaipur so far. But the pointers are clearly indicating towards their increase. The breeding ground for criminals will be provided by the Bastis. Fatalism of slum-dwellers can not check their immiserization. And immiserized herdes in the absence of political radicalization are most prone to crime. Vested political opportunistic interests are known to patronize criminals.[1] Not only this, those reporting and registering crimes were bound to be blaming one religious group as a whole. Elements of communalism were evident among the members of law enforcing agencies.

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1. An analysis of data reveals a fluctuating trend in crime recorded between 1977-83 in Jaipur city. The crime rate in Jaipur city per 10000 persons was 62.5 in 1977 which increased to 67.0 in 1979 but dropped to 57.2 in 1981 and 41.3 in 1983. Between 1977 and 1979 cases of general rioting show a most significant increase. Between 1979 and 1981 IPC cases of robbery, theft, kidnapping, murder etc. have either decreased or remained same; cases of general rioting maintain an upward trend. Between 1981 and 1983 rioting cases have sharply declined together with crimes of other kinds (See table 3).

Table 6.1
Incidents of Communal Rioting And Tensions In Jaipur District (1974-83)

Year	Incidents of Communal Riots			Communal Tensions		
	Jaipur City	Jaipur Rural	Total	Jaipur City	Jaipur Rural	Total
1974	3	1	4	7	-	7
1975	6	1	7	1	-	1
1976	2	-	2	6	-	6
1977	-	-	-	-	-	-
1978	1	-	1	2	2	4
1979	-		-	3	-	3
1980	-	-	-	14	3	17
1981	-	2	2	10	14	24
1982	-	-	-	3	2	5
1983	-	-	-	4	2	1

Source : FIR's registered with the Police Department

Increasing religiosity, the use of communal symbols, issues like Urdu language, Arabic University, urbanization, competition in trade and for jobs, the near absence of Muslims from non-household industries, increasing migration and communalized politics may provide sufficient conditions for communal rioting in Jaipur. These conditions will derive their life-force from the non-expanding economy.

For comprehending this a view of the population, population settlement pattern, nature of economic activities and its impact on in-migration, displacement of workers and competition in trade and for jobs and sharpening of communal cleavages and eruption of communal riots shall be attempted.

Population Composition And Population Settlement Pattern in Jaipur[2]

In 1981 census religionwise population distribution show that a higher proportion of the Muslim population in Rajasthan is concentrated in the district of Jaipur. In Jaipur urban agglomeration, Muslims constituted 23.66 per cent of the total population in 1981.

The popular notion is that higher the proportion of Muslims in an area higher is the probability of communal rioting. It is too simplistic a relationship for such a complex social phenomenon. Our surveys indicate that it is not the proportion in terms of numbers but rather it is the cluster formation which is one of the contributory factors to communalism. The pervasiveness of communal ideology not only contributes to social distance but also to physical isolation of religious or caste groups. In Jaipur city such a trend was also noticeable. The Muslims live in clusters in the areas of *Chandpole, Paharganj, Jalupura, Babu ka Tiba, Khandaar, Panni garan, Ghatogate, Chowkiri Tookhana Hazuri, Nahari ka Naka, Hani Colony, Hazaari Burj* and *Slaughter House*. The mohallas in these are based mainly on occupational categories and are inhabited mostly by the Muslims. For example, in *Chowkari Topkhanna Hazuri* area weavers (Ansaris) live in mohalla *Ansarian*, elephant

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2 This is based on the field survey conducted by CRRID in 1984. For details see Pramod Kumar & others, *Communal Violence and Its Impact on Development & National Integration in Jaipur, Rajasthan,* an unpublished report submitted to Rajasthan Government. Maps were prepared by Shri Krishan Chand, Cartographer, CRRID, Chandigarh.

riders and tonga wallas (Mehawats) in *Mahawatan*, Camel-riders in *Untavaan*, fishermen in *Machhliwalaan* etc. The Muslims, performing menial jobs earlier and living with Harijans along the *Ganda Nala* in the southern most part of the walled city, were shifted to various other parts of the city, such as *Dhobion ki Chhatri, Nahari ka Naka and N.B.C.* area. Along the western wall of the inner city called *Nahar Wara* the Muslims and Harijans live in separate clusters. The Muslims are mainly *coolies* and belong to the lower *biradaris*. The Harijans in this area are involved as labourers in extracting oil and cleaning grains in the mandis. In the *Ghat Gate* area the Ansaris are mainly involved in cutting and polishing gems, the Quereshis as Butchers and Rehgars as iron-smith. To the north of *Ghat Gate Chowkari* live Begdis who earn their livelihood by selling embellishments for clothes. The white collared workers and traders in gems, among the Muslims, generally belong to the Ansari *birdari* and live around *Ramganj bazar*. The silversmiths among the Muslims live in the *Pannigaran* area. The *lakh* toys and bangles are made mostly by the Muslims in the central part of inner city in a mohalla called *Maniharon ka rasta* (See maps 5 a, b).

The Harijans in the walled city are either inhabiting mohallas with lower class Muslims or those which are in locational confrontation with mohallas having Muslim majority. The mixed localities are like those to the west of *Indira Bazar, Purani Kotwali ka rasta, Ghat Gate Bazar, Mehron ka Rasta, Ghat Gate Chowkari.* The mohallas with a majority of the Harijans in locational confrontation with the Muslim clusters in the inner city are *Kundigaran ke Bhairon ka Rasta, Maniramji ki kothi ka rasta, Math ke kuan ka rasta* etc. (map 5b) The majority of the Harijans are cobblers (Mochi), Tanners (Chamars), Weavers (Kohlis), scavengers (Bhangi) etc. They are in the same occupations as lower class Muslims and share the congested space of walled city with the latter. Unemployment, illiteracy and poverty are rampant among these sections.

The inner city and its central part is inhabited by Rajputs who are in white collared jobs and rentiers and Jains who are engaged in trade and commerce. Besides them certain bania castes in the *Modi Khana* and *Visheshwaraji ki Chowkari* are engaged in trading in jewellery cloth and grains. Some Muslims of the *Neelgar and Manihar* biradaris also live in these areas. In *Chowkari Ram Chandraji* live Kayasthas and Brahmins who are mainly in services

JAIPUR CITY
LOCATION OF MOHALLAS
MAP-5a



MAP OF JAIPUR CITY,
DISTT JAIPUR

SOURCE: Field Study

WALLED CITY JAIPUR

LOCATION OF MOHALLAS

MAP-5a



MAP-II

SOURCE: Field Study

JAIPUR CITY
CLUSTER WISE DISTRIBUTION
OF POPULATION
RIOT HIT AND SENSITIVE
MOHALLAS
MAP-5b



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RIOT HIT MOHALLAS

SENSITIVE MOHALLAS

SOURCE: Field Study

WALLED CITY JAIPUR

CLUSTER WISE DISTRIBUTION
OF POPULATION
RIOT HIT AND SENSITIVE
MOHALLAS



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MAP-II

RIOT HIT MOHALLAS

SENSITIVE AREAS

SOURCE: Field Study

and white collared jobs (See maps 5a and 5b).

There are 179 Kachi bastis in Jaipur city with 48456 families living in them.[3] Within the walled city, and sometimes outside it also, Kachi Bastis with Muslims and Harijans in a majority, face each other. Striking examples of these are the Bastis in *Bharganj Area.* The Kachi Bastis in Mohalla *'Sivki Garan'* and *'Kani Kharian'* having majority of Muslims and the Kachi Basti at 'Kothi Rehgron (Ghat Gate) having Harijans in majority are other similar examples.

This kind of cluster formation has following serious implications :

i) It provides a leverage to vested interests to use some of the social miseries, political and economic deprivation which are the product of the logic of socio-economic development, to reinforce the elements of communalism, i.e. discriminations are made on religious group lines. For instance, if industrial development and social amenities are relatively absent from an area where a particular religious/caste group is clustered, it is concluded that this discrimination is deliberate on the part of policy makers.

ii) It also delimits social interaction and exposure to diversities of cultures etc. This builds up an inward looking attitude and in the process makes people less mobile to avail opportunities. These clusters are a fertile ground to cement and strengthen communal loyalities which in turn may be used by communal organizations to spread antagonism.

iii) The settlement pattern of Jaipur may also contribute to the eruption of communal rioting, especially between the Harijans and the Muslims. This is so because-

   a) these two groups are involved in the same occupations and have a certain cultural gap;
   b) the increase of Hindu fundamentalism through which Harijans are being elevated to the status of equal members of "Hindu Society". Since conversions in Meenakshipuram, this trend is the major programme of

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3. As early as 1964, erstwhile Jana Sangh leaders like Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, Giroharilal Bhargava and Dr. Ujala Arora started organizing the dwellers of these Jhuggies. This issue was later taken up by an organization named 'Kachi Basti Federation' formed in June 1975 under CPI(M) influence.

organisations like Hindu Manch, Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Arya Samaj etc. Mobile temples for Harijan *Basties* may be used in Jaipur to facilitate worship as has been done in western Uttar Pradesh etc.

The increasing tendency to live in exclusive localities is a pointer towards formation of distinct religious group identities. This in turn helps in fixation of targets during the course of riots.

The persistence of communalism as reflected in population settlement pattern, educational practices, media, government policies and non-absorption and displacement of local labour in traditional household industries of gems and sculpture are accentuating communal cleavages.

Educational Practices And Media

In educational practices and media, glorification of the past is occupying much larger space. The past so glorified is not historical, but a synthetic product concocted in the minds of a few - is a byproduct of the process of alienation. The present offers you no promise, no vision and hence no purpose in life. The future is too shapeless. So turn to the past and search for hidden pride. For instance, a large section of Hindus considered the ancient period of Indian history most glorious. Its rulers were peace loving, just and tolerant, whereas, a large section from amongst Muslim respondents regarded the medieval period to be the most glorious. It is the resurrection of an imagined past. This imagined past also has one or the other cruel edge to it. That is why it breeds intolerance and violence.

These thoughts are not only propagated with the help of oral history, but these are also reflected in the school text books. For instance, history lessons for class IV, counterposes Babar to Maharana Sanga, Akbar 'the Great' to Maharana Pratap and Aurangzeb to Shivaji. All the non-Muslim rulers are projected as nationalists.

Maharana Sanga was a very brave courageous and nation loving ruler. He did not want Babar to establish a permanent empire in India. So, he decided to confront Babur. On the other

hand, Babar was also aware that his victory over Rana Sanga was essential to establish a permanent empire in India. Under these circumstances, a battle between the two was inevitable.... In fact Rana Sanga was the last Hindu ruler of India' (translated from Hindi)[4].

'Maharana Pratap... was a great nationalist and freedom-loving person... His fight against Mughals was not for religion or property. He had many Muslim soldiers in his army.... He fought for the defence of freedom and bore suffering'. (translated from Hindi)[5].

...You have read that Akbar had expanded Mughal empire and strengthened it by his liberal policy. But Aurangzeb did not follow this policy. He was not generous towards the followers of any religious group save those of Islam. The outcome of this was that many people became opposed to Aurangzeb' (translated from Hindi)[6].

The Mughal rulers therefore became expansionist monsters. They were good administrators but they were better known as conquerors of 'freedom-loving' and 'nationalist' native (sometimes 'Hindu') rulers. So, Maharana Pratap is the epitome of religious tolerance if he employs 'Muslim' soldiers but Aurangzeb remains an intolerant fanatic even after promoting Mirza Raja Jai Singh of Amer (and several others of his like) to the rank of fullfledged generals. It would be better to tell children that rulers irrespective of their religious faith, were despotic politicians of their day. Their confrontations/compromises had nothing to do with the aspirations of members of different religious group or ill of the people at large.

Social studies text book for s III has prefixed adjective to the names of rulers in the table of contents, i.e. 'Brave Alexander', 'Justice-loving Vikramaditya', 'Generous Harshavardhan', 'Gallant Prithviraj'. All these rulers, including Ashoka, the Great' and Emperor Chandragupta, have often been glorified. Their subjects have been shown to be extremely happy under the loving care of these rulers. "Chandragupta did many good things to benefit the people under the guidance of his mentor, Chanakya.... People were very

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4. *Social Study Class IV* (1983) published by Rajasthan State Textbook Division, Jaipur, p.80.
5. ibid, p.84
6. ibid, p.89

happy and wealthy in his kingdom" (translated from Hindi)[7] "...There was enormous peace in our country due to his (Vikramaditya's) sense of justice. The people were happy and the country developed in every way..." (translated from Hindi)[8] "...He (Harshavardhana) used to tour his kingdom extensively to acquaint himself with the sorrows/complaints of his subjects and make arrangements for their welfare...."(translated from Hindi) [9]. No ruler in the medieval period is shown so benovelent and their subjects never as happy. The authors of these textbooks may probably benefit from R.S. Sharma's Indian Feudalism: 300-1200 (Calcutta, 1965). "...The economic essence of Indian Feudalism, like that of European, lay in the rise of landed intermediaries leading to the enserfment of the peasantry through mounting tax burdens, increasing obligations to perform forced labour and the evils of subinfeudation.

"Sharma postulates the existence of serfdom in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Kangra, Andhra, Orissa and Bengal during the sixth and seventh centuries on the basis of epigraphic references to the transfer of individual peasants and labourers together with the donated land.[10]. And further S.K Maity in Economic Life in Northern India in the Gupta Period (Calcutta, 1957). "...concludes that as regards the material life of the common people the Gupta period was not a golden age, a point supported by another work which suggests that taxes tended to increase in Gupta times"[11]

Care should be taken to explain forces and processes of history. Since history is explained with reference to the qualities of rulers all along in these text books it will be concluded that medieval period saw a decline of India as contemporary rulers failed to be one with the native people. Such a clue can be gathered from the following illustrations. "... He (Akbar) employed on high positions, without religious discrimination, meritorious people in his and different departments of administration. He had accepted India as his country and Indians as his country-man. On account of these

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7. *Social Study Class III* (1983), Publisher Rajasthan State Textbook Division, Jaipur, 69-70.
8. Ibid p.76
9. Ibid p.79
10. D.N. Jha (1980) *Studies in Early Indian Economic History,* Anupama Publications, Delhi, pp. 24
11. Social Studies Class IV (1983), p.85, op.cit.

qualifications Akbar could successfully administer an empire continuously for fifty years and proved to be a great king in history" (translated from Hindi)[12].

"Aurangazeb was a man of character and courage. He was very simple. But he could not trust anyone. He did not even trust his sons. He was not generous. If he were generous and if he could trust others the Mughal empire would certainly not have ended so soon". (translated from Hindi)[13].

This confirms the communal propaganda of medieval rulers being alien like Akbar and insensitive like Aurangzeb. Such notions about rulers have crystalized into stereotypes about the whole Muslim religious group. Therefore, after it is accepted that critical appreciation of the past is the object of teaching history, bard-like eulogies must be done away with.

The chapter on Indian Social System in the Social Studies text-book for Class V confines the elucidation of its subject to different religious/caste groups. The occupational categories of Indian society are grossly overlooked. The impact of developments in agriculture, industry, irrigation, transport, services, trade and commerce on the Indian social system are not mentioned. Elsewhere when these developments are narrated the focus is on their geographical location and economic output. This contribution of the educational system nourishes a sense of exclusiveness and redefine the religious boundaries. It can be said that communalism has struck roots in Jaipur city. With fresh initiative being taken by the communal forces in the form of Jamia-e-Hidayat, Urdu language, Training centre for temple priests the existing notion of communal harmony may not last for long.

The Urdu language issue, like in adjoining Uttar Pradesh, is also getting communalized. Migrant teachers from Aligarh are advocating Urdu to be the medium of instruction. Some of the local political leaders have taken up this issue. However, a majority of the local educated Muslims did not favour Urdu because they feel that the lag suffered by the Muslims in social spheres would further increase if they confined their knowledge to Urdu only. With equal enthusiasm proponents of communalism among Hindus oppose the

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12. *Social Studies* Class IV (1983), p.85, op.cit
13. Ibid p.91

recognition of Urdu as a medium of instruction. Such concocted battle of nerves arouses expectations along communal lines and generates hatred and suspicion for the other religious or caste groups.

Not only this even the state has started interfering into non-secular spheres of social activity. Rather than confining itself only to protect religions, it has started promoting religions. For instance, in Jaipur a government department known as *Devasthan Department* has undertaken to train pujaris. The Devasthan Department was created by the government of Rajasthan to control and supervise the various kinds of temples. The first three months training course for training Pujaris was inaugurated on May 17, 1984, for a batch of 23 serving priests. Apparently, this course will increase the efficiency of the priests to perform their duties. But with plans to open a similar Training Centre at Kota and train 10 fresh applicants in the Second batch at Jaipur, the government is bound to be seen as a 'promoter of Hindus religion'[14]. The trainers in the Priests Training Centre boast about the frequent demands being received by them for their trained pupils from within the country and outside. The fame of this state-owned centre has obviously spread far and wide. The consequences of this fame invoking similar demands from trustees of the places of worship of other religious groups and communalization of the issue should not overlooked. Communal politics has enough issues to rally support behind it. The government is supposed to negate these issues by practising secular principles and not feed communal politics by providing it a handle to misrepresent national/

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14. Rajasthan was formed by integration of 19 salute and 3 non-salute princely states. These Devasthan Departments were created by the governments of these States to control and supervise the following types of temples

    a) State temples
    b) Self-reliant temples
    c) Entrusted temples
    d) Grant-in-aid tmples (Jain temples, mosques etc.)

    This report of the Accountant General for 1982-83 indicate that this Department controls 388 temples and is directly managing 205 self-reliant and 403 Entrusted Temples. The rights of ownership of 326 temples are under litigation by private claimants. The Department has failed to codify its rules and regulations even after this was proposed by the Public Accounts Committee in 1955-56. These failings are bad enough. But why should the government create a department to administer temples when the Constitution prescribes that it will not interfere in religious affairs ? The Department as such militates against the letter and spirit of our Constitution.

constitutional ideals.

Demands of a similar nature could be raised by other communal groups, political parties or religious institutions. Such a situation will result in the strengthening of communal attitudes. Promotion or acceptance of religious demands raised by communalism will further aggravate the problem, for individual groups will coin new demands of a similar nature in order to protect and promote their economic and political interest.

Elements of communalism and their operation could also be discerned in stories popularly recounted by conformist and incremental communalism among the Hindu and Muslim religious groups. These stories are not only verbally communicated but also circulated in print. For instance, there is a story that a door of the Jama Masjid of Jaipur was sought to be opened in Johri Bazar in 1939 without the approval of the State's Government. The contemporary District Magistrate, one Vir Bahadur Singh 'Nepali', disuaded the people from 'Kafans' and continued building this gate. Firing was ordered by the District Magistrate and a few lives were lost. The muslim league joined issue with the Jaipur State and declared that a group of 'Muslims' will leave Jaipur every day.

The incident is remembered by people as a riot between two religious groups. There was no exodus from Jaipur of members of the Muslim religious group, not even in 1947. But 1939 in public memory is known as the year when half the population of this religious group left Jaipur.

Such provocations do not go unnoticed. They have a social appeal among certain sections of both religious groups. Communalism among the Hindus and the Muslims use such venomous items in perpetuating communalism.

It is evident from the above mentioned facts that communalism is acquiring sharp edges. These sharp edges may not on their own manifest into violence. So there is a need to find out the factors which may transform growing tensions into violence. The factors which may cause the eruption of violence may appear to be originating from many different pressures. It depends mainly on, how politics and economy is taking shape, the extent of decay of traditional sources of authority and the role and nature of emerging authority - symbols and authority centre.

The fierceness of competition in trade and for white collar jobs, the displacement of labour and growing unemployment, along-

with the perception of deprivation, discrimination and competition on religious or caste group basis will influence the spread of communal antagonism. Apart from these, the nature of politics and social mobilisations will reinforce communal antagonisms and cause communal rioting.

In Jaipur, the level of competition in trade and for jobs is not very intense. At the same time the rate at which economy is undergoing transformation is not matched by changes in socio-cultural patterns. In other words, the gains and miseries produced were justified with the help of religious practices and fatalism. The competition in trade is being projected and perceived communally. Whereas, the workers displaced are feeling deprived, but their deprivation is yet to be shaped around communal categories of social analysis. This can be substantiated by analysing the nature of the household industry in Jaipur.

Within Rajasthan, the district of Jaipur is one of the industrially developed pockets of the state. The small scale industries, for Jaipur, provide more than 15 per cent of the total employment provided by the small scale sector in the state. The investment in this sector, in Jaipur, was as high as 24 per cent of the total investment in the small scale industry. In the small scale sector, it is the unorganized sector which is dominant in Jaipur city. The household industry of gem and jewellary and sculptures are prodiving a basis for discontentment to be articulated on communal lines.

Household industry

Sculptures

The sculpture industry in Jaipur is characterised by an inflow of capital in this trade since it give better returns, leading to increasing competition and formation of wage labour, altering social composition of the labour market.

The history of this industry in Jaipur dates back to the building of Amber fort around 1000 years ago. Proficient sculptures of Bengal who happened to be brahmans came here just as they went elsewhere on the encouragement of local feudal chiefs. Jaipur, Kiston (Alwar), Thana Gazi (Alwar) were main centres of this trade. Chiselling statues and trading in them remained an exclusive domain of brahmans (Bhardwaj) till the recent past.

Many banias (Aggarwal) have entered into trading about a decade ago and some prajapatis (kumhars) are involved in its manufacturing and trading for the past few decades. More than 4000 people are engaged in Jaipur. There are about 500 units making varieties of idols. There are around 10 to 15 firms employing more than 10 artisans with a sale receipt of more than one lac per annu; 5000 medium firms employing between 5 to 10 artisans with a sale reciept betwee 50000/- and 100000/- p.a. and 300 to 400 small industrial units having less than five artisans and with a sale receipt of less than 50000/- p.a. The number of people engaged in these industries, the number of manufacturing units and their turn over have all been constantly increasing for the past few decades with an unusual increase since 1970.

The reasons for this have to be seen in the increasing demand of idols all over the country. This increasing demand is a reflection of increasing religiosity, the causes for which lie in the total socio-economic milieu. The quantitative increase in this industry is reflected in a manifold increase in shops in the last 30 years and the number of people earning a livelihood in this trade have multiplied 25 times. In the last 10 years the annual turn over has increased by nearly 8 times for the big traders, 5 times for middle traders and 8 times for small traders. It may be mentioned here that in this trade sale receipts have a close relationship with the extent of working capital available. This is a seasonal trade whose peak is reached between *Makar Sankranti* and mid-July (particularly March and April).

Persons involved in sculpture industry are exploiting caste ideology and reinforcing caste identities to secure an increasing share in the flourising trade of idols. The new traders who happen to be Aggarwals and Kumahars by caste are accused of "violationg the sacredness of idol-trading by selling even damaged idols". The accusation is widely and venomously made by the big and established traders who are mostly Adi Guru Brahmins. The discredited new traders cannot employ the traditionally skilled workers in this industry who are Adi Gur brahmins and are mostly engaged by the bigger traders of their own caste. The new traders, some of whom worked as artisans and acquired a fair amount of proficiency have decided to hit back by training their own kith and kin in sculpture. These workers, like the ones under the influence of big traders, are mobilized along caste lines in their occupations. They live on

miserable wages and are a case of sweating labour. And all this is acceptable to them, inter alia, because of the pride in belonging to the same caste as their employer as a consequence of the permeation of caste ideology.

Some 10 per cent of the total workers in the sculpture industry profess the Muslim faith. They earn their livelihood mostly by cutting marble slabs in desired sizes and chiselling decoration pieces. Some of them are also engaged in idol making. This fact illustrates the absence of religiosity and religious bigotry among atleast a section of the workforce in this industry.

Gem And Jewellery Industry

In Jaipur the household industry of gems is undergoing a structural transformation and experience intense competition due to wide fluctuations according to changes in international market conditions. In the gems industry Marwari and Jain merchant/manufacturers are well-entrenched but only recently Ansari (Muslim) have entered this trade. There were around 2000 exporting firms in Jaipur and an estimated ten per cent were owned by Ansaris. This trade, being demand based and export oriented, is prone to wide fluctuations, for individual traders, according to changes in international fashions. A sizeable working capital is required in this trade. The emerging merchant-manufactuers are not in as favourable a position, as those well-entrenched to absorb the erratic fashion inspired fluctuations or meet the requirements of huge working capital. The emerging and well-entrenched traders, in such a situation, are likely to mobilize wider social and political groups in their support. For instance, Ansaris are said to be the chief promoters of the proposed Arabic University in district Tong. Quereshis and Bissatis alleged that the Ansaris wanted to appear holier and build a nexus with Arabic countries to protect their economic interests. This proposed university shall have many implications like creating suspicion and distrust against the Muslim, they felt. When the medium of instruction in the whole of Rajasthan is Hindi they also doubted the functional utility of this University for the people of the region.

The processing of gems in Jaipur is a household industry. The artisans involved are able to accumulate capital. For instance, during the boom is this industry between 1970-74 some artisans from amongst the Qureshi, Ansaris and Bisati 'Biradaris' were able to

emerge as small traders. These merchant manufactuers have adequate technical skill, but are placed in an unfavourable position as compared to big traders who have a greater capacity to withstand wide fluctuations in this precarious fashion-oriented export based industry.

With expanding business and increasing competition the traders started bringing or creating a new skilled workforce in this industry. It is in pursuance of this that the gemstones Artisan Training School was established in 1977 by Gem and Jewellery Export Promotion Council in collaboration with the government of India and Rajasthan. Inspite of sufficient availability of skilled workforce and a substantial displacement of polishers, one of the stated objectives of the School is to create a "reservoir" of trained personnel. In an informal discussion with the Registrar of the School creation of a non-Muslim workforce (it shall also help simultaneously to create a different skilled workforce), was stated to be one of the purposes of setting up the school. Around 300 students have passed out with Diplomas in cutting and polishing of diamond and 365 students with Diplomas in cutting and polishing of coloured stones. Out of these 50 per cent or so were from outside the state. (Their religious groupwise composition was not divulged by the concerned authorities).

Division of labour on religious/caste lines is undergoing a change. The inmigration of skilled labour from Gujarat who happen to be Hindus, is perceived by the Muslim skilled labour to have deflated their bargaining position in gems and jewellery industry. The introduction of drilling machines in the same industry has displaced women and children, mainly from the Muslim religious group who were earlier doing this work. The workers, so far, feel economically deprived but not discriminated on a religious group basis. Apart from the fiercenss of competition, the nature of politics will determine the spread of communal antagonism and rioting.

In Jaipur there is a shift from a household to a factory system especially in the mode of producing traditional handicraft products like jewellery, sculpture etc. This factory system is prevalent in the form of what has ´been loosely termed as 'putting out system'. These structural changes have an uneven impact on different groups. The functional division of crafts along religious/caste lines has got destablized. The divergence of interest within the rank of merchant-manufacturers itself are evidently accentuating

the conflicts on communal lines. This increasing competition between the traders and competition and perception of deprivation amongst the workers may, in the long run, aggravate the problem.

In gems, jewellery and sculpture industry the putting out system and small firms are still surviving owing to the following reasons :

(i) Small firms contain to sustain in order to supply the orders of larger firms to help out at certain stages during the period of optimum demand. These small firms are like sub-contractors to large firms on a kind of modern putting out system practised between large and small capitalists.

(ii) Government regulations (relating to factory, labour etc. and rampant corruption) trend to perpetuate the putting out system because it is the optimal way out to maintain the profit as well as to escape regulation.

(iii) The large number of small peasants in villages around Jaipur city, clinging to the soil but unable to gain their full livelihood from it, are re-investing capital in the cottage industry. Consequently, the putting out system is getting a boost.

To sum up, increasing competition in gem's trade, displacement of local labour, fluctuations in the international market and tendency to employ co-religionists artisan, creating an alternative skilled force providing sufficient conditions for communal rioting.

Politics and Communalism

The pervasiveness of communal ideology and the propagation of stories through oral narration and text-books may sharpen the communal cleavages. There is already a sharp division of society on caste lines in Jaipur. But there is an increasing tendency of this division to acquire a religious form. The reasons are quite obvious. The increasing competition in electoral politics and also overlaping of the support base has compelled political parties to mobilze people on religious and caste group lines to cash on in electoral politics.

There are two major political parties which have been by and large able to accommodate divergent groups. A large section from amongst the Jats, Gujjars, Scheduled Castes and Tribes and

Muslims have found expression through Congress and Brahmins, Banias and Rajputs through Bhartiya Janta Party. These political parties provided the main channel of upward and downward mobility as well as a means of recruitment of all leaders having basis in the cleavages of religion, caste, personal and sectional interests. This recruitment of new leaders on the above mentioned cleavages is not taking note of the new emerging groups deriving their legitimacy from regional and economic interests. Changes brought about by economic development and politicisation of people have caused a displacement of skills which earlier coincided with caste and religious distinctions. Banias were traders, Rajputs were princelings, Jats were land owners/cultivators, Kayasthas were white-collar workers, Harijans were menial workers and among Muslims, Ansaris were weavers, Quershis were butchers etc. The relation between the caste and occupation of people is no longer isomorphic. Compulsion of electoral politics may lead the two competing political parties to woo people from the traditional support bases of each other by performing acts of social work and creating suspicion among the rival party's. The tradition of social work, like in the *Kachhi Bastis* of Jaipur, may no longer remain a barrier to the growth of communalism as before, but instead accelerate communal tensions.

The five Vidhan Sabha constituencies spread over Jaipur city have a mixed electorate. The compulsion arising from this fact positively prevents different political parties and leaders from mobilizing voters on communal lines. Only once in 1972 an independent candidate, supported by Muslim league, who contested from the Johri Bazaar constitutency openly projected himself as a defender of 'Muslim interests'. The virulent section of Jana Sangh has not been shy of exploiting communal sentiments in successive elections. And to this day no important functionary of Bharatiya Janata Party is a non-Hindu in Jaipur. The Congress has shown very little foresight in combating communalism. The Muslim league supported an independent candidate in 1972, who was given Congress ticket in 1980 Vidhan Sabha elections and he won from Johri Bazar constituency. Electoral mobilization on purely communal lines has not been practiced in Jaipur as it may have been in Hyderabad by *Majlis-e-Ittehadul-Musalmeen*. But religious symbols are used by vested political interests. And communal parties like Muslim league are often wooed for electoral support by different

political leaders and organizations. This naturally arouses expectations for the growth of one's area and incremental gains for oneself on communal lines. Yet necessity of economic cooperation in precious stones, compulsions of a mixed electorate etc. inhibit the transformation of religious groups into mutually exclusive, communally antagonistic groups.

However, no society stands still. As Jaipur grows, the 'Kachi Bastees' grow with it. And this 'Kachi Bastees' are mostly agglomeration of single religious/caste groups (data) *Mehnat Nagar, Ankur Cinema, Kachi Basti, Mohalla Challan* etc. are dominated by Harijans. These deprived sections often raise reasonable demands of resettlement, regularization and provision of basic social amenities. But these reasonable demands can not be met easily, considering that 30 per cent of Jaipur lives in 'Kachi Bastees'. Certain daily wage-earning sections of *Mehnat Nagar* did express a grouse. They felt that the Muslim dominated *Mehnat Nagar* had not been provided roads, electricity and potable water whereas these facilities had been extended to the adjacent Harijan dominated *Rai Colony*. The Harijan-Muslim divide a Moradabad can crystallize here. R.S.S. holds 'Shakhas' in several Kachi Bastis and Jamaat-e-Islami is active in several others. The developmental inputs can become a source of serious social tensions and grievance-mongering should not be forgotten. Hence, development of 'Kachi Bastis' has to be urgently undertaken but cautiously dispensed lest real or imaginary grievance break-out into communal riots. With the Kachi Basti Federation having got ineffective, the window for grievance ventilation stands closed. The Kachi Bastis are bound to remain restive and its residents ready for mobilization from any quarter, including communalists.

With the abolition of zamindari, the 'Rajput-Jat' conflict of Rajasthan is no longer a struggle between the landlords and their tenants. The mobilization of 'Rajputs' on August 29, 1984 (by BJP) ostensibly to recover possession of 513 'bighas' of land for Bhawani Shiksha Niketan Society is another aspect of the same problem. In fact this grand-scale meeting was organized -

a) to project the organizers as the sole benefactors of 'Rajputs'..
b) to push ex-princes Sarvshri Bhawani Singh of Jaipur and Gaj Singh of Jodhpur into taking an anti-Government stance and thereby scotch their chances of running on a Congress

ticket in the forthcoming Lok Sabha elections.

Such mobilzations, to begin with, consolidate casteism. And later the process snowballs into confrontation with other castes for scarce opportunities and resources. Such confrontations are not unforeseen in Jaipur, in the light of the experience in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

University and college politics in Jaipur and the Shekhwati region are badly afflicted by the mobilization of students on caste lines. The Kisan Hostel and Rajput 'Chatrawas' are two fortresses of rabid casteism among the 'devotees of higher learning' in Jaipur. Most of the future elite of Rajasthan is trained in such a milieu. Therefore, it is unlikely to expect a conscious attempt on their part to stem the degeneration of our democratic and secular values/institutions.

The youth among the Muslims in Jaipur is generally employed in shaping and polishing precious stones. They, on the strength of their independent means, have in the past four or five years opened voluntary social-service organizations. Naujiwan Khidmatgar Society and Youth Welfare Society are two such examples. Such voluntary organizations and their executive members provide a non-political leadership. The social groups covered by the medical, educational and entertainment activities of these organizations derive a feeling of close oneness while associating with such organizations. The political elite associates with such organizations to build up an image and impression of dedication to social service. The germination of such voluntary organizations is a welcome sigh only in so far as it reflects an attempt towards self-reliance on the part of the young. These efforts will considerably wash the common notion about Muslims being an emasculated lot incapable of helping themselves. But on the other hand, the narrow confines of the activity of these organizations tends to reinforce clustered living and communal thinking.

Politics in Jaipur is yet to be communalized as in Bhiwandi, Moradabad, Hyderabad, Aligarh. However, there are pointers towards this direction.

COMMUNAL RIOTS : THE WAY OUT

The solution to increasing eruptions of communal riots are sought in :

(a) frequent and excessive use of police and paramilitary forces;
(b) forming of peace committees;
(c) preaching communal harmony and religious tolerance;
(d) offering concessions to communalism.

In spite of the frequent resort to these measures communal riots continue unabated. Let us examine the above mentioned solutions as these were implemented in concrete situations and the impact they may have had on checking communal rioting.

Law and Order approach

There is a strong belief that communal rioting can be checked by the timely use of of para military forces. Communal rioting is treated like other ordinary crimes arising from the non-alertness in intelligence and of police officials. Even certain police officials consider communal riots to be a consequence of their lapses and are confident of tackling these through police reinforcements.

It is naive to presume that communal rioting can be controlled by merely strengthening the network of intelligence agencies and reinforcing the law enforcement apparatus. This is so because events immediately preceding communal riots cannot be taken as determinant factors responsible for the rioting itself. Changing the routes of religious processions or banning public celebration of religious festivals are the outcome of such wrong understanding. The futility of such an approach was illustrated by the events in Bhiwandi. The public celebration of Shivaji Jayanti (birth day of Shivaji)) was banned at Bhiwandi in 1971. Communalists used this issue to rally support during local municipal elections. Instead of easing communal tensions, the ban provided an excuse for fanning communal animosity. Another example can be cited to prove this point. The immediate cause of the 1969 communal riots in Indore was a wrestling match between two sportsmen who happened to belong to two different religious groups. Interestingly, to preclude the possibility of communal riots, the administration banned the

matches between wrestlers belonging to two different religious groups. But communal riots, continued unabated. Similarly, in Bhopal, it was thought the imposition of section 144 would control rioting during *Ranga Panchami* and *Moharram* days. However, though communal rioting was suppressed on this occasion, it erupted at other times.

The conventional methods of law and order control have proved to be failures. Now the question arises, why these methods have failed ? These methods failed because:

(i) It is assumed that the vacuum created by Ideological State Apparatus can be filled by the police. In practice the frequent use of police, in a situation where legitimacy of the system is declining, only produces counter-productive results.

> Every state apparatus, whether repressive or ideological functions both by violence and by ideology, but with one very important distinction which makes it imperative not to confuse the Ideological state apparatus with (Repressive) state apparatus.
>
> This is the fact that the (Repressive) state apparatus functions massively and predominantly by *repression* (including physical repression), while functioning secondarily by ideology...(1)

The increasing reliance on repression exposes the declining legitimacy of the existing political system. The growing need to moderate or control events by relying on fear and force undermines the structural and ideological factors.

Law and order machinery has to take into consideration various pre-stages which ultimately manifest into rioting. The first stage is *simmering tension*. The relationship between communal tension and its manifestation into violence is most difficult but essential to establish. The situation is analogous to an earthquake where the rifts in the surface represent the violence and the pressure far below the earth the tensions.[2]

The simmering tensions can be gauged from the visible changes

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1. Althusses. L. (1972) `Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses' in B.R. Cosin (ed.) *Education : Structure and Society* pp. 251-62.
2. Richard Lambert (1951) op. cit. p.17

in inter-religious group interactions, nature of disputes and the people involved in it. During one of the field surveys in Vadodara a respondent in response to a question, is it possible to know the possibility of the eruption of a riot before hand, made an interesting comment 'whenever a slogan of Hindu-Muslim Bhai Bhai is raised- you take it that a riot is going to erupt. The fact that the need to raise such a slogan has been felt shows that there is something wrong'. It is here the police has to shift to unconventional approach to gauge the tension and take preventive measures.

The second stage is *politicisation and communalization* of tension. This is the most difficult stage for there is a danger of the administration and police becoming partisan. Nevertheless, the prevention lies in mobilisation of the community and involvement of the non-communal and secular forces for diffusing the situation.

Simultaneously, the steps have to be taken to identify the weak points where violence may appear.

There is a tendency among various religious, caste and other ascriptive groups to live in exclusive localities. Keeping this in view the localities be classified into the three categories. These three categories are:

(1) Hindu majority area
(2) Muslim majority area
(3) Mixed area (where Hindus and Muslims are almost evenly balanced)

This kind of population settlement pattern make the residents psychologically claustrophobic and create a visual impact of being organized threat to the antagonistic religious or communal groups.

Therefore, attempt should be made to break the exclusive isolationist nature of localities. This should not dislocate people from the next of kin.

Prevention and control of riots encompass localities in widely dispersed geographical areas. There is a need to identify sensitive areas i.e. the ones which are communally tense. In these localities communal elements may be pervasive, but the absence of certain other conditions keeps the actual rioting at bay.

Riot hit localities may also be identified where the authorities physically assault religious groups or the religious groups assault each other by attacking symbols or by destroying or looting property perceived to be belonging to the other religious groups.

The need is not to make riot hit areas alone the focal point of attention. Measures should also be taken in areas which act as feeders to these riot prone areas.

Special attention should be paid to mohallas which are in locational confrontation as it is most often seen that they tend to become the hot-beds of communal tension at even the slightest provocation.

The spread effect of rioting is more a function of ideology. For an administrator this is a necessary input for the prevention of violence. In other words, the target fixation in a riot is on the basis of symbolic identification. For instance, if a group of Harijans attacked Muslim localities and religious symbols of Islam, the retaliation may not be against Harijans, it may be higher caste Hindus who are seen as constituting the Hindu religious group. Therefore in a more generalised manner it can be suggested that precautions should be taken to protect the perceived antagonistic symbols, physical locations and population.

Third stage is the *actualization of tension into violence*. It is here the efficient use of force may help to check the intensity of communal rioting.

(ii) Communal riots are taken as autonomous and the events preceding the riots are taken as the root causes.

(iii) Communal rioters are treated at par with ordinary criminals. These rioters should first be identified. The participants in communal riots are not merely riff-raffs. These participants may be the victims of communal ideology. For them it is not a question of stealing a television set or getting a raise in salary. They are committed to the idea of creating a society in which the so-called *kafirs* and *melchas* would have no right to exist. This section do not necessarily derive their rationalization from immediate economic or political gains. The need in their case is to disseminate secular theories about the origin of the universe, progression of

history and development of society. The law and order machinery at the most can take punitive action against anti-social elements. The instigators responsible for engineering communal riots arrogate themselves to the status of political leaders of their 'community' whose gullibility they exploit to promote their own vested interests. Public opinion has to be mobilised against these political and economic vested interests.

There is a need to place the repressive state apparatus in the societal context. The factors like crowded bylanes in inner cities, no communication net work, footloose youth on the streets, persistent rumours and inadequate information do hamper efficiency of the police. But lack of faith in the police which is symbolic of deeper crisis of Indian State has to be taken seriously. Merely recruiting policemen belonging to religious groups will not help. Efforts should be made to dispel the fears of people about the performance and partiality of police force by ensuring that a police-man functions not as a Hindu or Muslim but as a functionary of a secular state.

The existing laws both the Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code should be strictly imposed. For instance, not many people have been convicted for their instigation or participation in a communal riot. This is necessary because it will help to reinforce the faith of the citizens that the state in India is actuated not by law alone, but by a sense of justice.

Communal Harmony : Going in Circles

Communalism uses religion, caste or other ascriptives group affinities, so it is believed that communalism exist ever since religion, caste or other ascriptive groups came into being. Therefore, political and ideological struggle against communalism have to oppose religion. This struggle either try to build a non-religious or monotheistic society.

Communal conflicts are seen as religious conflicts. Communalism, in fact, is anti-religion. What communalism claims to be representing is distorted. It uses religion as a vehicle to articulate demands and interests other than those it claims to be serving.

Communalism suggests solutions which are false in premise, opportunist in approach and retrogressive in impact.

The following are some of the solutions which are implemented within the framework of communalism.

1. communal harmony or tolerance of the religious practices and beliefs of one religious group by another,
2. giving concessions to religious groups which are numerically in minority; and
3. elimination and expatriation of adherents of antagonistic religious groups.

The proposition of maintaining communal harmony is based on the assumption that differences in religious practices cause communal rioting and the need is to be tolerant towards one another's religious beliefs. It has been shown earlier that this assumption is fallacious. Communalists proclaim that the religious group they represent is tolerant and the religious beliefs of this group are universal. The rival communalists lay similar claims and counter claims which generate conditions for religious intolerance.

Communalism is not caused by religious or caste differences but it merely uses them. The major ingredients of communalism are mistrust, fear and suspicion which are consciously built against religious groups other than one's own. Persons who become victims of communal ideology are likely to be imbued with fear, suspicion and mistrust.

Fear, suspicion and insecurity are the result of these objective facts but are perceived on communal lines. The prescription of communal harmony without touching on the objective facts lying at the root of fears and insecurities remains farcical. Metaphorically, communalism is a disease and there can be no harmony of diseases. The prescription of communal harmony, therefore, only reinforces communalism.

The notion of communal harmony was propagated as a part of government policy on the belief that technological and industrial development would prevent tensions from taking communal form if people become tolerant towards the religious beliefs and practices of one another. Development of science and technology as also the rapid progress in industrialization and urbanization have not secularized the west and cannot, per se, be responsible for secularization of the Indian sub-continent. Science on its own cannot bring

the collapse of the ideological structures which are rooted in the specific nature of Indian socio-economic development.

Concessions to Communalists : Prostituting Secular Politics

Frequent use and misuse of religious symbols and religious institutions by political leaders and increasing communalization of the agents of the state have further aggravated the problem. Communal concessions are granted and electoral alliances with communal groups are made by non-communal and secular parties. Concessions have been offered to all types of communalists with a simplistic view of accommodating and drawing them into secular politics and/or with an opportunistic and immediate design to win elections or form governments. For instance, the religious demands, raised by Akali Dal were conceded by the Congress in 1984 through an announcement made by the then Prime Minister in Gurdwara Bangla Sahib, New Delhi. Another such concession was made to communalists in November, 1984, when the ruling party did not take any action against persons known to have instigated Delhi riots. Recently in order to appease communalists the political parties like Congress and Bhartiya Janata Party did not give a non-communal interpretation to issues relating to *Babri Masjid* and *Ram Janam Bhumi* etc. Very rarely have concessions been made to communalists with the perspective of gaining time or/to organize secular forces.

In the initial years of independence, concessions were granted to communalists out of conceptual error that failure to meet communal demands would inflame communalism.
To quote Nehru :

> Communal representation may have to be put up with because of various factors, the principle reason being that a denial of it actually increases the disease".

This conceptual error has been part of our policy since independence. To quote S. Gopal :

> Nehru and Gandhi took the line that it was for the Hindus as the majority community to make concessions while the com-

munal problem lasted. This, in itself, despite the call to magnanimity assumes a communal approach, however, subconscious. The argument is based on the belief that the majority community is a privileged one, and the minority community has a reason to be communal.

Granting special privileges to the communalism of the minorities is counter-productive. It is counter-productive because communalism resolves around fear, insecurity and suspicion, not generosity.

Therefore any policy of appeasing communalism or giving concessions to a religious group - be it a numerical majority or a minority - is doomed to failure. Concessions sought or demands raised on communal lines will not eliminate rather strengthen communalism.

There are also examples of mobilisation by political leaders on disputes regarding places of religious worship. And government has passed certain legislation to resolve these disputes. It is submitted that the religious institutions should be stripped of their government sponsored holiness. The Government should repeal the SGPC Act, Devasthans and the Waqf Act, so that government may not become a party to the promotion of any religious activity. Religious heads should exercise their moral authority to administer the affairs of their respective religions.

It is suggested that the administration may :

i) encourage the formation of citizens' committees and provide it with the powers to run the affairs of such places of worship;

ii) declare ancient historic places of religious worship as national monuments.

There is also a tendency to transfer high level of district administrators immediately after the riots. These transfers are often made on the demand from communal leaders giving the latter more legitimacy and also fillip to their communal activities. Such transfers should be avoided.

Peace Committees : Turning Devils into Angels

Peace committees are ad hoc bodies which are constituted on the spur of the moment and meet only when Communal violence flares up. Besides, peace committees are usually comprised of self-appointed leaders of various social-religious groups, who propagate communalism themselves. For example, peace committees are composed of the same persons who are generally involved in generating communal tensions. On several occasions some of these persons have been put in lock-up and charge-sheeted for fomenting communal trouble. Jawaharlal Nehru thought it better to organize citizens rather than peace committees to check communal riots. To quote Nehru :

> The most effective method to check these degrading conflicts (communal riots) is the organization of average citizens for the protection of their mohallas and not the peace committees usually formed during communal riots of the very elements that have caused the trouble.

Therefore, peace committees should be replaced by mohalla discussion and defence groups.

These are some of the suggestions, however, it is appropriate to point out that there are no readymade solutions. The problems of history cannot be resolved in a jiffy. There is a need to evolve a long term strategy to counter communalism and combat communal violence and build a secular society.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Indian social reality is confronted with a new set of issues and challenges posed by changes in the socio-economic formations and developments in politics, culture and religions. The specificity of social institutions like the caste system, religious practices and beliefs, tribal social formations and gender relations throw up phenomena of divergent forms in India. Therefore there is a need to identify issues specific to the Indian context, keeping in view the regional variations. Undoubtedly the social, political and economic priorities do not altogether shift from region to region, but some do.

Therefore, methods and techniques adopted have to emerge on the strength of their capability to interpret and explain diverse social forces acting and reacting on each other. Here exists a gap and the need to develop specific research methods to study phenomenon which are cultural and ideological in nature, but are also typical. These methods must have a built-in interactive thrust. This condition is easy enough to lay down, but indeed very hard to fulfill in actual practice. For it demands a method which can transcend disciplines' boundaries.

The typical nature and complexity of the phenomenon of communalism and communal violence reinforced the need for such a perspective and method. Communalism has deep roots and unseen motivating factors. It does not grow out of a situation naturally, it is encouraged by several factors, each one carefully cultivated by either through concious acts or conscious omissions. The need therefore is not merely to understand the phenomenon to achieve greater clarity, but also to evolve perspectives and shape movements to counter it.

The efforts to evolve perspectives to counter communalism have tried to grapple with the meanings of the terms 'Communalism' and 'secularism'. This is elementary, but difficult. The definitional paradigm of both Communalism and Secularism has religion as a single point locus. The main plank of Communalism is that the political, economic and social interests of a religious group are common and antagonistic to other religious collectivities. Whereas, the main plank of Secularism is that the antagonistic use of religion in politics and economic activities is not desirable. For example, the use of religious symbols like *Ram Rajya* by Gandhiji was against colonial domination. This usage transcended boundaries of caste and religion and it was not projected as synonymous with the 'Hindu identity'. Its main plank was not to accentuate inter-religious group differentiation. No doubt such usage can prepare the ground for communalism, but use of religious symbols in politics per se cannot be termed, communalism.

The tendency of having elements of religion in one's articulation, but not identifying with a particular religion raises a fundamental question; Is or is not secularism a contextual or situational response? This raises another sub-set of questions. Is it possible to draw a scale of persons being less or more secular? In other words, is it possible to measure secularism or communalism.

The recent use of the notion of 'Ram Rajya' was projected and perceived as antithetical to the interests of the members of other religious groups. The meaning attributed to Indian civilization is distorted to mean 'Hindu civilization'. The believers of other religions are projected as culturally inferior, politically and socially aliens. The same symbols which were used by Gandhiji have acquired different meaning, because the forces and individuals appropriating these symbols have a track record which has counterposed religious collectivities.

During Forty years of independence the concerns and sensibilities of politics and society did not appropriate the secular discourse in society. In other words, the areas governed by caste or religious ethics and the politics pursued by the dominant political parties have increasingly become consistent. This provided a larger space and greater scope to political parties to distort and use religious belief systems in politics.

The world of communal segregation has been evolved. The new reality of capitalism does not want communalism, but it needs it. The realities of the path of development, the parameters governing human interactions and pretentious dimension of practice of politics have provided life force to this tendency. The thrust of political leadership is to make capitalism efficient and promise all virtues of socialism to counter people's dissent.

Communalism is one of the instruments of this politics to blur the real contradictions and it derives its life force from the conflicts inherent in the contradictions of the specific form of capitalist development and from the reservoir of mistrust and suspicion prevalent among various religious or caste groups. The co-existence of communalism and capitalism will mainly depend on the choices made by the ruling classes.

Communalism as an ideology provide rationale for over exploitation. It does not merely confine to economic exploitation, but it has got woven into the power structure. It has become respectable and clinical with institutionalisation. The need therefore is to understand communalism in relation to the contemporary reality of the multi-national character of Indian society. The institutionalization of communalism has resulted in the suppression of urges of various sub-nationalities in a vast country like India. The suppression of their urges and ethos in turn are strengthening the forces of

communalism. The vision of making India into a monolithic entity by evolving a canopy culture and producing a colourless homogeneity and, thereby denying its various constituents their democratic rights has provided life force to identify articulations and also to distortions like communalism.

The operative reality of communal discriminations and increasing intolerance within Indian society of diverse religious and cultural streams have necessitated the need for renewal of India rather revival of India. The questioning of the very basis of some of the realities like communalism will make civilization to survive.

Communalism is not merely a state of mind. It is a political ideology. The purpose should be to confront politics and ideology of communalism with a alternate political ideology. But unfortunately this kind of struggle is going by default. There are political parties which are shying away from this struggle and entering into opportunistic alliances with communal forces, and others do not ideologically subscribe to it. In this context, it is necessary not to be taken in by 'anti-formulas'. These are negative and inadequate. 'It is not possible to counter a principle except by producing a superior alternative principle'.

Moving away from the democratic and secular politics shall result in the increasing use of retrogressive tendencies like communalism, casteism and regional chauvinism to deflect cumulative social anger. Like fascism in germany, communalism also appears to be identifying misplaced targets in the event of non-realisation of demands so raised. For example, the anti-capitalist stance of the fascists propagated Jewish usurers or bankers and the petty Jewish merchants to be the exploiters.

"Socialism", Goebbele wrote, can be achieved only in opposition to the Jews, and it is because we want socialism that we are anti-semitic'. `Anti-semitism, which began as a racial prejudice exploited as a demagogic trick, ended in the most abominable genocide of all times'. We are only a step away from fascism. Fascism in Germany first chose Jews as their target of attack and promised socialism after exterminating them for being usurers. Communalism has also chosen its targets.

There is a need for the progressive forces to return to secular and transformational approach, competitive politics with an emphasis on human rights. Therefore, the struggle against communalism,

should identify structural roots which provide life forces to it, but at the same time the practice of communalism must be understood. The struggle against communalism, if launched as a part of the political programme of the struggle of underprivileged sections, will demystify misplaced targets and motives and simultaneously will shape politics on secular and democratic lines. Now question arises, why it cannot be a broader struggle of all forces which are committed to build a secular and democratic society ? This broader struggle while having its basis in transformational course, may not abandon the systematic frame and evolve a synthesis of the two. It is only through struggles it would be possible to question the hegemony of that politics which use communalism and shape an alternate politics.

Appendices

Appendix I

List of Mohallas
MauNath Bhanjan and Azamgarh Towns

Appendix II

List of Mohallas
Ahmedabad and Vadodara Cities

Appendix III

List of Mohallas
Jaipur City

APPENDIX - I

MAUNATH BHANJAN M.B.

Religion-wise Distribution of population

Hindu Majority Mohallas

01	Allauddinpura
02	Astupura
03	Aurangabad
04	Bhanderia Tola
05	Barka Pokhra
06	Brahmin Tola Dakhin
07	Brahmin Tola Uttar
08	Chamar Tola Dakhin
09	Chamar Tola Pacchim
10	Chamr Tola Uttar
11	Dasain Pokhara
12	Ghora Dalal Ki Bari
13	Hassan Makha Sani
14	Hydel Colony
15	Kamharia Bari
16	Kamharia Chhoti
17	Katua Pura Pacchim
18	Katua Pura Purab
19	Khatik Tola Dakhin
20	Khatik Tola Pacchim
21	Khatik Tola Uttar
22	Mata Pokhra
23	Pura Aggarwal
24	Pura Bakshi
25	Pura Balli
26	Pura Chheda
27	Pura Dabgar
28	Pura Dankabir

29 Pura Durjan Rai
30 Pura Mutfarkat
31 Pura Raja Ram
32 Pura Rajputan Dakshin
33 Pura Rajputan Uttar
34 Pura Sahu
35 Pura Sopat
36 Railway Colony
37 Sahadat Pura

Muslim Majority Mohallas

38 Bulaqi Pura
39 Bazar Mandi
40 Bhikhari Pura
41 Bhoj Mamnan Awwal
42 Bhoj Mamnan Doyam
43 Biswa Nath Pura
44 Chandpura
45 Chhattar Pura
46 Chittan Pura
47 Domanpura I
48 Domapura II
49 Fakhruddinpura
50 Ghasipura
51 Hafizabad
52 Hasan Makha Awwal
53 Hasan Lala
54 Husainpura
55 Ibrahimpura
56 Islampura
57 Jahan Ashiq
58 Jamal Ashiq

59	Jamalpura
60	Kadi Pura
61	Kasim Pura
62	Katra
63	Madan Pura
64	Mahmood Pura
65	Mallik Tahir Pura
66	Malik Tola
67	Mirza Hadipura
68	Mirza Mehdi
69	Momin Pura
70	Madan Pura
71	Moghal Pura
72	Mustafabad
73	Nawa Pura (West)
74	Nawa Pura (East)
75	Niyaz Mohammad Pura
76	Pahar Nathan
77	Pahar Pura
78	Pathan Tola
79	Pura Baz
80	Bharhoo
81	Pura Bhikhan
82	Pura Bindu Rai
83	Pura Chhanga
84	Pura Farid
85	Pura Gulab Rai
86	Pura Jahan
87	Pura Khushal Rai
88	Pura Luchhi Ram
89	Pura Mian
90	Pura Nizam
91	Pura Pema Rai
92	Pura Ram Salha

93	Pyarepura
94	Qasimpura
95	Qazi Damanpura
96	Qazi Mubarak
97	Qazi Tola
98	Raghunathpura
99	Rasul Pura
100	Sheikh Damunpura
101	Takiya Imam Bara

Mixed Mohallas

102	Allahdadpura
103	Hathi Madari
104	Jaddu Ki Mandi
105	Mohsinpura
106	Pura Biru Rai
107	Pura Harkesh
108	Sari Kohna
109	Yusuf Pura

MAUNATH BHANJAN M.B.

Riot-hit Mohallas

Sr. No.	Name of Mohalla	Location Number	Year of the Riot or Communal Incident
01	Pathan Tola	78	1969,1980 1983,1984
02	Raghunathpura	98	1984
03	Pura Dankabir	28	1984
04	Ghora Dalal Ki Bari	12	1980
05	Pura Cheda	26	1983,1984
06	Aurangabad	3	1983, 1984
07	Mirza Hadipura	67	1983
08	Malik Tahir Pura	65	1969

Sensitive Mohallas

01	Ghas Bazar	50
02	Rajputana South	32
03	Idgah Chowk	12,3,26
04	Sahadatpura and Munshpura	37
05	Pura Bhikkan (Sanskrit Patshala)	81

AZAMGARH M.B.

Religion-wise Distribution of Population

Hindu Majority Mohallas

01	Arazi Baghat
02	Asif Ganj
03	Anant Pura
04	Ailwal
05	Balrampur
06	Belsya
07	Bazar Pande
08	Civil Lines
09	Choti Naroali
10	Dal Singer
11	Kartarpur
12	Khattri Tola
13	Kurmi Tola
14	Kundigarh
15	Mukeri Ganj
16	Matber Ganj
17	Marya
18	Museypur
19	Naroali
20	Pura Jodhi
21	Palani
22	Qalin Ganj
23	Raidopur
24	Sita Ram
25	Sada Varti
26	Sidhari I
27	Sidhari II

Muslim Majority Mohallas

28	Kot
29	Pura Gulami
30	Takia

Mixed Mohallas

31	Badarga
32	Baj Bahadur
33	Chakala
34	Farrash Tola
35	Guru Tola
36	Jalandhari
37	Katra
38	Nala Dharmu
39	Pahar Pur

APPENDIX - II

AHMEDABAD CITY

S.No.	List of Hindu Majority Mohallas
1.	Amdupura
2.	Astodia
3.	Astodiagate
4.	Ambaji Mata
5.	Azad Society
6.	Ayojan Nagar
7.	Asarwa
8.	Bhistibad
9.	Bhadra
10.	Bapu Nagar (North)
11.	Bombay Housing
12.	Braham Bhatt
13.	Bhakta Dhola Road
14.	Chand Lodia
15.	Changispur
16.	Chhada-wad
17.	Dhalika Pole
18.	Dhinkra
19.	Dudeshwar
20.	Dhalgawad
21.	Dariapurgate
22.	Daria Khan
23.	Fatehpur
24.	Ghee Kanta
25.	Gomtipur
26.	Gulbai
27.	Ghodasar
28.	Hardasnagar
29.	Housing Colony I
30.	Housing Colony II
31.	Institute of Management
32.	Jahagirpura

33. Jaganath Road
34. Jaganath Mandir
35. Khanpur
36. Kagdapeeth
37. Khan Bhai
38. Khamasa
39. Kankaria
40. Kalupur gate
41. Khadia
42. Kochrab
43. Khokara Mehamdabad
44. Kali
45. Lal Darwaza
46. Lal Bhai
47. Manak Baug Society
48. Madhupur
49. Mani Nagar
50. Manju Shree
51. Manipur
52. Manik Chowk
53. Naginawad
54. New Wadaj
55. Navrangpura
56. Narangpura
57. New Housing Colony
58. Old Wadaj
59. Autheshwar
60. Prem Darwaja
61. Patel Mill
62. Rai Khad
63. Relief Road
64. Raipur
65. Kaliwad
66. Ranipur
67. Rasala lane
68. Raipur Mill
69. Station Road
70. Shahpur
71. Shaher Koda
72. Sarangpur

73. Shahi Bagh
74. Sardar patel Colony
75. Surkhej Road
76. Sheikhpur (Khanpur)
77. Shreyas
78. Sabarmati
79. Usmanpur
80. Vadigodn
81. Vasna
82. Vikasgrih
83. Zaveriwad
84. Vasna (J.P.)
85. Narangpur (J.P.)
86. Bapu Nagar (South)

List of Muslim Majority Mohallas

87. Beheran Pura
88. Chandan Talavdi
89. Cheepa Wad
90. Chandola (J.P.)
91. Dabgarwad
92. Daryapur Chakla
93. Dandia Wad
94. Delhi Gate
95. Deoji Pura
96. Do Masjid
97. Domidi Wad
98. Ellis Bridge (J.P.)
99. Haram Wali Pole
100. Haveli
101. Jagannath Ji Road
102. Jama Masjid
103. Jamalpur
104. Jamalpur Chakla
105. Kalupur Chakla
106. Karinie Cheepa
107. Kanch Ki Masjid
108. Kasaiwad
109. Kazipur Kagdiwad

110. Lal Baba Ka Tiba
111. Mirzapur
112. Momnabad
113. Moti Ali Pole
114. Nagina Masjid
115. Nagina Pole
116. Nariawad
117. Panch Pipli
118. Qadri Mohalla
119. Rajpur Hamirpur (U.P.)
120. Rakhial (J.P.)
121. Sarki Wad
122. Shah Aligam Dhami
123. Taar Ki Seri
124. Vaish Sabha
125. Nagoriwad

List of Mixed Mohallas

126. Amaria Wad (J.P.)
127. Amba Wadi
128. Asarwa Extension (South) (J.P.)
129. Asarwa Extension (North) (J.P.)
130. Bazar Khan
131. Delhi Chakla
132. Ghodasar
133. Halim Ki Khirki
134. Jamalpur Road
135. Mirzapur Road
136. Paldi (J.P.)
137. Panch Kuan Darwaza
138. Panch Kuan
139. Rakhial
140. Rokadia Hanuman
141. Saraspur
142. Shaher Kotada
143. Shahibagh
144. Teen Darwaza
145. Zhulta Minar

AHMEDABAD CITY

80.	Vadigam	Hindu Majority
115.	Nagina Pole	Muslim Majority
40.	Kalupur Gate	Hindu Majority
131.	Delhi Chakla	Mixed
21.	Dariapur Gate	Hindu Majority
62.	Rai Khad	Hindu Majority
63.	Relief Road	Hindu Majority
70.	Shahpur	Hindu Majority
91.	Dabgarwad	Muslim Majority
145.	Zulta Minar	Mixed
144.	Teen Darwaza	Mixed
88.	Chandan Talvadi	Muslim Majority
52.	Manik Chowk	Hindu Majority
105.	Kalupur Chakla	Muslim Majority
93.	Dandiwad	Muslim Majority
125.	Nagoriwad	Muslim Majority
135.	Mirzapur Road	Mixed
72.	Sarangpur	Hindu Majority
10.	Bapu Nagar	Hindu Majority
141.	Saraspur	Mixed

AHMEDABAD CITY

SENSITIVE AREAS

99.	Haramvali Pole	Muslim Majority
133.	Halim Ki Khirth	Mixed
53.	Naginawad	Hindu Majority
25.	Gomtipur	Hindu Majority
19.	Dedeshwar	Hindu Majority
24.	Ghee Kanta	Hindu Majority
45.	Lal Darwaza	Hindu Majority
60.	Prem Darwaza	Hindu Majority
20.	Dhalgawad	Hindu Majority
89.	Cheepawad	Muslim Majority
94.	Delhi Gate	Muslim Majority
100.	Haveli	Muslim Majority
103.	Jamalpur	Muslim Majority
111.	Mirzapir	Muslim Majority
117.	Punch Pipli	Muslim Majority
137.	Punch Kuan	Mixed
121.	Sarkiwad (Shahpur)	Muslim Majority

BARODA

S.NO.	NAME OF HINDU MAJORITY MOHALLAS
1.	Abhilasha Society
2.	Ahmedabadi Pole
3.	Alembic Colony
4.	Ambra Kunj
5.	Anand Nagar
6.	Ansantosh Nagar
7.	Atledra
8.	Atmajyote
9.	Avdhut Nagar
10.	Azad Nagar
11.	Babanpur
12.	Bakra Wadi
13.	Bakrq Maharashtrian Society
14.	Bhoi Wada
15.	Wadi Wadi
16.	B M C Quarter
17.	Bhesana
18.	Basajipura
19.	Brampuri
20.	Champanergate
21.	Chandania Pole
22.	Chaunkhandi
23.	Chitra Nagar
24.	Dandia
25.	Dhaiber Colony
26.	Dairy
27.	Danteshwar
28.	Dodsal
29.	Delix Society
30.	Fatihgunj
31.	Gajar Wadi
32.	Giri Raaj colony
33.	Gantiyan Pole
34.	Goyagate
35.	Girya Baipaga

36. GIDC Colony
37. Garnala
38. Gotri
39. Housing Board
40. Hari Om Nagar
41. Indira Nagar
42. Industrial Colony
43. Jawahar Chowk
44. Junigheri
45. Jubli Bang
46. Jyoti
47. Kokan Phalia
48. Kaptan Road
49. Kumharwad
50. Kothi
51. KAchya Pole
52. Khanderao
53. Kishanwadi
54. Kothi
55. Mangal Bazar
56. M.G. Road
57. Mehta Pole
58. Mandi
59. Maidan Phalia
60. Manishal
61. Makarpura
62. Maneja Colony
63. Mukti Nagar
64. Meri Mata
65. Maratha Mohalla
66. Majalpur
67. Navjeevan Society
68. Nava Bazar
69. Nursy Ji Pole
70. Panjara Pole
71. Pallargate
72. Pira Mittla
73. Patel Pole

74. Postal Colony
75. Pratap Gunj
76. Panchwate
77. Rannurkteshwar
78. Raopura
79. Railway Colony
80. Rokbad Mais
81. Ram Barg Society
82. Sujapura
83. Shivaji Road
84. Siya Bang
85. Sadar Chowk
86. Sharad Nagar
87. Shanti Nagar
88. Sapra
89. Sanjay Society
90. Sudama Society
91. Suidh Bai Mata Road
92. Shanker Society
93. Skandy
94. Sangar Society
95. Savad
96. Sama
97. Subhapura
98. Syed Vasna
99. Tyagraj Nagar
100. Tagore Road Market
101. Udai Nagar
102. Vidhyadham
103. Vishwamitri
104. Varsa Colony
105. Vadasar
106. Varai Mata

Muslim Majority Mohallas

107. Badri Mohalla
108. Bira Nagar
109. Bohra Colony

110. Cheepawada
111. Mee Mandi
112. Jahangirpura
113. Lehripura
114. Lal Bang
115. Memon Colony
116. Mughalpura
117. Machhiputh
118. Navapura
119. Nizampura
120. Nazar Baugh
121. Pansion Pura
122. Panigate
123. Sultanpura
124. Tandelja

Mixed Mohallas

125. Barampura
126. Bhadra
127. Gunaj Khana
128. Haramkhana
129. Jagotri
130. Gorwa
131. Kalupura
132. Kohli Phata
133. Nagarwada
134. Swami Narayan Temple
135. Idgat
136. Nagapurawadi
137. Jetalpura
138. Wadi

APPENDIX - III

LIST OF CLUSTERS
JAIPUR CITY
(A) Muslim Majority Mohallas

CLUSTER NO. 1

S.No.	Location Code No.	Name of the Mohalla
1.	1	Khawasji Ka Rasta
2.	2	Neelgaron Ka Rasta
3.	3	Phuta Khura
4.	16	Panni Garann Mohalla
5.	17	Rasta Sularton
6.	69	Chelon Ka Mohalla
7.	86	Vijay Mahal
8.	88	Jal Mahal
9.	90	Karbala
10.	91	Hazi Colony
11.	96	Badri Nath Ji Ki Dungri
12.	97	Gobind Nagar (East)
13.	99	Gobind Puri
14.	100	Bas Badan Pura
15.	108	Badanpura Fakiron Ki Doongri

CLUSTER NO. 2

16.	35	Ghat Darwaza Bazar
17.	43	Minerva Cinema Area
18.	51	Ghat Gate
19.	52	Pahar Ganj Ka Rasta
20.	56	Chokri Top Khana Hazuri
21.	57	Thakur Gij Ghar Ka Rasta
22.	58	Bala Ji Ki Kothi Ka Rasta
23.	60	Loharon Ka Khura
24.	61	Rasta Machhi Bazar
25.	64	Police Lines Ke Piche Ka Rasta or Amagarh Road

CLUSTER NO.3

26.	121	Raja Shiv Das Ji Ka Rasta
27.	178	Jalupura
28.	179	Paroji Ka Bag Jayanti Market
29.	194	Moti Dungri Road, Slaughter House
30.	208	Fateh Tiba

B: Mixed Localities

CLUSTER NO.4

31.	4	Jagannath Shah Ka Khura
32.	5	Sierhe Deodi Bazar
33.	8	Moti Katla Bazar
34.	10	Ghora Nikas Road
35.	11	Nahar Wara
36.	12	Mohalla Sikaran
37.	15	Ramganj Bazar
38.	76	Amer Road
39.	79	New Amar Road
40.	83	Khandar Ka Rasta
41.	84	Ganga Pole Road
42.	85	Ganga Pole Gate
43.	92	Hazari Burj

CLUSTER NO. 5

44.	34	Purani Kotwali Ka Rasta
45.	41	Mehron Ka Rasta
46.	53	Suraj Pole Bazar
47.	54	Bala Ji Ka Rasta
48.	55	Kumharon Ka Rasta

CLUSTER NO. 6

49.	23	Kishanpole Bazar
50.	50	Telipara Ka Rasta
51.	117	Nahargarh Road(Nilgran Ki Basti)
52.	125	Nahri Ka Naka
53.	126	Top Khana Ka Rasta
54.	127	Ninder Rao Ji Ka Rasta
55.	128	Kalyan Ji Ka Rasta
56.	129	Bhindo Ka Rasta
57.	130	Khajana Walon Ka Rasta
58.	131	Khejdon Ka Rasta
59.	132	Tehbil Daron Ka Rasta (Baba Harish Chander Marg)
60.	137	Tikkey Walon Ka Rasta
61.	138	Indira Bazar Area
62.	139	New Colony
63.	173	Nahri Ka Naka Scheme

(C) Hindu Majority Mohallas

CLUSTER NO. 7

64.	6	Bhaton Ka Rasta
65.	7	Moti Katla Bazar (A)
66.	9	Moti Katla Bazar (B)
67.	13	Chankya Marg
68.	14	Ladlyji Ka Rasta
69.	18	Dhava Ji Ka Rasta
70.	67	Raja Mal Ka Talab
71.	68	Sindhi Colony
72.	73	Old Amer Road
73.	74	Harijan Quarters
74.	75	Madho Bilas Area
75.	77	Santosh Sagar
76.	80	Chowkri Gangapole
77.	82	Bandri Kc Nasik Ka Rasta

78.	87	Dashera Kothi
79.	89	Moti Katla
80.	93	Kagdiwara
81.	94	Gujjar Ghatti
82.	95	Parsu Ram Dwara
83.	98	Gobind Nagar (West)
84.	101	Badan Pura
85.	102	Lakshmi Narayanpuri
86.	103	Hida Ki Mori
87.	104	Mandi Khetikan
88.	105	Mandi Dekotan
89.	106	Bagichi Jat Ji Ki
90.	107	Mohalla Rehgran

CLUSTER NO. 8

91.	33	Johri Bazar
92.	36	Haldion Ka Rasta
93.	37	Ghee Walon Ka Rasta
94.	38	Moti Singh Bhomia Ka Rasta
95.	39	Kundi Gharon Ke Bheron Ka Rasta
96.	40	Mani Ram Ji Ki Kothi Ka Rasta
97.	42	Math Ke Kue Ka Rasta
98.	59	Gangori Bazar
99.	62	Rasta Sumer Karanji Ka
100.	63	Babu Ka Tiba

CLUSTER NO. 9

101.	19	Maniharon Ka Rasta
102.	20	Chaura Rasta
103.	21	Nehru Bazar
104.	22	Tripolia Bazar
105.	24	Modi Khana
106.	25	Thatheron Ka Rasta
107.	26	Natanion Ka Rasta
108.	27	Lalji Sandh Ka Rasta
109.	28	Churkon Ka Rasta

110.	29	Rasta Radha Damodar Ki Galli
111.	30	Ajab Ghar Ka Rasta
112.	31	Bordi Ka Rasta
113.	32	Film Colony
114.	44	Bapu Bazar
115.	45	Vidhya Dhar Ji Ka Rasta
116.	46	Hanuman Ji Ka Rasta
117.	47	Gopal Ji Ka Rasta
118.	48	Jarion Ka Rasta
119.	49	Sauthli Walon Ka Rasta
120.	78	Purani Basti
121.	109	Brahampuri
122.	110	Chandpole Bazar
123.	111	Balanandji Ka Rasta
124.	112	Uniara Rao Ji Ka Rasta
125.	113	Bagru Walon Ka Rasta
126.	114	Jat Lal Munshi Ka Rasta
127.	115	Jai Lal Munshi Ka Rasta
128.	116	Gobind Rajon Ka Rasta
129.	118	Dinanath Ji Ka Rasta
130.	119	Gunge Behron Ka Rasta
131.	120	Barion Ka Barh
132.	122	Gulab Behron Ka Rasta
133.	123	Bordi Ke Kuen Ka Rasta
134.	124	Kachhi Basti Harijan
135.	133	Miser Raja Ji Ka Rasta
136.	134	Jhalanion Ka Rasta
137.	135	Takkar Mal Ka Rasta
138.	136	Khunteton Ka Rasta
139.	140	Zobnier
140.	141	Kantinagar
141.	142	Barodia Basti
142.	143	San Colony
143.	144	Between Kabir Marg to Durga Pura Marg(Ganga Pat, Basant Marg, Dapabali Marg, Bahiti Marg).
144.	145	Between Durga Marg Road to Jaisingh Highway Road, Devi Marg (Banipark Colony).

145.	146	Bihari Marg, Tulsi Marg, Tagore-Path, Collectorate.
146.	147	Between Bhashkar Marg and Tulsi Marg
147.	148	Sindhi Colony, Baraf Karkhana Road to Power House Road, I.T.I. Gurudwara Road.
148.	149	Labour Colony or Indira Colony
149.	150	Sindhi Colony
150.	151	Between Kalidass Marg to Madho Singh Marg Road.
151.	152	Between Madho Singh Marg to Hathi Babu Marg.
152.	153	Between Hathi Babu Marg to Shiv Marg Between Todarmal Marg to Nirman Marg(Pital Factory and Meera Marg)
153.	154	Todar Mal Marg to Jai Singh Highway Circle.
154.	155	Between Kanti Chand to Shiv Marg
155.	156	Pareek College Scout Head Quarters
156.	157	Subhash Nagar
157.	158	Ram Nagar
158.	159	Saitan Singh Colony
159.	160	Bhattha Basti
160.	161	Housing Board Colony
161.	162	Nawan Jallu Pura
162.	163	J.P.Colony (Jaiprakash Narayan Colony)
163.	164	Ambawari
164.	165	Prem Nagar
165.	166	Bassi Sita Rampura
166.	167	Khatipura
167.	168	Vidya Dhar Nagar
168.	169	Marlipura
169.	170	Shastri Nagar

170.	171	Swaran Kar Colony
171.	172	Jhotwara
172.	174	Inspector Schools, Mamya Cinema's left Portion.
173.	175	Park House, Ram Nagar Colony
174.	176	Gopalwari, Lalwari Scheme
175.	177	Chandpole Mandi
176.	180	Civil Lines (Sudarshanpura Factory Area Patel Nagar).
177.	181	Katchi Basti Asam Gate
178.	182	Ram Nagar Colony
179.	183	Sodala
180.	184	Jamuna Nagar, Laxmi Nagar
181.	185	Hasanpura
182.	186	'C' Scheme Area Quarters
183.	187	Area in Civil Line Zone
184.	188	Hawa Sarak

CLUSTER NO. 10

185.	189	Bajaj Nagar (Harizan Colony)
186.	190	Bapu Nagar
187.	191	Kanoto Uniara Bag
188.	192	Moti Doongri Road, Ram Niwas, Gangwal Park, Wali Garden.
189.	193	Amritpuri
190.	195	Bhomia Ki Chhappari Ke Ass Pass Part of Adarsh Nagar
191.	196	Frontiers Colony, Teneja Block (Adarsh Nagar)
192.	197	Guru Nanakpura(Punjabis & Sindi Hindu Majority).
193.	198	Tilaknagar
194.	200	Raja Park, Ram Galian (Adarsh Nagar)

195.	201	Sindhi Colony (Adarsh Nagar)
196.	202	Purana Ghat, Agra Road, Golecha Garden
197.	203	Janata Colony
198.	204	Sethi Colony (Mental Hospital)
199.	205	Patrakar Colony
200.	206	Jawahar Nagar
201.	207	Truck Stand
202.	209	Gandhi Nagar

Other Areas

203.	65	Temple Govind Ji
204.	66	City Palace
205.	70	Jalebi Chowk
206.	71	Town Hall
207.	72	Hawa Mahal
208.	199	University of Rajasthan Campus
209.	81	Outside Zorawar Singh Gate

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